People v. Tanner
| Citation | 387 Mich. 683,199 N.W.2d 202 |
| Decision Date | 26 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 4,4 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Richard Lawrence TANNER, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Michigan |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Department, Luvenia D. Dockett, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellee.
Norman L. Zemke, P.C., Detroit, for defendant-appellant.
Before the Entire Bench.
Charged with first degree murder, defendant pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the fifth day of trial. He was thereafter sentenced to serve 14 years, 11 months to 15 years in prison. The Court of Appeals denied defendant's application for leave January 6, 1971. We granted leave. 384 Mich. 825 (1971).
Defendant presents three issues for review which attack the sentence imposed as: (1) an abuse of discretion; (2) cruel or unusual punishment; and (3) a violation of due process.
By their 1902 amendment of the Constitution of 1850, the people first provided the legislature with the power to establish indeterminate sentences following the Supreme Court's holding in People v. Cummings, 88 Mich. 249, 50 N.W. 310 (1891), that any such power must be established in the organic law. Subsequent to that amendment, in People v. Cook, 147 Mich. 127, 110 N.W. 514 (1907), the Court referred to and adopted the reasoning of the minority opinion in In re Manaca, 146 Mich. 697, 110 N.W. 75 (1906), wherein Justice Moore laid to rest all questions of the constitutionality of indeterminate sentencing. We likewise hold that our present indeterminate sentence act is not constitutionally infirm as providing cruel or unusual punishment or as denying due process.
Defendant's remaining issue concerns the application of the statute to his sentence. Generally, in the past, this Court has refused to review sentences in any context, typically observing, as in People v. Guillett, 342 Mich. 1, 9, 69 N.W.2d 140, 144 (1955), that:
'It is sufficient to say that the sentence was within the maximum provided by statute.'
Even in People v. Murray, 72 Mich. 10, 17, 40 N.W. 29 (1888), though the Court opined that the 23-year-old defendant's sentence of 50 years for carnal knowledge of a female under 14 was excessive as unwarranted by the record, and all agreed that the trial court had abused its discretion in so pronouncing sentence, a new trial was ordered for other reasons.
In other cases presenting the question, we find a number of examples of questionable sentencing. In reviewing the sentencing in this case, we begin with the observations of Justice Carpenter in In re Campbell, 138 Mich. 597, 599, 101 N.W. 826 (1904), which, though addressed to the indeterminate sentence act of 1903, 1 have relevance to our present discussion:
(Emphasis added.)
Though the question comes to us couched in terms of abuse of discretion, it clearly involves, and we address ourselves to, the purely legal proposition of whether defendant's sentence is in fact 'indeterminate' as contemplated by the provisions of M.C.L.A. §§ 769.8 and 769.9; M.S.A. §§ 28.1080 and 28.1081.
The three cases popularly raised in sentencing appeals are: People v. Earegood, 12 Mich.App. 256, 162 N.W.2d 802 (1968), rev'd 383 Mich. 82, 173 N.W.2d 205 (1970); People v. Lessard, 22 Mich.App. 342, 177 N.W.2d 208 (1970); and People v. Snow, 26 Mich.App. 510, 182 N.W.2d 820 (1970), aff'd 386 Mich. 586, 194 N.W.2d 314 (1972).
People v. Earegood, supra, while dealing with discretionary abuses in sentencing practice, actually turned on constitutional issues. The Court criticized the systematic discretionary abuse, and held that the exercise of a constitutional right may not properly by considered in sentencing.
People v. Lessard, supra, is more in point to the issue at hand. Defendants Lessard and Schultz both received sentences which had the minimum set one day short of the maximum pursuant to the trial court's declared new sentencing policy. The Court of Appeals remanded for new sentencing on the basis that the trial court had failed to exercise its discretion in pronouncing sentence. Note the Court did not hold the sentences imposed to be determinate and thereby in conflict with M.C.L.A. § 769.8; M.S.A. § 28.1080.
People v. Snow, supra, was decided on the same basis as People v. Earegood, supra. The question of compliance with the indeterminate sentence act was neither presented nor considered.
Having before us a plethora of cases involving sentences with a period of but 30 days between minimum and maximum, we are constrained to observe that though technically providing some period, though brief, within which the correction authorities may exercise the discretion vested in them by the legislature, such sentences fail to comply with the clear intent and purpose of the indeterminate sentence act.
We recognize that by virtue of the regular good time provision alone the defendant herein might actually serve a minimum of only 10 years, 9 months and 12 days. However, we are of the opinion that a sentence either does or does not comply with the indeterminate sentence act, irrespective of the effect of special remedial provisions such as those granting regular and special good time. 2 We note in this context that the American Bar Association's minimum standards for criminal justice, 3.2(c)(iii), reads:
'In order to preserve the principle of indeterminacy, the court should not be authorized to impose a minimum sentence which exceeds one-third of the maximum sentence actually imposed;'.
However, we need not adopt this American Bar Association recommendation literally. Michigan's statutory provisions relating to regular and special good time credits in conjunction with the rule we hereby adopt today fairly approximates the objective of the American Bar Association's minimum standards 3.2(c)(iii).
Thus, turning to the precise proposition involved, we are convinced that 30 days is not a sufficient interval of time to guarantee that the corrections authorities will be able to exercise their jurisdiction or judgment with any practicality. The net effect of such severe judicial limitation on indeterminate sentencing is to frustrate the intended effect of indeterminate sentencing.
Convinced as we are, that a sentence with too short an interval between minimum and maximum is not indeterminate, we hold that any sentence which provides for a minimum exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to comply with the indeterminate sentence act.
Of course this holding has no application to sentencing under statutes by which the only punishment prescribed is imprisonment for life, or those providing for a mandatory minimum. See, M.C.L.A. § 769.9; M.S.A. § 28.1081.
Based upon the principles analyzed and discussed in People v. Hampton, 384 Mich. 669, 187 N.W.2d 404 (1971), we hold that the decision herein is prospectively limited to those cases in which sentence in to be or has been imposed after date of filing of this opinion and to those cases which on date of filing of this opinion are pending on appeal and which have properly raised and preserved the issue for appeal. Sentences imposed prior to date of this decision and not pending on appeal upon properly preserved specific issue shall not be affected by the rule herein adopted.
Defendant's sentence is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing in accordance herewith.
Defendant was convicted upon his plea of guilty to the crime of manslaughter.
M.C.L.A. § 750.321; M.S.A. § 28.553, provides:
A sentence upon first conviction of manslaughter is controlled by the indeterminate sentence statute; M.C.L.A. § 769.8; M.S.A. § 28.1080:
The issue here is whether the sentence imposed of 14 years 11 months minimum to 15 years maximum is a sentence authorized by law. The majority do not conclude that the sentence is cruel or unusual or violative of due process.
Nothing in the briefs or arguments before this Court would suggest any claim that the sentence was appropriate in light of ...
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People v. Wilkins
...of 41/2 to 5 years violated the indeterminate sentence act, M.C.L.A. § 769.8; M.S.A. § 28.1080, as interpreted by People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972). The trial court construed the statute as inapplicable to the defendant because of his three prior felony convictions. The......
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Duffy v. State
...exceeding two-thirds of the maximum is improper as failing to comply with the indeterminate sentence act." People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202, 204-205 (1972). Under this judicially promulgated law governing sentences, the court of appeals reduced a 35-50 year sentence to 33 1/2......
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People v. Mitchell
...the more pointless. 1 We do not reach defendant's claim that the trial court erred in modifying the sentence under People v. Tanner, 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972). The issue was not preserved below. Moreover, we agree with the Court of Appeals that pointing out what appeared at the t......
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State v. Delaoz
...a sentence under that state's indeterminate sentencing law in People v. Tanner, and we find its analysis particularly useful. 387 Mich. 683, 199 N.W.2d 202 (1972). In that case, the defendant appealed his sentence of a minimum term of fourteen years and eleven months and a maximum term of f......