People v. Tapia
Citation | 181 Cal.Rptr. 382,129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 |
Decision Date | 02 February 1982 |
Docket Number | Cr. A |
Court | United States Superior Court (California) |
Parties | 129 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Rose Katherine Diane TAPIA, Defendant and Respondent. 19143. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California |
Norwood, Holtz, Patterson & Cohen and Fred M. Cohen, El Monte, for defendant and respondent.
John K. Van De Kamp, Dist. Atty., Arnold T. Guminski and Sterling S. Suga, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and appellant.
Defendant Rose Katherine Diane Tapia was arraigned on a charge of violating Penal Code, section 484, subdivision (a) (petty theft), and trial was set for June 4, 1981. On May 4, 1981, upon defendant's motion and over the objection of the prosecutor, the court ordered that defendant be "diverted pursuant to section 1001 Penal Code for a period of one year," upon stated conditions. The People appeal. 1
The People contend that Penal Code sections 1001 through 1001.11 do not provide a general grant of power to the trial judge, over objection of the prosecutor, to divert a defendant from the criminal justice system, absent a state, county or municipally mandated diversion program. 2 We agree and reverse the order.
Prior to enactment of Penal Code sections 1001 through 1001.11 (Stats. 1977, ch. 574, §§ 2 and 3) as chapter 2.7 of title 6 of part 2 of the Penal Code ( ), there were in existence two statutorily mandated diversion programs. In 1972, the Legislature had enacted sections 1000 through 1000.5 of the Penal Code as Chapter 2.5 of the same title. 3 (Chapter 2.5.) Chapter 2.5 authorized pretrial diversion of persons accused of certain drug-related offenses. 4 It established criteria for eligibility (§ 1000, subd. (a), subsects. (1) through (6)) and procedures to be followed. (§§ 1000, subd. (b), 1000.1, 1000.2, 1000.3, and 1000.5.)
Also in effect were sections 13201, 13201.5 and 13352.5 of the Vehicle Code, authorizing postjudgment avoidance of some of the consequences of a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, when the court has certified to the Department of Motor Vehicles that the defendant has consented to participate in a public or private program for the supervision of alcoholism. (Pen.Code, § 13352.5.)
In People v. Municipal Court (Gelardi) (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 692, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30, the Court of Appeal reviewed a practice of several judges of the Municipal Court for the Central Judicial District of Marin County. Pursuant to it, judges at a pretrial conference, over the objection of the People, would continue the case for six months or a year and in the interim place defendant on "probation," with the promise that if he fulfilled the terms of the probation, at the end of the period the case would be dismissed pursuant to Penal Code, section 1385. In granting an extraordinary writ to invalidate this practice, the Court of Appeal stated:
(84 Cal.App.3d at p. 698, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30.)
The Court of Appeal noted that in People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 120 Cal.Rptr. 65, 533 P.2d 193, our Supreme Court had spoken against the use of Penal Code, section 1385, to effectuate a plea bargain between defense counsel and the court made over the objections of the People. Quoting from Orin it said:
" ...' ...
" " (Ibid., 84 Cal.App.3d at pp. 698-699, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30.) 5
A second reason given by the Court of Appeal in Gelardi for invalidating the municipal court practice under review was that the lengthy continuance afforded a defendant to implement the judicially created "diversion" practice was directly contrary to the legislative policy stated in Penal Code section 1050. That section states that "... all proceedings in criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest possible time." and further, "... both the people and the defendant have the right to an expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both the prosecution and the defense, to expedite such proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice ...." (84 Cal.App.3d pp. 699-700, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30.)
As a third reason, the Court of Appeal pointed to the pretrial diversion procedures established by Penal Code sections 1000 et seq., as expressing a legislative policy of preempting the field of diversion.
Gelardi was concerned with events occurring prior to the effective date of sections 1001-1001.11 of the Penal Code. The opinion, however, contains this dictum:
(pp. 700-701, 149 Cal.Rptr. 30.)
From Gelardi it is clear, therefore, that prior to enactment of Chapter 2.7, trial courts had no authority to institute, over the objection of the prosecution, diversion proceedings, except as permitted by Chapter 2.5 and by sections 13201, 13201.5 and 13352.5 of the Vehicle Code. Defendant maintains, however, that by Chapter 2.7, it was the intention of the Legislature to enact a general diversion statute, available to judges of the municipal court, and applicable to all persons except those specifically excluded under other statutes. She points to a published opinion of the Attorney General as supporting that interpretation. We believe, however, that neither the legislative history, the wording of the sections comprising Chapter 2.7, nor their context with other statutes in pari materia supports that interpretation.
Chapter 2.7 was enacted as an urgency measure for the stated reason:
The unpublished opinion to which reference was made was requested with regard to a local diversion program in effect in Sacramento County. Although we have not been provided with details of the program, it appears to have been one sanctioned by the court, the district attorney and the defense bar for certain selected minor offenses. The deputy attorney general who authored the opinion concluded that the program was invalid because the Legislature, in enacting Chapter 2.5 and section 13201 et seq. of the Vehicle Code, had intended to preempt the field of diversion. He based this conclusion upon one of the grounds stated in Gelardi for invalidating the Marin County program. Having found the Sacramento County program invalid on that ground, it was unnecessary for the deputy to consider if it was deficient in any other respect.
The intention of the Legislature in enacting Chapter 2.7 is stated in section 1001 of the Penal Code as follows:
In sections 1001.3 through 1001.9 of Chapter 2.7, the Legislature established a series of procedural requirements for eligibility of persons for and their participation in a pretrial...
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