People v. Taylor

• Jurisdiction: Illinois,United States
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Shaun N. TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Citation: 2023 IL 128316,220 N.E.3d 1034,468 Ill.Dec. 255
• Decision Date: 18 May 2023
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Docket Number: Docket No. 128316

2023 IL 128316

220 N.E.3d 1034

468 Ill.Dec. 255

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee,

v.Shaun N. TAYLOR, Appellant.

Docket No. 128316

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Filed May 18, 2023

James E. Chadd, State Appellate Defender, Thomas A. Karalis and Santiago A. Durango, Deputy Defenders, and Dimitri Golfis, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellant.

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katherine M. Doersch and Nicholas Moeller, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

JUSTICE ROCHFORDdelivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1DefendantShaun N. Taylor was convicted of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, plus an additional 20 years’ imprisonment for using a firearm during the commission of the offense.The Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

2022 IL App (3d) 190281, 456 Ill.Dec. 922, 194 N.E.3d 41.This court allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal.Ill.S. Ct. R. 315(eff. Oct. 1, 2021).For the following reasons, we affirm the appellate court's judgment.

¶ 2 FACTS

¶ 3 On October 15, 2017, Illinois State TrooperAndrew Scott stopped defendant on Interstate 80 due to an obstructed windshield.Scott approached defendant's vehicle, identified himself as an Illinois State Trooper, and informed defendant that he was going to give him a warning.While Scott was preparing the warning, another officer arrived with a canine unit.That officer walked the canine around defendant's vehicle, and the canine alerted.Scott and the other officer asked defendant to exit his car.Defendant refused and sped off.

¶ 4Defendant exited the interstate at the first available exit and ultimately parked his vehicle on a country road.Defendant then grabbed two weapons that he was carrying in his vehicle, an AR-15, semiautomatic rifle and a .40-caliber handgun.Defendant took up a hidden position in a cornfield directly across from his vehicle.Scott found defendant's vehicle shortly thereafter but did not approach the vehicle because he could see the vehicle was not occupied.Scott parked his squad car approximately 60 yards from defendant's vehicle, with the front of his squad car facing the front of defendant's vehicle.Scott exited his squad car and moved to a spot behind it.Defendant then fired 23 shots in Scott's direction with the AR-15 rifle.Scott was unharmed.Law enforcement officers then pursued defendant, who surrendered several hours later.

¶ 5Defendant was charged with one count of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties ( 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1)(West 2016)) and one count of aggravated discharge of a firearm (id.§ 24-1.2(a)(3)).Prior to defendant's trial, the trial court appointed Dr. Kirk Witherspoon, a clinical psychologist, to examine defendant.Dr. Witherspoon examined defendant on two occasions to determine whether defendant could raise the defense of not guilty by reason of insanity, defendant could raise the mitigation of guilty but mentally ill, and defendant was fit to stand trial.

¶ 6 Dr. Witherspoon's diagnosis of defendant was that defendant suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder.Dr. Witherspoon found defendant to be fit to stand trial and further found that defendant did not meet the criteria for a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.However, Dr. Witherspoon opined that, if defendant was convicted, the presumption of guilty but mentally ill seemed applicable.Dr. Witherspoon also filed an addendum to his psychological evaluations.The addendum was based upon Dr. Witherspoon's review of records that defense counsel was able to obtain from a 2007 psychiatric hospitalization of defendant.Dr. Witherspoon's addendum stated that the data associated with defendant's 2007 brief hospitalization did not appear significant or sufficient to alter Dr. Witherspoon's recommendations that defendant was not eligible for a not guilty by reason of insanity plea but that the court could consider a guilty but mentally ill finding if defendant was found guilty.

¶ 7 Dr. Witherspoon also sent defense counsel a handwritten note stating:

"Mr. Taylor's is a borderline case.I do not think he meets the threshold of [not guilty by reason of insanity].However, if his parents can afford it, you may wish to seek a second opinion.If so, I can give you the names of a couple of other good psychologists who can do this work."

¶ 8Defendant then filed a motion requesting the appointment of another expert, at the State's expense, to render a second opinion concerning whether defendant could raise a not guilty by reason of insanity defense.In support of his request, defendant referenced Dr. Witherspoon's handwritten note to defense counsel.The trial court denied defendant's motion, noting that, in his report, Dr. Witherspoon did not limit or qualify his opinion in any way.The trial court also noted that he had seen Dr. Witherspoon make recommendations to the court on previous occasions recommending that the court appoint another expert.Further, the handwritten note did not recommend that the court appoint another expert.Rather, the note simply stated that, if defendant wanted to spend the money, he could talk to someone else.The trial court held that defendant did not show the need for the appointment of a second expert at public expense.

¶ 9 Defense counsel then asked the court if it would be willing to entertain a renewed motion if counsel could secure a firmer recommendation from Dr. Witherspoon.The trial court agreed that, if Dr. Witherspoon filed another addendum to his report, the court would consider that addendum.Further, in the event defense counsel was able to secure a firmer recommendation from Dr. Witherspoon, the trial court told defense counsel that he could set the matter for hearing and call Dr. Witherspoon to testify.No further recommendations or evaluations from Dr. Witherspoon were filed.

¶ 10Defendant's case then proceeded to a jury trial, where defendant was found guilty of both charges.Because defendant was charged and convicted of attempted first degree murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties, defendant was subject to a sentence between 20 and 80 years’ imprisonment (id.§ 8-4(c)(1)(A) ), rather than the sentencing range of 6 to 30 years’ imprisonment for attempt to commit first degree murder (id.§ 8-4(c)(1);730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(West 2016) ).

¶ 11 At defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court asked the parties whether the 20-year firearm sentencing enhancement in section 8-4(c)(1)(C) of the Criminal Code of 2012(Code)( 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1)(C)(West 2016)) applied to defendant's case, given that defendant also was subject to the higher sentencing range for the attempted murder of a peace officer set forth in section 8-4(c)(1)(A).The State argued that the firearm sentencing enhancement applied, while defendant argued that the firearm sentencing enhancement would constitute an improper double enhancement.

¶ 12 Citing People v. Tolentino , 409 Ill. App. 3d 598, 351 Ill.Dec. 72, 949 N.E.2d 1167(2011), andPeople v. Jackson , 2018 IL App (1st) 150487, 423 Ill.Dec. 588, 105 N.E.3d 996, the trial court found that the 20-year firearm enhancement did apply.Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties, plus an additional 20 years for discharging a firearm in the attempted murder, for a total of 50 years’ imprisonment.The trial court then merged the aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction into the attempted murder conviction.

¶ 13Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, again arguing that imposition of the firearm enhancement constituted an improper double enhancement.At a hearing on defendant's motion, the trial court noted a conflict in the appellate court over whether imposition of a firearm enhancement to a defendant subject to an enhanced status-based sentence under subsection (A) constituted an improper double enhancement.The trial court agreed with the cases finding the firearm enhancement addressed different policy concerns than the subsection (A) status-based sentence, so that the firearm enhancement in this case did not constitute an improper double enhancement.The trial court therefore denied defendant's motion to reconsider sentence.

¶ 14Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for appointment of a second expert to determine whether defendant was eligible for a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity.Defendant also argued that the trial court's imposition of the 20-year firearm enhancement constituted an improper double enhancement, because the trial court also imposed a status-based sentence for the attempted murder of a peace officer in the course of performing his official duties.

¶ 15The appellate court affirmed ( 2022 IL App (3d) 190281, ¶ 42, 456 Ill.Dec. 922, 194 N.E.3d 41 ) with one justice dissenting on the issue of double enhancement ( id.¶ 45(Lytton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).The appellate court first unanimously held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for a second expert to determine whether defendant was insane at the time of the offense.Id.¶ 21(majority opinion);id.¶ 45(Lytton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).The appellate court noted that the United States Supreme Court in Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53(1985), established that,

" ‘when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure

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