People v. Taylor

Citation158 A.D.3d 1095,72 N.Y.S.3d 256
Decision Date02 February 2018
Docket Number1058,KA 15–00214
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dante TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court Appellate Division

THE ABBATOY LAW FIRM, PLLC, ROCHESTER (DAVID M. ABBATOY, JR., OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANTAPPELLANT.

DANTE TAYLOR, DEFENDANTAPPELLANT PRO SE.

CHRISTOPHER BOKELMAN, ACTING DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LYONS (WENDY EVANS LEHMANN OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: CARNI, J.P., LINDLEY, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND TROUTMAN, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDERMemorandum:

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, following a jury trial, of four counts of murder in the first degree ( Penal Law § 125.27 [1][a][vii], [viii] ; [b] ), two counts of burglary in the first degree (§ 140.30[2], [3] ) and one count of arson in the second degree (§ 150.15). On July 14, 2013, the bodies of a mother and daughter were found in a residence in Sodus, New York. They had gone to the residence to take care of an animal while the owner was away. Items from the residence as well as items belonging to the victims were missing, and several small fires had been set inside the residence. Using cell site location information (CSLI), police officers were able to locate the victims' cell phones in a bag in Rochester, New York. In the same bag was a receipt for a purchase made with an electronic benefits card belonging to defendant's girlfriend, with whom defendant resided. Eyewitnesses recalled seeing a "dark-colored Mercury Mountaineer" in the driveway of the Sodus residence shortly before the victims had gone to the residence, and a dark-colored Mercury Mountaineer was registered to defendant. Police officers thereafter filed an "Exigent Circumstances Form" with defendant's cell phone company, seeking historical CSLI for a four-day period encompassing the date of the crime. Upon learning that defendant's cell phone had been located in Sodus at the time of the crime, police officers were able to obtain search warrants for defendant's vehicle and residence. Inside defendant's residence were items taken from the Sodus residence, and blood found on those objects matched the DNA profile of one of the two victims. Additionally, blood found on a laundry basket inside defendant's residence as well as blood found inside defendant's vehicle matched the DNA profiles of the victims.

Initially, defendant contends that the indictment was jurisdictionally defective because the four counts charging him with murder in the first degree failed to allege that he "was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime," as required by Penal Law § 125.27(b). That contention lacks merit. "By alleging that defendant committed [‘Murder in the First Degree,’] those counts ‘adopted the title of’ the first-degree murder statute and incorporated all of the elements of that crime, including the age element, thereby affording defendant fair notice of the charges against him' " ( People v. VanGorden, 147 A.D.3d 1436, 1437, 46 N.Y.S.3d 730 [4th Dept. 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1037, 62 N.Y.S.3d 306, 84 N.E.3d 978 [2017], quoting People v. Ray, 71 N.Y.2d 849, 850, 527 N.Y.S.2d 740, 522 N.E.2d 1037 [1988] ).

Defendant further contends, in his pro se supplemental brief, that his responses to pedigree questions from police officers, wherein he admitted his age, should have been precluded at trial because the People failed to provide him with a CPL 710.30 notice of those statements. We reject that contention. "Because routine administrative questioning by the police presumptively avoids any grounds for challenging the voluntariness of statements given in response to those questions, notice of such statements is not required" ( People v. Rodney, 85 N.Y.2d 289, 293, 624 N.Y.S.2d 95, 648 N.E.2d 471 [1995] ).

Relying on Riley v. California, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2493–2494, 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014), United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–405, 132 S.Ct. 945, 181 L.Ed.2d 911 (2012), and People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 445, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (2009), defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the historical CSLI related to his cell phone because that information was obtained in violation of the Federal and New York State Constitutions as well as the Stored Communications Act ( [SCA] 18 USC § 2701 et seq. ). We reject that contention and conclude that the court properly refused to suppress such evidence. As we noted in People v. Jiles, historical CSLI is information "contained in the business records of defendant's service provider" (158 A.D.3d 75, 79–81, 68 N.Y.S.3d 787, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 08944, 2017 WL 6544614, *3 [4th Dept. 2017] ). We thus conclude that defendant's reliance on Riley, which concerned a warrantless search of "digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who ha [d] been arrested," is misplaced ( ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. at 2480 ), and that his reliance on Jones and Weaver, which involved the physical installation of a device to track the defendant's movements (see Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–405, 132 S.Ct. 945 ; Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d at 445, 882 N.Y.S.2d 357, 909 N.E.2d 1195 ), is likewise misplaced. The United States Supreme Court has held that "the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [that party] to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed" ( United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 [1976] ). Moreover, that analysis "is not changed" by the mandatory nature of such record keeping ( id. ).

We thus conclude that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that he revealed to his service provider (see Jiles, 158 A.D.3d at 80, 68 N.E.3d 787, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 08944 at *3; People v. Sorrentino, 93 A.D.3d 450, 451, 939 N.Y.S.2d 452 [1st Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 977, 950 N.Y.S.2d 360, 973 N.E.2d 770 [2012] ; People v. Hall, 86 A.D.3d 450, 451–452, 926 N.Y.S.2d 514 [1st Dept. 2011], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 961, 950 N.Y.S.2d 113, 973 N.E.2d 211 [2012], cert denied 568 U.S. 1163, 133 S.Ct. 1240, 185 L.Ed.2d 189 [2013] ; see also United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 [11th Cir.2015], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 479, 193 L.Ed.2d 349 [2015] ; In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 [5th Cir. 2013] ; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec. Communication Serv. to Disclose Records to Govt. , 620 F.3d 304, 313–317 [3d Cir. 2010] ; cf. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 [6th Cir. 2012], cert denied 570 U.S. 919, 133 S.Ct. 2851, 186 L.Ed.2d 913 [2013] ). We note that defendant does not contend that the relevant CSLI data included passively-generated data, i.e., data that was not generated by the subscriber's proactive use of his or her cell phone.

As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has written, "[w]e understand that cell phone users may reasonably want their location information to remain private, just as they may want their trash, placed curbside in opaque bags ... or the view of their property from 400 feet above the ground ... to remain so. But the recourse for these desires is in the market or the political process: in demanding that service providers do away with such records (or anonymize them) or in lobbying elected representatives to enact statutory protections. The Fourth Amendment, safeguarded by the courts, protects only reasonable expectations of privacy" ( Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615 ).

With respect to defendant's state constitutional challenge, we conclude that "there is ‘no sufficient reason’ to afford cell site location information at issue here greater protection under the state constitution than it is afforded under the federal constitution" ( Jiles, 158 A.D.3d at 81, 68 N.E.3d 787, 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 08944 at *3 ; see People v. Guerra, 65 N.Y.2d 60, 63–64, 489 N.Y.S.2d 718, 478 N.E.2d 1319 [1985] ; People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 241–242, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513 [1982] ; see also Sorrentino, 93 A.D.3d at 451, 939 N.Y.S.2d 452 ; Hall , 86 A.D.3d at 451–452, 926 N.Y.S.2d 514 ; cf. New Jersey v. Earls, 214 N.J. 564, 588–589, 70 A.3d 630, 644 [2013] ).

Defendant further contends that there was a violation of the SCA and, as a result, suppression was warranted. We need not address the merits of the alleged violation because, even if there had been such a violation, defendant would not be entitled to suppression of the evidence (see United States v. Stegemann, 40 F.Supp.3d 249, 270 [N.D.N.Y.2014], affd in part 701 Fed.Appx. 35 [2d Cir. 2017] ; United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 [5th Cir. 2014], cert denied ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1548, 191 L.Ed.2d 643 [2015] ; United States v. Corbitt, 588 Fed.Appx. 594, 595 [9th Cir. 2014] ; United States v. Zodhiates, 166 F.Supp.3d 328, 335 [W.D.N.Y.2016] ; United States v. Scully, 108 F.Supp.3d 59, 87 [E.D.N.Y.2015] ; see also People v. Thompson, 51 Misc.3d 693, 714, 28 N.Y.S.3d 237 [Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2016] ). "The availability of the suppression remedy for ... statutory, as opposed to constitutional, violations ... turns on the provisions of [the statute] rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights" ( United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 432 n 22, 97 S.Ct. 658, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 [1977] ). Here, the statute provides that a violation of the SCA may be punishable by criminal or civil penalties or administrative discipline ( 18 USC §§ 2701 [b]; 2707; see Zodhiates, 166 F.Supp.3d at 335 ; Scully, 108 F.Supp.3d at 88 ).

Before trial, the court conducted a Sandoval hearing, after which the court determined that the People would be permitted to question defendant,...

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