People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 26 July 1893
• Citation: 56 N.W. 27,96 Mich. 576
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE v. TAYLOR.

56 N.W. 27

96 Mich. 576

PEOPLE v. TAYLOR.

Supreme Court of Michigan

July 26, 1893

Error to superior court of Grand Rapids; Edwin A. Burlingame Judge.

Albert Taylor was convicted of prize fighting, and appeals. Reversed.

Dunham & Preston, for appellant.

A. A Ellis, Atty. Gen., and Alfred Wolcott, Pros. Atty., for the People.

MONTGOMERY J.

The respondent was convicted under an information containing two counts, based upon How. St. � 9306, which provides that "any person who shall hereafter be a party to, or engage in a prize fight, or any other fight in the nature of a prize fight, in this state, or who shall aid or abet therein shall, on conviction thereof, be punished," etc. The first count of the information charged that the respondent "at the city of Grand Rapids, in the county of Kent, did then and there unlawfully engage in a prize fight with one Edgar Broom, and did then and there fight a prize fight with said Edgar Broom, contrary to the statute." The second count of the information charged that "the said Albert Taylor did then and there engage in a fight in the nature of a prize fight with one Edgar Broom, contrary to the statute." The defendant moved to quash the information, on the ground that no offense is charged therein, and the refusal to quash the information is assigned as error.

It is contended that prize fighting is not an offense at the common law, and that, where a statute creates a new offense, it is necessary to set out the facts and circumstances, so that the court may judge whether the act charged comes within the prohibition of the statute. It is undoubtedly the general rule that when an offense is created by statute an information is sufficient which charges the offense in the words of the statute. This rule is not, however, universal. Wherever it is essential to apprise the defendant of the precise offense charged, and an averment in the language of the statute is not sufficient to do so, the courts will require that the information be more specific. But this can only occur where the words of the statute may by their generality embrace cases which, while falling within its literal terms, are not within its meaning or spirit. Such, we think, is not the case as to the offense here under consideration. Prize fighting is prohibited by the statute, and there is no species of prize fighting which is innocent while this statute is in force. As to what constitutes prize fighting is a question of law; but it is a term in common use, and the very employment of the word indicates what is meant. A similar statute has been twice before the supreme court of Massachusetts, and indictments following the language of the statute have been upheld. Com. v. Welsh, 7 Gray, 324; Com. v. Barrett, 108 Mass. 303. It is true that the supreme court of Mississippi reached a different conclusion in Sullivan v. State, 67 Miss. 346, 7 South. Rep. 275, but we think the Massachusetts doctrine more in accord with the holdings of this court. See People v. Kent, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 42; Rice v. People, 15 Mich. 9; Durand v. People, 47 Mich. 332, 11 N.W. 184.

2. It is objected that so much of the act as seeks to punish for engaging in a fight in the nature of a prize fight is unconstitutional, as the title is not broad enough to include this provision. The title is, "An act to prohibit discourage, and punish prize fighting in the state of Michigan." We do not think the statute open to this precise objection, as we are unable to see that the words, "or any other fight in the nature of a prize fight," can be treated as defining any offense other...