People v. Taylor

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MANELLA, J.
• Citation: People v. Taylor, 228 Cal.Rptr.3d 575, 19 Cal.App.5th 1195 (Cal. App. 2018)
• Decision Date: 30 January 2018
• Docket Number: B280781
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Montrell Lamonte TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

19 Cal.App.5th 1195

228 Cal.Rptr.3d 575

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.Montrell Lamonte TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

B280781

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 4, California.

Filed January 30, 2018

Robert Booher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General and Michael C. Keller, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MANELLA, J.

In the underlying action, appellant Montrell Lamonte Taylor was convicted of evading a pursuing police officer while driving with a disregard for safety, as defined in Vehicle Code section 2800.2.¹ Subdivision (a) of that statute provides that a motorist engages in a crime when he or she flees from, or attempts to elude, a police officer's vehicle, and drives "in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." Subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 further states that "[f]or purposes of this section," such disregard "includes, but is not limited to," driving in a manner involving the commission of three or more traffic violations assigned a point under section 12810.

Appellant contends subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 establishes an improper mandatory presumption regarding the existence of the "willful or wanton disregard" required for the offense; he further contends the jury was improperly instructed with CALCRIM No. 2181 because it incorporates that purported presumption. We conclude that section 2800.2 contains no such presumption, and that there was no prejudicial instructional error. Accordingly, we affirm.

RELEVANT PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In August 2016, an information was filed, charging appellant with evading a police officer while driving recklessly ( Veh. Code, § 2800.2 ). Accompanying the charges were allegations that appellant had suffered a strike under the "Three Strikes" law ( Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b) - (i), 1170.12, subds. (a) - (d) ), and four prior felony convictions for which he had served a prison term ( Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b) ). Appellant pleaded not guilty and denied the special allegations.

After a jury found appellant guilty as charged, the trial court found the prior conviction to be true, denied appellant's motion to strike his strike ( People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789, 917 P.2d 628 ), and imposed a sentence of 10 years in prison. This appeal followed.

FACTS

At trial, appellant stipulated that on June 24, 2016, while driving a vehicle, he willfully fled from, or tried to elude, a police officer with the intention of evading the officer. The sole witness at trial was Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department Sergeant Michael Bryerton.

According to Sergeant Bryerton, on June 24, at approximately 1:00 a.m., he was on patrol in Lancaster in a marked police vehicle. After receiving a call that a black male adult suspected of attempted rape was driving a white SUV with "disabled" license plates, he saw appellant drive past him. Because appellant and his vehicle appeared to fit the description provided in the call, Bryerton followed appellant. In an effort to pull appellant over, Bryerton activated his sirens and flashing lights. Instead of stopping, appellant accelerated and drove through residential neighborhoods, exceeding the posted speed limits and failing to halt at stop signs. Appellant then accelerated to 75 miles per hour along a street with open businesses and a posted speed limit of 35 miles per hour. The pursuit ended when appellant drove into a motel parking lot, stopped, and ran into a motel room, where he was detained. Bryerton testified that in the course of the pursuit, appellant committed eight traffic violations assigned at least one point under the traffic violation point system.

DISCUSSION

Appellant asserts interrelated contentions regarding section 2800.2 and the corresponding jury instruction, CALCRIM No. 2181. He maintains that section 2800.2 establishes a mandatory presumption that contravenes principles of due process. He further maintains that the trial court engaged in prejudicial error by instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 2181 because it reflects the improper presumption. For the reasons discussed below, we reject his contentions.

A. Governing Principles

The key issues concern whether section 2800.2 sets forth an improper mandatory presumption regarding an element of the offense established by that statute. As our Supreme Court has explained, presumptions are not inherently impermissible in criminal proceedings; rather, they are a " 'staple of our adversary system of factfinding' " because " '[it] is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime—that is, an "ultimate" or "elemental" fact—from the existence of one or more "evidentiary" or "basic" facts.' " ( People v. McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 182, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351 ( McCall ), quoting Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777.) Nonetheless, issues of due process may attend so-called "mandatory" presumptions. ( McCall, supra, at p. 183, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351.) Generally, a mandatory presumption " 'tells the trier of fact that he or they must find the elemental fact upon proof of the basic fact, at least until the defendant has come forward with some evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts ....' " ( Ibid., quoting Ulster County, supra , at p. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213.)² In the context of criminal proceedings, such a presumption contravenes due process—and thus is improper—when it relieves the prosecution of its burden of proving the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( McCall, supra, at pp. 183-184, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 82 P.3d 351.)

Here, our focus is the offense set forth in section 2800.2, which is defined in part by reference to the related offenses established in section 2800.1. Section 2800.1 provides that when, with the intent to evade, the driver of a motor vehicle willfully flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer's motor vehicle or bicycle under specified circumstances, the driver is guilty of a misdemeanor.³ Subdivision (a) of section 2800.2 provides that when a person contravenes section 2800.1 and "the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," the person is subject to prosecution for a misdemeanor or a felony. Subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 further states: "For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under [Vehicle Code s]ection 12810 occur, or damage to property occurs."

B. No Improper Mandatory Presumption

Appellant contends subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 creates an improper mandatory presumption involving three or more significant traffic violations as the evidentiary or basic fact, and the existence of "a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property" as the ultimate or elemental fact. The crux of his argument is that the subdivision "directed the jury to find that appellant had a particular intent—a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of people and property—based on his having sped or run a stop sign." Appellant acknowledges that three appellate decisions have rejected similar contentions ( People v. Pinkston (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 387, 390-394, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274 ( Pinkston ); People v. Williams (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1445, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 909 ( Williams ); People v. Laughlin (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1025, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 ( Laughlin )), but he maintains that they were wrongly decided for the reasons set forth in a dissenting opinion by Presiding Justice Klein in Pinkston , supra , at pages 395-398, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274. As explained below, we agree with the majority opinion in Pinkston and the courts in Williams and Laughlin .

In maintaining that subdivision (b) of section 2800.2 established an improper mandatory presumption, Justice Klein viewed the phrase " 'willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property' " as carrying the precise meaning attributed to the same phrase in section 23103, subdivision (a), which establishes the offense of reckless driving. ( Pinkston , supra , 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 395, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, dis. opn. of Klein, J.) Originally enacted in 1923 (Stats. 1923, ch. 266, § 121, p. 557), the reckless driving statute was amended in 1929 to proscribe driving with a "wil[l]ful or a wanton disregard of the safety of persons or property" (Stats 1929, ch. 253, § 121, p. 540). Subdivision (a) of section 23103, in its current version, provides: "A person who drives a vehicle upon a highway in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving."

As the reckless driving statute has never defined driving with "willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property," courts have determined that it targets driving manifesting a particular state of mind ( People v. Smith (1939) 36 Cal.App.2d Supp. 748, 750-751, 92 P.2d 1039 ), namely, "consciousness of the results with intent to omit or do an act, realizing the probable injury to another; or acting in reckless disregard of the consequences; or conduct exhibiting reckless indifference as to the probable consequences with knowledge of likely resulting injury" ( People v. Allison (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d Supp. 932, 934, 226 P.2d 85 ). That characterization of the mental state defining reckless driving is traceable to People v. McNutt (1940) 40 Cal.App.2d Supp. 835, 837-838, 105 P.2d 657, and reflects the common or ordinary meaning of the terms " 'willful' " and " 'wanton' " (see ...