People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 27 September 2022
• Docket Number: C091382
• Parties: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS WAYNE TAYLOR et al., Defendants and Appellants
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CURTIS WAYNE TAYLOR et al., Defendants and Appellants

C091382

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Shasta

September 27, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

(Super. Ct. No. 08F5142)

ROBIE ACTING P. J.

Defendants Curtis Wayne Taylor and Beau Houston Gray appeal from the trial court's order denying their petitions for resentencing under Penal Code^[1] former section 1170.95.^[2] Defendants contend: (1) the trial court impermissibly looked beyond their petitions and improperly considered the record of conviction; (2) a jury could have found defendants guilty of second degree murder under a natural and probable consequences theory; and (3) the trial court engaged in improper factfinding in denying their petitions. In addition both defendants contend that Senate Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2), which came into effect while defendants' appeals were pending, applies to their appeals. The People respond that, regardless of any errors, the record of conviction establishes that defendants were convicted of malice murder and are therefore ineligible for relief under section 1170.95. Even after considering section 1170.95, as amended by Senate Bill No. 775, we agree with the People and will affirm the orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A Defendants' Case

A detailed recitation of the underlying facts is set forth in our prior opinion in this case. In sum, defendants assaulted the victim and caused him to suffer a traumatic brain injury. The victim was hospitalized for eight days but died within 48 hours of being discharged. After leaving the hospital, the victim consumed alcohol and medication that had not been prescribed to him, despite being told to avoid such substances by his physician. (People v. Taylor et al. (Mar. 19, 2012, C064852) [nonpub. opn.].)

During the joint trial, the jury was instructed that defendants were being "prosecuted for murder under two theor[ies]: One malice aforethought; and two, felony murder." The jury was never instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory of murder liability pertaining to vicarious liability, pursuant to CALCRIM No. 402 or 403. The jury was instructed that it could convict defendants of first degree murder based on either (1) malice aforethought (CALCRIM Nos. 520-521), (2) torture murder (CALCRIM No. 521), (3) felony murder with the felony being the crime of torture (CALCRIM No. 540A), or (4) felony murder as an aider and abettor to the crime of torture (CALCRIM Nos. 540B, 540C, 549). It was instructed that "[a]ll other murders are of the second-degree." It was not instructed on felony murder for second degree murder or on the natural and probable consequences doctrine pertaining to vicarious liability.

The jury was further instructed that, if defendants unlawfully killed the victim, they could be convicted of manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter under various theories of guilt. The jury was also instructed on the torture/murder special circumstance (CALCRIM Nos. 700, 733, 703, 704, 705, 706) and the charged crime of torture (CALCRIM No. 810). The jury was instructed on causation per CALCRIM No. 240 as follows: "An act causes injury or death if the injury or death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and the injury or death would not have happened without the act. A natural and probable consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider all the circumstances established by the evidence. [¶] There may be more than one cause of injury or death. An act causes injury or death only if it is a substantial factor in causing the injury or death. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor. However, it does not have to be the only factor that causes the injury or death."

Mirroring the instructions, the prosecutor argued during closing argument that the jury could find defendants guilty of first degree murder based on malice aforethought or felony murder with the felony being torture. All other murders were second degree murder.

The jury found defendants not guilty of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) or torture (§ 206) but guilty of second degree murder and assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). The jury also found true that defendants inflicted great bodily injury during the commission of the assault. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8).) The jury found not true a special allegation that the murder involved the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) The trial court also found true that Taylor had a prior strike (§ 1170.12), had served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and was released on bail when he committed the assault (§ 12022.1). Gray was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 19 years to life, and Taylor was sentenced to prison for an aggregate term of 42 years eight months to life. (People v. Taylor, supra, C064852.) On appeal, we modified the judgments to stay defendants' sentences for assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury, pursuant to section 654. (People v. Taylor, C064852.) We otherwise affirmed the judgments. (Ibid.) The trial court subsequently resentenced Gray to an aggregate term of 15 years to life, and Taylor to an aggregate term of 30 years to life.

B Defendants' Petitions

In January 2019, Gray filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. In his petition, Gray declared that an information had been filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he was convicted of first or second degree murder pursuant to the felony-murder rule or the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder based on the recent changes to sections 188 and 189. He also requested the court appoint counsel.

That same month, Taylor filed a similar petition under section 1170.95. Taylor also declared that an information had been filed against him that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, that he was convicted of second degree murder pursuant to the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder based on the recent changes to sections 188 and 189. He also requested the court appoint counsel.

In March 2019, the trial court appointed counsel for defendants.

In July 2019, the prosecution filed a response to defendants' petitions, arguing: (1) section 1170.95 was unconstitutional and (2) defendants were not eligible for relief because they were the actual killers or because they were major participants in the underlying felony of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. The prosecution asked the trial court to dismiss defendants' petitions.

In October 2019, the prosecution filed a second response to defendants' petitions, arguing the petitions must be dismissed because defendants had failed to establish a prima facie showing that they were eligible for relief. The prosecution argued defendants had been convicted based on their direct participation in the victim's murder, because they were major participants in the underlying felony of assault with force likely to cause great bodily injury. Included in the prosecution's response was a copy of our prior opinion and the probation officer's report for Gray.

In December 2019, Taylor filed another petition for resentencing under section 1170.95. He argued his conviction rested on the natural and probable consequences theory. Although it was alleged that Taylor participated in the assault on the victim, it was Gray who had stomped on the victim's head. In addition, the victim had consumed alcohol and fentanyl after his discharge from the hospital. Taylor also noted that the trial court had instructed the jury on causation (CALCRIM Nos. 240, 620), since the victim died nearly 10 days after the assault. Taylor also argued that two physicians had testified during trial that the victim's head trauma could have been the result of a recent fall, especially since the victim had been suffering from acute alcohol withdrawal, but still drank and abused controlled substances against his physician's advice. According to Taylor, his actions merely "amounted to the equivalent of aider and abettor."

Gray did not file a reply to the prosecution's brief.

During a January 2020 hearing, the trial court noted it had read the parties' briefs and reviewed its file. The court also noted it had a "fairly vivid recollection of the facts of the case." The court briefly summarized the facts and noted that "causation was a major issue in the case. And the jury ultimately concluded that the injuries caused by the beating were substantial factors in causing the victim's death, notwithstanding other contributing factors.... It appeared to me from the facts that both parties were active participants in the incident." The court further noted it was inclined to agree with the prosecution "that the defendants were liable, not just under a felony murder rule, the theory that they were the actual killers in the case. [¶] They were major participants in the underlying felony of assault, force likely to create bodily injury." The court announced its tentative ruling that defendants had failed to make a prima facie showing that they were entitled to relief.

Taylor's counsel argued that, even though Taylor might have been involved in the beating of the victim, he was not necessarily the reason the...