People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 30 October 1974
• Docket Number: Cr. 16605
• Parties: , 527 P.2d 622 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alvin TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant. In Bank
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 70

117 Cal.Rptr. 70

12 Cal.3d 686, 527 P.2d 622

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Alvin TAYLOR, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 16605.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Oct. 30, 1974.

James L. Rankin, Santa Cruz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for defendant and appellant.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward A. Hinz, Jr., and Herbert L. Ashby, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., William E. James, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Eric Collins, Eugene Kaster and Joyce F. Nedde, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Defendant Alvin Taylor appeals from a judgment upon jury convictions of the murder (Pen.Code, § 187) of John H. Smith, one of the individuals who, with defendant, perpetrated a robbery of Jack West and of the robbery (Pen.Code, § 211) of said Jack West. ¹ Both crimes were found in the first degree and, upon stipulation, the penalty on the murder count was fixed at life imprisonment. ² Defendant contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the murder conviction; (2) that in connection with the murder conviction he was improperly limited in his cross-examination of a key prosecution witness relative to the issue of malice; (3) that his proposed instruction on malice was improperly rejected; and (4) that the murder conviction is barred by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel based on the prior acquittal of his confederate, James Daniels, of the same charge. We agree with defendant's fourth contention and reverse the judgment as to the murder conviction. As will appear, defendant's guilt, if any, of the murder charge is vicarious and can be predicated only on the guilty conduct of his confederates. Since the People failed to establish such guilty conduct at Daniels' trial, they are now barred from relitigating that identical issue.

By reason of our reversal of the judgment as to the conviction of murder, it is not necessary for us to discuss in this opinion the first three issues presented by defendant as the same are applicable only to the charge of murder. It is necessary, however, to set forth in some detail the evidence adduced at the trial as it relates to that offense in order to permit full consideration to the fourth contention of defendant, the issue of collateral estoppel.

The record now before us discloses that defendant, James Daniels and John H. Smith planned to commit robbery in the nighttime at a liquor store operated by Jack and Linda West. Defendant remained in the gataway car as Daniels and Smith approached the store. Daniels went inside where he was recognized by the Wests as having been in the store on a previous occasion. He approached Mr. West at the cash register and asked for a package of cigarettes. Smith entered the store at about this time and was standing across the counter from the cash register to the right of Daniels when Mr. West returned with the requested item. Daniels then stated, 'This is a hold up.' At this time Smith was holding a gun in his right hand and was pointing it at Mr. West.

Mrs. West was standing with her back to the counter on a step ladder almost directly behind her husband. At trial she testified that both of the robbers appeared to be excited and nervous. ³ After demanding ond receiving the contents of the cash register, Daniels ordered Mr. West on two, three or perhaps more occasions 'to get down on the floor.' As Mr. West lowered himself to the floor, Daniels commanded, 'On your stomach, on your stomach, Or we'll have an execution right here.' (Italics added.) Smith then moved the gun to a position over the cash register and continued to aim it at Mr. West as he slowly approached a reclining position. The statement relative to an execution was repeated 'perhaps two or three times.' At this juncture 'things were getting pretty fast' and Mrs. West 'knew they were going to kill' her husband.

Mr. West testified that after he had delivered the contents of the cash register to Daniels the situation was such that he feared for his life. Although it was Daniels who generally gave the orders, Mr. West watched 'the guy (Smith) that was shaking the gun at me.' 'Daniels kept wanting me to get down on my stomach, turn over and he said he was going to kill me if I didn't, and Smith was . . . kept pointing the gun at me.' Smith would sometimes 'back up Daniels by saving 'I will kill you,' and when I was on the floor they were going to execute me or something.' (Italics added.) As Mr. West approached a supine position Daniels 'was telling the other one to watch me, watch me, because I had a pistol in my pocket.'

During the course of the foregoing event Mrs. West had stepped off the ladder and stood behind her husband. Tucked under her waist band, she was carrying a hand gun which was concealed by the loose blouse she was wearing. She turned, pulled the gun and fired four shots in rapid succession. Smith was hit and spun away but managed to fire back at Mrs. West. Mr. West then crawled along the floor to the end of the counter and observed Smith taking aim at Mrs. West. Mr. West fired his gun twice at Smith, who fell to the floor mortally wounded. Daniels fled from the store as Mrs. West fired at him. ⁴

We held in Taylor I that on the record presented the felony-murder doctrine was inapplicable (see People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130), but that defendant might nevertheless be found guilty on a theory of vicarious liability if it independently appeared that his confederates entertained malice aforethought (see People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 704--705, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365 (revd. on other grounds, 388 U.S. 263, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178)). In considering whether an accomplice of a robber who threatens his intended victim with a gun may be deemed to have acted with malice, that is, with 'conscious disregard for human life, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life,' the majority stated that the test was satisfied when a fatal gun battle was 'initiated by acts of provocation falling short of firing the first shot.' (Taylor v. Superior Court, supra, 3 Cal.3d 578, 584, 91 Cal.Rptr. 275, 278, 477 P.2d 131, 134.) We also held in Taylor I that if on trial 'the trier of fact concludes that under the particular circumstances of the instant case Smith's death proximately resulted from acts of petitioner's accomplices done with conscious disregard for human life, the natural consequences of which were dangerous to life, then petitioner may be convicted of first degree murder.' (Id., at p. 583, 91 Cal.Rptr. at p. 278, 477 P.2d at p. 134.)

While Taylor I was pending in this court Daniels was separately tried and convicted of the robbery but was acquitted of the murder charge. Since defendant was sitting in the getaway car outside the store at the time of the shooting, his subsequent conviction for murder could result only upon a finding that one of his confederates, Daniels or Smith, harbored malice which the trier of fact then attributed to defendant because of his role as an aider and abettor. (See § 31.) At Daniels' trial the People already have sought and have failed to establish that either Daniels or Smith entertained the requisite malice aforethought. Defendant thus argues that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should have precluded the People from relitigating this identical issue at his later trial. ⁵ We agree.

Collateral estoppel has been held to bar relitigation of an issue decided at a previous trial if (1) the issue necessarily decided at the previous trial is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; if (2) the previous trial resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and if (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is assessed was a party or in privity with a party at the prior trial. (See Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 604, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439, cert. den. 372 U.S. 966, 83 S.Ct. 1091, 10 L.Ed.2d 130; Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal.2d 807, 813, 122 P.2d 892.) The first two of these requirements are fully satisfied in the instant case. The question of whether the conduct of Daniels or Smith was sufficiently provocative to support a finding of implied malice was resolved adversely to the People in Daniels' trial, and the People have sought to relitigate the identical issue in these proceedings. Daniels' acquittal was a final judgment on the merits.

As to the third requirement of identity of parties, it is the rule in civil cases that the party benefitting from collateral estoppel need not have been a party in the prior trial so long as the party bound by the doctrine was such a party. Mutuality is thus not required. (Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra, 19 Cal.2d 807, 811--813, 122 P.2d 892; see Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Insurance Co., Ltd., supra, 58 Cal.2d 601, 604--607, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439.)

In criminal cases the bar of collateral estoppel is constitutionally compelled when the same defendant was involved in both trials. (Ashe v. Swenson (1970) 397 U.S. 436, 443--447, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469.) However, courts have sometimes declined to apply the doctrine in behalf of a criminal defendant who was not involved in the prior trial. (See Woodford v. Municipal Court (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 874, 877--878, 112 Cal.Rptr. 773; People v. Uptgraft (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9--10, 87 Cal.Rptr. 459, cert. den. 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 152, 27 L.Ed.2d 151.) Defendant argues that notwithstanding the lack of identity of the parties defendant, the state should be barred by the doctrine when in proceeding against an accused it must rely Vicariously on a factual determination which was rejected by the trier of fact at a prior trial of a perpetrator of the identical crime charged against him. That factual determination, in the instant case a finding as to the existence of malice on the part of Daniels or...