People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 10 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 1–09–0517.,1–09–0517.
• Citation: 949 N.E.2d 124,350 Ill.Dec. 636,409 Ill.App.3d 881
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,v.Alexander TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

409 Ill.App.3d 881

949 N.E.2d 124

350 Ill.Dec. 636

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Alexander TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 1–09–0517.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

March 4, 2011.Rehearing Denied June 10, 2011.

Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney (Alan J. Spellberg, Mary P. Needham, Stacia D. Weber, of counsel), for Appellee.Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender (Melissa C. Chiang, Assistant Appellate Defender), for Appellant.

[350 Ill.Dec. 641 , 409 Ill.App.3d 882] OPINION

Justice ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

Following a jury trial, defendant Alexander Taylor, an African–American, was convicted of aggravated battery of a senior citizen; aggravated battery to an employee of a hospital engaged in the performance of her duties and aggravated battery that knowingly caused her great bodily harm. After a hearing to reconsider defendant's initial sentence of three concurrent terms of 5 years' imprisonment, the trial court sentenced defendant to three concurrent terms of 3 years' imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections, with a credit of 850 days for time considered served. On appeal, defendant seeks reversal of his convictions, claiming that the trial court: (1) failed to conduct a proper fitness hearing and, as a result, abused its discretion in finding defendant fit to stand trial; (2) erred and violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), when the State exercised two of its peremptory challenges to purposefully exclude two African–American venirepeople from the jury; (3) failed to comply with the mandate of Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (Ill.S.Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. May 1, 2007)); and (4) improperly allowed the State to present the testimony of one of the victim's medical physicians because: (a) the State failed to disclose “a statement of the doctor's qualifications” as an expert in violation of Supreme Court Rule 412 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 412 (eff. Mar.1, 2001)); (b) the medical physician's testimony concerning “the victim's psychological injuries was irrelevant”; (c) the medical physician's testimony “contained inadmissible hearsay concerning medications prescribed by a psychiatrist and neurologist”; and (d) the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the medical physician's testimony “concerning the medications prescribed to [the] victim.” We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On November 11, 2006, defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of aggravated battery: one count of aggravated battery of Leonard Giles, a 60–year old hospital security supervisor, pursuant to section 12–4.6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12–4.6(a) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery of a senior citizen); and two counts of aggravated battery of Vida Catalla, a hospital staff nurse, pursuant to section 12–4(b)(7) (720 ILCS 5/12–4(b)(7) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery

[350 Ill.Dec. 642 , 949 N.E.2d 130]

to hospital personnel engaged in the performance of her duties) and section 12–4(a) (720 ILCS 5/12–4(a) (West 2006)) (aggravated battery that knowingly caused great bodily harm). The charges arose from a physical altercation that occurred while defendant was a patient in a psychiatric unit of the Lincoln Park Hospital where Giles and Catalla were employed.

On December 5, 2006, the Cook County public defender's office was appointed to represent defendant. An assistant public defender requested a behavioral clinical examination (BCX) for defendant to determine his fitness to stand trial because defendant was a psychiatric patient at the time of the offenses.

On March 12, 2007, a fitness hearing was held and Dr. Susan Messina, a clinical psychologist employed by the Forensic Clinical Services (FCS), was the only witness to testify concerning defendant's fitness. Dr. Messina testified that she was a licensed psychiatrist, and the parties stipulated to her qualifications as an expert. Dr. Messina testified that she interviewed defendant on December 11, 2006, and February 8, 2007. She testified that she also reviewed defendant's medical and arrest records. She further testified that she conducted a mental status examination of defendant and opined that defendant demonstrated an understanding of the charges against him, the legal proceedings, and the roles of court personnel.

Dr. Messina also testified that defendant would often become “tangential” in his responses and “focus * * * on his own victimization.” She testified that defendant had a “distorted perception based on his paranoia and suspiciousness and distrust.” Based on those observations, she opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant was not fit to stand trial because he would be unable to assist counsel in his defense. She further opined that “with appropriate clinical attention and medication” defendant could be restored to fitness for trial within one year. Based on Dr. Messina's testimony, the trial court entered an order finding defendant unfit to stand trial and ordered defendant to be “confined in the least constrictive secure in-patient setting by the Department of Human Services.”

At a status hearing on September 24, 2007, the State informed the trial court that it had received a psychiatrist's written report concerning defendant's fitness to stand trial from the Chester Mental Health Center where defendant was confined. The State did not mention who wrote the report and it was not included in the record. According to the State, the report stated that defendant was able to understand the nature of the charges against him and would be able to cooperate in his defense. The State also informed the trial court that a psychiatrist from FCS was prepared to examine defendant on September 25, 2007, and provide an opinion concerning his fitness to stand trial. The trial court instructed defense counsel that a fitness restoration hearing was necessary if defendant was found fit to stand trial and set a date for a fitness restoration hearing to be held on November 7, 2007.

On September 26, 2007, Dr. Nishad Nadkarni, an FCS staff psychiatrist, submitted to the trial court a written evaluation concerning his opinion on defendant's fitness to stand trial. In his written evaluation, Dr. Nadkarni stated that he evaluated defendant on September 25, 2007, and opined that defendant manifested “severe antisocial and borderline character pathology.” He opined that defendant demonstrated to him “an adequate understanding of the charges against him, and adequate comprehension of the nature of courtroom proceedings and the roles of various courtroom

[350 Ill.Dec. 643 , 949 N.E.2d 131]

personnel.” He further opined that defendant demonstrated a capacity to assist counsel in his defense, found no evidence that he suffered from adverse effects from his medication regimen that would impair his fitness, and opined that “any observations of noncooperativity * * * should be interpreted as volitional on his part.” Dr. Nadkarni opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant “is currently restored to fitness to stand trial, with medication.” He stated that defendant's medication regimen consisted of Seroquel, an antipsychotic, and Depakote, a mood stabilizer.

On November 7, 2007, defense counsel informed the trial court that Dr. Nadkarni was unavailable to testify at the fitness restoration hearing, and the trial court continued the matter to December 3, 2007. On that date, Dr. Nadkarni did not testify and the record is not clear whether he even appeared or provided reasons for his failure to testify. Defense counsel then requested that a psychiatrist other than Dr. Nadkarni reevaluate defendant concerning his fitness to stand trial. The trial court ordered defendant to be reevaluated by an FCS psychiatrist other than Dr. Nadkarni and continued the matter to January 7, 2008.

On January 7, 2008, Dr. Andrew Kulik, an FCS forensic psychologist, submitted to the trial court a written evaluation concerning his opinion on defendant's fitness to stand trial. In his written evaluation, Dr. Kulik stated that he evaluated defendant on December 14, 2007, and opined that defendant demonstrated that he “is cognizant of his charge[s], understands the nature and purpose of legal proceedings, and shows the ability to cooperate with counsel in his defense if he so chooses.” He also opined that defendant was responding well to his medication regimen of Seroquel and Depakote, and not experiencing any side effects that would impair his fitness to stand trial.

Dr. Kulik also opined in his written evaluation that, after reviewing “the available records and information” he obtained during his interview, he found “no report or documentation” that indicated defendant experienced any symptoms of mental disease or defect which would have caused him “to lack the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct at the time of the alleged offense.” Dr. Kulik opined, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that defendant “is fit to stand trial with medication, * * * was legally sane at the time of the alleged offense, * * * and had the ability to understand Miranda [warnings] at the time of his arrest.”

Defense counsel informed the trial court that the public defender's office was hiring a private psychiatrist to evaluate defendant's fitness to stand trial and requested a continuance to obtain the private psychiatrist's evaluation and have that medical provider review Dr. Kulik's written evaluation. The trial court granted defense counsel's request for a continuance.

The matter was continued to May 6, 2008, when defense counsel informed the trial court that defendant had been evaluated by a private psychiatrist who agreed with the opinion of Dr. Kulik that def...