People v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 18 May 2006
• Docket Number: No. 99756.,99756.
• Citation: 221 Ill.2d 157,850 N.E.2d 134
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael TAYLOR, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 134

850 N.E.2d 134

221 Ill.2d 157

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Michael TAYLOR, Appellee.

No. 99756.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 18, 2006.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, Springfield, Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney, Chicago (Linda D. Woloshin, Assistant Attorney General, Chicago, and James E. Fitzgerald, Michelle Katz, Sang Won Shim, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender, Vicki P. Kouros, Assistant Appellate Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Elgin, for appellee.

Chief Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion:

This appeal presents the question of whether a minor who has been adjudicated delinquent in proceedings conducted under article V of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (hereinafter, the Juvenile Court Act or Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-101 et seq. (West 1998)) is considered a "person convicted of a felony" for purposes of the offense of escape as set forth in section 31-6(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (hereinafter, the Code or the escape statute) (720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 1998)).

BACKGROUND

On the evening of December 23, 1998, defendant was a 16-year-old juvenile incarcerated at the Audy Home, a juvenile temporary detention center located in Cook County. On that night, Terrance Willis, who was also a juvenile incarcerated at the facility, escaped from his cell and cut the throat of a detention center counselor. Defendant was locked in his cell during the attack, but Willis took the jail keys from the stricken counselor and opened defendant's cell. According to eyewitness testimony, defendant then aided Willis in shoving the counselor into a cell and locking it. Defendant and Willis were apprehended a short time later after they had fled in separate directions.

Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act, the juvenile division of the circuit court of Cook County held a discretionary-transfer hearing in connection with the December 23, 1998, incident. The court transferred defendant to the jurisdiction of the criminal division on December 20, 1999, on charges of attempted first degree murder, attempted escape, aggravated battery and aggravated unlawful restraint. The cause then proceeded to a jury trial on these charges.

To prove one of the elements of the attempted escape charge — i.e., that defendant was a "person convicted of a felony" at the time of the attempted escape — the State introduced a certified copy of a finding of delinquency entered by the juvenile court on August 7, 1998, that was based on an allegation that defendant had committed a robbery. The record shows that following a dispositional hearing on this delinquency adjudication for robbery, the juvenile court committed defendant to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division. Consequently, defendant was incarcerated at the Audy Home on December 23, 1998, awaiting transport to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, when the events that formed the present criminal charges took place.

Defendant testified at his criminal trial that he was asleep at the time Willis broke out of his cell on December 23, 1998, that defendant had no plan to escape, and that he was ordered out of his cell. He denied participating in putting the counselor in the cell, but instead claimed that he ran to the bathroom first and then to summon help for the counselor.

At the completion of his jury trial, defendant was convicted of the offenses of attempted escape, aggravated battery and unlawful restraint, but was acquitted of the attempted first degree murder count. The trial court sentenced him to five years in prison on the attempted escape charge to run concurrently with sentences of five years' and three years' imprisonment on the other two charges.

Defendant appealed, and the appellate court reversed. 353 Ill.App.3d 462, 288 Ill.Dec. 793, 818 N.E.2d 728. The State conceded before the appellate court that defendant did not commit the substantive offenses of aggravated battery and aggravated unlawful restraint. Instead the State argued that defendant was guilty of these charges on an accountability theory for his participation in the escape. Because defendant's accountability on these two charges depended on whether he was guilty of the escape attempt, the appellate court first examined the escape charge. It noted that the escape statute requires as an element of the offense that a defendant must be a "person convicted of a felony" or "charged with the commission of a felony" at the time of the offense. 353 Ill.App.3d at 471, 288 Ill.Dec. 793, 818 N.E.2d 728. It then concluded that defendant's delinquency adjudication was not a "conviction" for purposes of the escape statute. 353 Ill.App.3d at 472-75, 288 Ill.Dec. 793, 818 N.E.2d 728. Accordingly, the appellate court held that under the plain language of the escape statute, defendant could not be found guilty of the offense of escape as a matter of law. 353 Ill.App.3d at 475, 288 Ill.Dec. 793, 818 N.E.2d 728. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill.2d R. 315(a).

ANALYSIS

Before this court, the State contends that the term "conviction" as defined in the Code is ambiguous. According to the State, the Code must be read in pari materia with various provisions of Juvenile Court Act to find a legislative intent to punish a juvenile for any escape attempt from a penal institution.¹ Specifically, the State points out that the term "delinquent minor" under the Juvenile Court Act means "any minor who prior to his or her 17th birthday has violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act occurred, any federal or State law, county or municipal ordinance." 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3) (West 1998). Moreover, proceedings under the Act may be instituted for such violations, unless the Act requires that the minor be prosecuted criminally. 705 ILCS 405/5-120 (West 1998). The State contends that section 5-130 of the Act requires that all escape attempts be prosecuted criminally, rather than in a juvenile proceeding. See 705 ILCS 405/5-130 (West 1998). According to the State, the appellate court's interpretation of the escape statute would lead to an absurdity if an adjudication is not considered a "conviction," because then a minor who attempts to escape from confinement following a juvenile adjudication would not be subject to prosecution under either the criminal laws or the Juvenile Court Act.

The State's argument raises a question of statutory interpretation, and the principles governing our analysis are well known. The construction of a statute is an issue that is reviewed de novo. In re Michelle J., 209 Ill.2d 428, 434, 283 Ill.Dec. 699, 808 N.E.2d 987 (2004). Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature's apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Davis, 199 Ill.2d 130, 135, 262 Ill.Dec. 721, 766 N.E.2d 641 (2002). But our inquiry must always begin with the language of the statute itself, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of the legislature's intent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d 36, 42, 248 Ill.Dec. 237, 733 N.E.2d 1235 (2000). When the language of a statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to further aids or tools of interpretation. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill.2d 428, 433, 300 Ill.Dec. 350, 844 N.E.2d 22 (2006). Furthermore, criminal or penal statutes are to "be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and nothing should be taken by intendment or implication beyond the obvious or literal meaning of the statute." People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill.2d 330, 337, 233 Ill.Dec. 639, 701 N.E.2d 489 (1998). We cannot, under the guise of statutory interpretation, remedy an apparent legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a way that is inconsistent with its clear and unambiguous language. Pullen, 192 Ill.2d at 42, 248 Ill.Dec. 237, 733 N.E.2d 1235. However, if the language of a statute is ambiguous, we may look to tools of interpretation — such as the doctrine of in pari materia — to ascertain the meaning of a provision.

The statute at issue here is the escape statute, which provides that "[a] person convicted of a felony or charged with the commission of a felony who intentionally escapes from any penal institution or from the custody of an employee of that institution commits a Class 2 felony." 720 ILCS 5/31-6(a) (West 1998). Under the statute's plain language, proof of a prior felony conviction is an element of the offense of escape in the present circumstances.² See People v. McCollum, 72 Ill. App.3d 174, 176, 28 Ill.Dec. 457, 390 N.E.2d 624 (1979). The question before us, then, is whether a juvenile adjudication can be considered a felony conviction for purposes of this statute. The term "conviction" is specifically defined by the Code in the general definitions contained in Article II (see 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 1998)) and that definition governs our inquiry, as the words and phrases defined in article II have the same meaning throughout the Code as is designated in article II unless the context clearly requires a different meaning (720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 1998)). Section 2-5 of the Code states as follows:

"`Conviction' means a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a jury." 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 1998).

Under both the plain language of this statute and the various provisions of the Juvenile Court Act cited by the State, juvenile adjudications are not mentioned as being included in the Code's definition of conviction. Nor has any Illinois case ever held that a juvenile adjudication constitutes a criminal conviction — although Illinois cases have specifically held that juvenile adjudications do not constitute convictions. See In re W.W., 97 Ill.2d 53, 57, 73 Ill.Dec....