People v. Taylor

• Citation: 166 Ill.2d 414,655 N.E.2d 901,211 Ill.Dec. 518
• Decision Date: 22 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 75277,75277
• Parties: , 211 Ill.Dec. 518 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Paul TAYLOR, Appellant.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

Page 901

655 N.E.2d 901

166 Ill.2d 414, 211 Ill.Dec. 518

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Paul TAYLOR, Appellant.

No. 75277.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 22, 1995.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1995.

Charles M. Schiedel, Deputy Defender, Springfield, and Steven L. Clark, Asst. Defender, Chicago, both of the Office of State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Roland W. Burris, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Rosalyn B. Kaplan, Solicitor Gen., and Arleen C. Anderson and Bradley P. Halloran, Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

Justice HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court:

In the circuit court of Williamson County the defendant, Paul E. Taylor, entered a plea of guilty on June 9, 1992, to a charge of having committed the offense of first degree murder on or about January 18, 1992, while he committed a forcible felony, namely, an aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(a)(3)). On October 8, 1992, a jury found the 21-year-old defendant eligible for a death sentence pursuant to section 9-1(b)(6) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)) and, following a hearing concerning factors in aggravation and mitigation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(c)), returned a verdict on October 15, 1992, finding that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude its imposition. Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death. The cause comes directly to this court for review (Ill Const.1970, art. VI, § 4(b); 134 Ill.2d R. 603), where defendant presents seven issues related to his sentencing.

Initially defendant contends that at sentencing he was denied the right to a fair and impartial jury for two reasons: because the circuit court erroneously seated a juror, Darryl Rendleman, who had formed an opinion to vote for a death sentence prior to hearing evidence and because the court erroneously excused a prospective juror, Doris McAnally, who was reluctant to vote for a death sentence.

With respect to the juror Rendleman, during defense counsel's examination of him the venireman expressed the view that the death penalty should apply to cases of "cold-blooded murder," described by him as those that occur for "no apparent reason," an example of which he gave as murder that occurs during the commission of another crime. When defense counsel asked, "There was no apparent reason for [defendant] to kill [the victim in this case]. So are you predisposed at this time to give the death penalty under the charge that [defendant] has already pled guilty to?" the juror responded in the affirmative. Later, the following exchange between defense counsel and the venireman took place:

"Q. * * * My initial question is have you formed an opinion as you sit there right now without ever hearing any evidence in this case from this Court?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. So one side is starting out at an advantage as we sit here right now?

A. Yes and no.

Q. What do you mean by yes and no?

A. Because I still haven't heard all the whole thing, the whole situation.

Q. Is it going to take considerable evidence to change your mind?

A. It probably will not.

Q. What types of things would you look at in deciding that the death penalty should be imposed?

* * * * * *

A. A lot of background circumstances.

Q. On those two points when you say background, what are you referring to, sir?

A. What kind of things have happened in a person's past, how much trouble they have been into.

* * * * * *

Q. * * * Is there anything in someone's background that you would look to in the decision that the death penalty should not be given?

A. None that I know of.

Q. None whatsoever. You can think of no factor in a person's background that would convince you that a death penalty should not be given?

A. No.

Q. No matter what kind of life they have led. That would not come into play in any way whatsoever in your determination as to whether or not you would give the death penalty?

A. No.

Q. So you have only to look to a person's background in deciding to go ahead and give the death penalty but not in deciding not to give the death penalty?

A. Right."

On the basis of these answers defense counsel then asked that the venireman be excused for cause.

In response the circuit court addressed the venireman, essentially explaining the nature of evidence in mitigation and in aggravation as well as the need for a juror to weigh "each piece of evidence" offered by both the State and the defendant. In so doing, the court explained to the venireman that

"the jury does not just take the act itself of the killing to consider whether [the defendant] should receive the death punishment. They also must consider what kind of a young man he has been, the kind of home that he has had. Things that might have contributed to his being of a frame of mind to permit the killing. That's mitigation."

Thereafter, in answer to a number of questions by the court, the venireman indicated unequivocally that he could vote either to impose the death penalty or not to do so, depending upon "[t]he evidence and the law." Defense counsel subsequently questioned the venireman further at length, eliciting answers entirely consistent with those just given to the court. At the conclusion of defense counsel's questioning of him, however, the following colloquy between the venireman, defense counsel, and the court ensued:

"[Defense counsel]: Mr. Rendleman, if your son was sitting here right now picking a jury to decide whether he would live or die, do you feel he would receive a fair trial from someone thinking the way you're thinking as you sit there right now?

A. Yes, he probably would.

Q. Probably. Would you pick one as predisposed as you are right now to the death penalty to sit on that jury?

A. Yes, I probably would.

Q. And you feel you would be able to totally put aside any opinion you have right now, totally get rid of that opinion and make your decision only on the facts and circumstances that are presented in this courtroom and arguments that [the State's Attorney] and myself will make to you?

A. Yes.

Q. You feel you can be totally fair; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Even though you have formed an opinion at this time already?

A. Yes, sir.

[Defense counsel]: We are--we show a continuing motion for cause.

THE COURT: You are going to vote the death penalty or no death penalty depending on the law and the evidence, one way or the other?

MR. RENDALMAN [sic ]: Yes.

THE COURT: It will be overruled."

The standard for determining whether a venireperson in a capital case ought to be excluded for cause as a consequence of his views concerning capital punishment is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' " (Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 quoting Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589; People v. Holman (1989), 132 Ill.2d 128, 143, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124.) In reviewing a circuit court's decision whether to excuse a venireperson for cause, it is necessary to consider the venireperson's statements as a whole and not in isolation (Holman, 132 Ill.2d at 144, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124; People v. Gaines (1981), 88 Ill.2d 342, 357, 58 Ill.Dec. 795, 430 N.E.2d 1046) and to recognize that the circuit court is in a superior position to ascertain the meaning that a venireperson intends to convey where there are inconsistencies in the answers he or she has given (Holman, 132 Ill.2d at 148, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124). The determination whether to allow a challenge for cause lies within the sound discretion of the circuit court (Holman, 132 Ill.2d at 148, 138 Ill.Dec. 155, 547 N.E.2d 124) and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion.

Applying these principles, we conclude that venireman Rendleman's statements as a whole do not indicate that his views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accord with his instructions and his oath. On numerous occasions during the thorough examination of him he indicated that he would make his decision based upon the law and the evidence. Plainly, the circuit court, in its superior position to assess the responses of the venireman, determined that he could be fair and impartial and would, in fact, make his decision upon the law and the evidence. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's challenge of this venireman for cause.

With respect to the venirewoman McAnally, during examination by the court she stated initially that she was "not sure" that she could vote in favor of the imposition of the death penalty. During extensive examination the venirewoman said further that, concerning the imposition of the death penalty, "at this time I probably lean more heavily towards saying no than I do yes"; that she "doubt[ed]" that she could sign her name to a verdict calling for the death sentence; that although she was "not one hundred percent clear in [her] mind" as to whether she could vote in favor of the imposition of the death sentence under certain circumstances, she had "a feeling when it came right down to it that [she] probably could not"; that "part of [her] strong conflict is a religious problem that [she has] about the death penalty and taking another life"; and that even though the evidence and the law indicated that the death penalty was warranted, because of her religious beliefs she probably could not sign her name to a verdict in favor of it.

Following the State's examination of the venirewoman, the State's Attorney asked that she be excused for cause, whereupon the circuit court questioned her further as follows:

"Q. Are you saying that under no conditions would you ever vote for the death penalty because of...