People v. Taylor

Decision Date27 October 1980
Docket NumberNo. 79SA67,79SA67
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Donna TAYLOR, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Terrance Farina, Dist. Atty., Arthur R. Smith, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., Grand Junction, for petitioner-appellant.

Nelson, Hoskin, Groves & Prinster, P. C., Jon E. Getz, William H. Kain, III, Grand Junction, for respondent-appellee.

Lawrence W. Treece, Denver, for Colorado Lawyers Committee, amicus curiae.

Anthony F. Renzo, Denver, for ACLU Foundation, amicus curiae.

Randall Swanson, James Dean, Denver, for Legal Aid Society of Metropolitan Denver, Inc., amicus curiae.

Betty L. Nordwind, Denver, for Colorado Bar Office for the Mentally Disabled, amicus curiae.

ROVIRA, Justice.

This is an appeal from the district court's dismissal of the proceeding to confirm the certification of the respondent, Donna Taylor, for short-term treatment at the Colorado State Hospital, pursuant to section 27-10-107, C.R.S.1973. In response to a motion filed by respondent, the trial court ruled that the Colorado statutes providing for an individual's involuntary psychiatric treatment in a confined institutional setting are unconstitutional, that due process entitles the respondent to the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, 1 and that, under the circumstances of this case, the respondent is entitled to assert the statutory physician-patient privilege. 2 We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

The respondent is an adult who was being seen by Dr. Gird Leopoldt on an out-patient basis at the Mesa County Mental Health Center in Grand Junction. With the active encouragement of her family, she voluntarily entered St. Mary's Hospital for more intensive psychiatric treatment on September 26, 1978. At the time she entered this closed setting, Miss Taylor had a long history of psychiatric illness and of frequent hospitalizations.

On October 12, 1978, Dr. Leopoldt filed a Notice of Certification and Certification for Short-Term Treatment at the Colorado State Hospital with the district court, a copy of which was served on respondent. Section 27-10-107, C.R.S. 1973. He alleged that respondent was mentally ill and, as a result, gravely disabled, and that, despite her acceptance of voluntary treatment, he had reasonable grounds to believe that she might not remain in a voluntary program.

In his certification, Dr. Leopoldt made no claim that Miss Taylor was actively dangerous to herself or to others. He described her behavior as becoming "increasingly bizarre," and he had formed the opinion that her psychiatric condition was deteriorating. He further noted that she could not "engage in meaningful conversation with others, stays in her bed, mumbles incoherently and tends to gesture to herself."

On October 16, 1978, the respondent moved the court to dismiss the Certification for Short-Term Treatment. This motion was argued on October 25, 1978, at which time the People made an offer of proof that: (1) the respondent had been diagnosed as a schizophrenic of the "affective type"-subject to inappropriate mood swings between "hyperactivity" and severe depression; (2) before her most recent hospitalization, her inattention to burning cigarettes, candles, and stoves had caused a danger of fire on more than one occasion; (3) she ignored her personal appearance and hygiene, gave up cooking meals, and remained in bed for prolonged periods; (4) during her phases of overactivity, she often became incontinent and was an active nuisance to strangers, calling them by telephone at late hours, roaming her neighborhood clad only in a robe and barefoot, collecting articles of trash which she believed had value. The People argued that the respondent was "dangerous" in the sense that she was unable to care for her basic personal needs.

The district court granted the respondent's motion to dismiss holding that: (1) the definitions of "gravely disabled" contained in section 27-10-102(5), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.), and "mentally ill person" contained in section 27-10-102(7), C.R.S.1973, are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the respondent's constitutional right to procedural due process would be denied if she were tried under the standard of proof specified for hearings conducted under section 27-10-111(1), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.); (3) on the facts of this case, respondent posed no imminent and substantial danger to herself or to others and, therefore, it would be unconstitutional to deprive her of liberty for purposes of treatment; and (4) the respondent was entitled to claim a privilege against self-incrimination of the same scope as one who is subject to a criminal prosecution.

II.

The district court held that the statutory definitions of a "mentally ill person" and of the condition of being "gravely disabled" are not sufficiently certain and definite in their meanings to meet constitutional standards. A mentally ill person is defined as one "who is of such mental condition that he is in need of medical supervision, treatment, care, or restraint." Section 27-10-102(7), C.R.S.1973. The statute nowhere attempts to classify the types or causes of the "mental condition" that may create a need for medical intervention. The district court also invalidated that portion of section 27-10-102(5), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.), which declares that being gravely disabled is a condition "in which a person, as a result of mental illness, is unable to take care of his basic personal needs." 3 The court reasoned that such matters as incontinence, which implicate basic personal needs and thus seem within the statutory language, are not in themselves enough to justify involuntary hospitalization.

Where a statute is alleged to be unconstitutionally vague, a court must look to its purpose and context in evaluating the standards it sets down. Mr. Lucky's, Inc. v. Dolan, 197 Colo. 195, 591 P.2d 1021 (1979). Only when these standards are so inexplicit that a danger of arbitrary and capricious enforcement exists, or when the statutory language is phrased so that it does not give fair warning what conduct is being regulated will the statute be held unconstitutional on its face. LDS, Inc. v. Healy, 197 Colo. 19, 589 P.2d 490 (1979).

In drafting legislation total precision of expression is frequently impossible. Weissman v. Board of Education, 190 Colo. 414, 547 P.2d 1267 (1976); People v. Blue, 190 Colo. 95, 544 P.2d 385 (1975). A close scrutiny of the language in question here, in light of the purpose and context of the statutory enactment providing for short-term treatment, demonstrates that the statute gives adequate notice to persons of common intelligence of what type of conduct is being regulated and provides procedures to minimize the risk of arbitrary interpretations and enforcement.

In adopting provisions for the care and treatment of the mentally ill, the legislature has declared that a person not be deprived of liberty unless "less restrictive alternatives are unavailable and only when his safety or the safety of others is endangered." Section 27-10-101(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. The legislature intended that its provisions be liberally construed to protect the autonomy, dignity, and privacy of the individuals whose conduct it regulates. See section 27-10-101(2), C.R.S.1973. Such concerns reflect and temper the traditional justifications for a legislature's power to authorize civil commitment: (1) under circumstances where an individual is unable to take care of himself and his safety is at stake, the state may act as parens patriae and deprive him of liberty for purposes of care and treatment; and (2) one whose mental illness renders him dangerous may be deprived of liberty under the state's police power. See People v. Lane, 196 Colo. 42, 581 P.2d 719 (1978).

It is axiomatic that a finding of mental illness alone can never be a justification for a person's involuntary confinement. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 95 S.Ct. 2486, 45 L.Ed.2d 396 (1976). The Colorado short-term treatment procedure requires that a causal nexus be established between a person's mental illness and the condition of being a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled. 4 A variety of judgments are brought to bear on deciding this question of causation. It is necessary that the professional treatment and evaluation staff find, after analysis, that the person for whom certification is sought is "mentally ill and, as a result of mental illness, a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled." Section 27-10-107(1)(a), C.R.S.1973. 5 But before involuntary care and treatment can be ordered, a court or jury must also determine that the person is "mentally ill and, as a result of such mental illness, a danger to others or to himself or gravely disabled." Section 27-10-111(1), C.R.S.1973 (1979 Supp.). Thus the statutory procedure brings both the educated opinion of the expert and the common sense judgment of the judge or jury to bear on whether short-term involuntary treatment is necessary. This procedure, involving a mixture of medical and social or legal judgments, was obviously adopted to put a check on the discretion of the professionals responsible for deciding whether certification is justified. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972).

Although some professional persons might be of the opinion that a wide range of people are "in need of medical supervision, treatment, care, or restraint," 6 this statutory definition of mental illness, on its own terms, cannot be read to intend that every idiosyncratic or eccentric person requires involuntary medical intervention. Mere disability alone, even if found in conjunction with mental illness, is not enough to warrant involuntary commitment. Rather, this disability must arise as a result of the mental illness; and in keeping with the statutory purpose, it must be so grave that the person's safety is...

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