People v. Taylor

Decision Date30 September 1971
Docket NumberNo. 43362,43362
Citation50 Ill.2d 136,277 N.E.2d 878
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. William TAYLOR, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Sam Adam, Edward M. Genson, and R. Eugene Pincham, Chicago, for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (Robert A. Novelle, and James Veldman, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

RYAN, Justice:

In this case we have heretofore granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal from a decision of the Appellate Court for the First District. 124 Ill.App.2d 268, 260 N.E.2d 347.

On November 12, 1968, a search warrant was issued for the defendant's residence which was searched pursuant to the warrant and a quantity of narcotic drugs seized. The defendant was arrested and charged with unlawful possession of narcotic drugs. On December 2, 1968, a judge of the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to motion made by the defendant entered an order quashing the search warrant and suppressing the evidence seized. Thereafter, on December 16, 1968, the grand jury of Cook County returned an indictment against the defendant charging him with unlawful possession of a narcotic drug. This indictment involves the same circumstances and the same evidence as were involved in the previous proceeding. After indictment the defendant again moved to suppress the evidence on the basis of the previous order quashing the search warrant and suppressing the evidence contending that the question had been previously adjudicated, that no appeal had been taken therefrom by the State and the ruling was therefore binding on the trial court. The trial court sustained the defendant's motion holding that the previous ruling was binding. The State appealed directly to this court and we transferred the same to the appellate court because, although the order was appealable under Supreme Court Rule 604, Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, c. 110A, § 604, it was not a final judgment and we had no jurisdiction on direct appeal. See People v. Lerch, 34 Ill.2d 305, 215 N.E.2d 257.

The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that the order quashing the search warrant and suppressing the evidence at the preliminary hearing was not binding on the trial court. We granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal.

A similar question was presented to this court in People ex rel. MacMillian v. Napoli, 35 Ill.2d 80, 219 N.E.2d 489, in which case a pre-indictment motion to suppress evidence was allowed. Subsequently the trial judge ruled that the suppression order was not binding in the criminal trial. In an original Mandamus action this court held that the suppression order was binding. At that time, section 114--12(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 38, par. 114--12(b)) provided that if a pretrial motion to suppress evidence is granted, the evidence suppressed under such order shall not be admissible in evidence against the movant at any trial. This court stated that if the People were not content with an order granting a motion to suppress they had a right to appeal therefrom under Supreme Court Rule 27 then in effect (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, ch. 110, par. 101.27). That rule provided: 'In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment, the substantive effect of which results in dismissing an indictment, information or complaint; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.' The same provisions are now incorporated with minor changes in language in our present Rule 604.

In People v. Quintana, 36 Ill.2d 369, 223 N.E.2d 161, at a preliminary hearing the defendant moved for and was granted a discharge because of a violation of his right to a speedy trial. The State's Attorney then secured an indictment charging the defendant with the same offense. This court held that the order for discharge at the preliminary hearing was an appealable order under Supreme Court Rule 604 and was not subject to later review by the trial court.

In 1967 after the decisions in the above two cases, the General Assembly amended section 109--3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1967, ch. 38, par. 109--3) by adding thereto subparagraph (e) as follows:

'During preliminary hearing or examination the defendant may move for an order of suppression of evidence * * * and may move for dismissal of the charge * * *. If any such order of suppression of evidence or dismissal of the charge is allowed and issued in the course of any preliminary hearing or examination, such order of suppression or of dismissal shall be nonfinal, the State may not appeal therefrom, and such order of suppression or of dismissal shall not in any manner bar, affect or be determinative in any subsequent proceedings.'

Also in 1967 the General Assembly amended section 114--12(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which the court relied on in People ex rel. MacMillian by adding thereto the following: 'except that, if the order suppressing evidence is nonfinal according to Section 109--3 of this Act, the property shall not be restored and shall not because of such order be inadmissible in evidence at any proceeding other than such preliminary hearing or...

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  • People v. Walensky
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • December 31, 1996
    ...for reconsideration is timely filed. People v. Williams, 138 Ill.2d 377, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990); People v. Taylor, 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1971). Cf. People v. McBride, 114 Ill.App.3d 75, 69 Ill.Dec. 833, 448 N.E.2d 551 (1983). Where, however, the trial court does no......
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    ...from his custodial interrogation, and because the State procured dismissal of its appeal from that order (see People v. Taylor (1971), 50 Ill.2d 136, 140, 277 N.E.2d 878; People v. McBride (1983), 114 Ill.App.3d 75, 80, 69 Ill.Dec. 833, 448 N.E.2d 551; People v. Schlemm (1980), 82 Ill.App.3......
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    ...search is now subject to review under the constraints of People v. Hopkins (1972), 52 Ill.2d 1, 284 N.E.2d 283 and People v. Taylor (1972), 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878. The majority improperly limits the collateral estoppel effects of the Perry County Circuit Court's rulings to the "valid......
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    • Illinois Supreme Court
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    ...276 Ill.Dec. 343, 794 N.E.2d 238. People v. Williams, 138 Ill.2d 377, 150 Ill.Dec. 498, 563 N.E.2d 385 (1990), and People v. Taylor, 50 Ill.2d 136, 277 N.E.2d 878 (1971), relied on by Williams, both the State's attempt to relitigate fourth amendment suppression issues after the suppression ......
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