People v. Teamer

• Decision Date: 13 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. B072462,B072462
• Citation: People v. Teamer, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 20 Cal.App.4th 1454 (Cal. App. 1993)
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bernard TEAMER, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 296

25 Cal.Rptr.2d 296

20 Cal.App.4th 1454

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Bernard TEAMER, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B072462.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Dec. 13, 1993.

As Modified Jan. 12, 1994.

[20 Cal.App.4th 1455] Leonard Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., George Williamson, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert R. Anderson, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Edmund D. McMurray and John R. Gorey, Garrick W. Chock and Sanjay T. Kumar, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MIRIAM A. VOGEL, Associate Justice.

Bernard Teamer contends his conviction of vehicular burglary must be reversed because the only felony he intended to commit when he broke into a car was the theft of the car he broke into. We disagree, and therefore affirm his conviction.

FACTS

At about 8:30 p.m. one evening, Valencia Oldham parked her red Nissan in front of her house, locked the car, went into her house and ultimately went to bed. At about 2:00 a.m. the next morning, Ken Oldham (Valencia Oldham's nephew who was spending the night with his aunt) was awakened by noises coming from the street. When he looked out the window he saw a man in his aunt's Nissan. As Ken Oldham watched, the man got out of the Nissan, walked to a black Hyundai parked on the other side of the street (facing in the wrong direction), and then returned to the Nissan with another man. Both men got into the Nissan.

At that point, Ken Oldham awakened his aunt. After grumbling that she didn't want to be bothered because she had to get up early to go to work, Valencia Oldham finally got up, looked out and saw someone sitting in her car. She called the police. Deputy Sheriff Ellen D. Horton arrived within minutes and stopped her patrol car next to the Nissan. The two men in the Nissan took one look at Deputy Horton, jumped out of the Nissan and ran away.

Valencia Oldham went out to examine her car. She found the lock on the driver's door had been "popped," the steering column had been cracked open, and wires were hanging from the column (which, to state the obvious, was not how she had left the car the night before). A screwdriver which wasn't hers was found on the floor of the car. Deputy Horton noticed the black Hyundai parked the wrong way on the other side of the street and went over to look at it. Its windows were open, it was unlocked and its engine was warm. Ken Oldham told Deputy Horton that the two men had been in the Hyundai and a computer check led to the registered owner of the Hyundai, Sheila Akwal, who told Deputy Horton that her son, defendant Bernard Teamer, had borrowed the car the night before.

A few weeks later, Teamer was arrested and informed of the charges against him. After waiving his constitutional rights, he told Deputy Sheriff Mark Wedel that he didn't have anything to do with the attempted theft of the Nissan--he said he was at a party and suggested someone might have taken the keys to his mother's car. Deputy Wedel didn't believe Teamer and told him so. Matching fiction with fiction, Deputy Wedel concocted a story about an eyewitness identification--he told Teamer he had been identified from a photographic lineup and showed him a contrived photo lineup card with his picture.

Teamer bought it, hook, line and sinker. He confessed to Deputy Wedel that he had borrowed his mother's car and gone to a Halloween party. When the party was over, he left with an unnamed friend and, as they were driving, the friend said he wanted to steal a car. Teamer stopped the Hyundai, and his friend got out and broke into the Nissan while Teamer remained in the Hyundai. Minutes later, the friend came over to Teamer and asked for help. Ever obliging, Teamer got out of the Hyundai, walked over to the Nissan with his friend, and both men got into the Nissan. Teamer was behind the wheel, trying to cut some wires, when the sheriff's car drove up, at which point Teamer and his friend got out of the Nissan and ran away.

Teamer was charged with one count of second degree burglary of a vehicle (Pen.Code, § 459) ¹ and one count of attempted grand theft auto (§§ 664, 487h, subd. (a) [since repealed and replaced by § 487, subd. (3) (Stats.1989, ch. 930, §§ 6.1, 12.5, pp. 3255-3256, 3266] ).) Teamer pled not guilty and the case was tried to a jury. Teamer did not present any defense (perhaps because the trial court ruled that, if he testified, he could be impeached with a 1990 conviction of accessory to murder). Teamer was convicted as charged and sentenced to state prison for two years (mid-term) on the burglary charge, with a six month term on the attempted grand theft auto count imposed and stayed. Teamer appeals.

DISCUSSION

Teamer contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction of vehicular burglary because his only intent at the time he entered the car was to steal the car itself. More specifically, he concedes evidence of an attempt to steal a car will support a conviction of attempted grand theft auto but claims that same evidence will not support a conviction of vehicular burglary--unless accompanied by proof of an intent to commit a second felony inside the car. At trial, the People disagreed and argued to the jury that "[a] burglary occurs at the moment you enter someone else's locked vehicle with the intent to steal their car." On this appeal, the People argued instead that sufficient circumstantial evidence supports an implied finding that Teamer entered the car intending to find something in it to steal in the event he was unable to steal the car. We disagreed, and asked the People to file supplemental briefs on the precise issue raised by Teamer, which is the one we now address. ²

A.

Under the plain language of the statute, every entry into a house or other building or locked vehicle with the "intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony" is a burglary. (§ 459.) ³ In cases of nonconsensual entries into houses or other immobile structures, the intent inquiry necessarily focuses on what it is the defendant planned to do inside the structure--because criminals do not (at least in the cases we know about) enter houses or apartments or stereo stores with the intent to steal the house or apartment building or store. In cases involving structures (as opposed to vehicles), if the defendant's intent is to get out of the rain or to commit some other nonfelonious act once inside, he is guilty of a misdemeanor, not burglary. (See e.g., §§ 602.5 [simple trespass], 603 [forcible entry with vandalism].) It is only when he intends to commit a theft or any felony that he is guilty of burglary. (See e.g., People v. Goldsworthy (1900) 130 Cal. 600, 62 P. 1074 [intent to commit arson]; People v. Schwab (1955) 136 Cal.App.2d 280, 286, 288 P.2d 627 [intent to commit murder or felonious assault]; People v. Denningham (1947) 82 Cal.App.2d 117, 120, 185 P.2d 614 [intent to commit an act of sex perversion]; People v. Dingle (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 30, 219 Cal.Rptr. 707 [intent to commit theft].)

But where the entry is into a locked vehicle, it is both physically possible and logically probable that the unlawful entry is accomplished with the intent to steal the car itself--which is (even if aborted as it was here) a felony in and of itself, attempted grand theft auto. (§§ 487, subd. (3), 489, subd. (b), 664, subd. (1).) Under the plain language of the statute, therefore, an entry into a locked vehicle with the intent to steal that vehicle is a burglary.

B.

When a statute is written in plain English and without qualification, we are supposed to interpret it according to the natural import of its language--for the simple reason that, to do otherwise, would be to judicially rewrite the statute. (Corbett v. Chambers (1895) 109 Cal. 178, 180-181, 41 P. 873; People v. Barry (1892) 94 Cal. 481, 482-484, 29 P. 1026; People v. Salemme (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 775, 779, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 398.) For several reasons, this rule of statutory construction is particularly appropriate in this case.

1.

In Illinois, where vehicular burglary is defined as a knowing entry without authority into "a motor vehicle ... or any part thereof, with intent to commit therein a felony or theft" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, [p] 19-1(a), emphasis added), the courts have rejected the same argument Teamer makes in this case--that entry into a vehicle with the intent to steal the vehicle itself (as opposed to something "therein") did not constitute a burglary. (People v. Sansone (1981) 94 Ill.App.3d 271, 273, 418 N.E.2d 862, 864; People v. Mullinex (1984) 125 Ill.App.3d 87, 88-91, 465 N.E.2d 135, 137-138; People v. Steppan (1985) 105 Ill.2d 310, 315-317, 473 N.E.2d 1300, 1303-1304; People v. Buckner (1990) 203 Ill.App.3d 525, 535, 561 N.E.2d 335, 342 [otherwise, "a person who entered a car to steal something from within would be punished for burglary but a person breaking in to steal the car itself would be guilty of theft only"].)

In Florida, where vehicular burglary is defined as an entry into "a structure or a conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein...." (Fla.Stats., § 810.02(1), emphasis added), the courts have also rejected the argument that the statute ought not to apply when the only intent is to steal the vehicle itself. (State v. Dalby (Fla.App.1978) 361 So.2d 215, 216; State v. Stephens (Fla.1992) 601 So.2d 1195, 1196-1197.) The courts of Tennessee and Oklahoma have reached the same result based on the same or substantially similar statutory language. (Tenn.Code.Ann., § 39-905; Mellons v. State (Tenn.Cr.App.1977) 560 S.W.2d 634, 635-636; Morrow v. State (Okl.Cr.App.1972) 502 P.2d 339).

It appears, a fortiori, that a statute prohibiting the entry into a vehicle with the intent to commit any felony sans a requirement that the felony must be committed "therein" must be similarly construed--that an entry into a vehicle with the intent to steal...