People v. Teasdale, 79
| Decision Date | 06 October 1952 |
| Docket Number | No. 79,79 |
| Citation | 55 N.W.2d 149,335 Mich. 1 |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. TEASDALE et al. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Joseph W. Louisell, Detroit, for appellants.
Frank G. Millard, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Solicitor Gen., Lansing, Gerald K. O'Brien, Pros. Atty., County of Wayne, Ralph Garber, Chief Asst. Pros. Atty Garfield A. Nichols, Asst. Pros. Atty., Chief, Appellate Division, George W. Miller, Asst. Pros. Atty., Appellate Division, all of Detroit, for the People.
Before the Entire Bench.
The defendants in this case were prosecuted in the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit under an information charging them with criminal conspiracy to violate statutes of the State enacted for the suppression of gambling. To such charge twelve of the defendants pleaded guilty and their pleas were accepted. By amendment a count was added to the information, charging the offense of maintaining a gaming room in violation of C.L.1948, § 750.303, Stat.Ann. § 28.535. The remaining defendants were convicted on their pleas of guilty to the added count. In each instance an order of probation was made, setting forth the conditions prescribed by the statute, 1 and further requiring that each probationer pay a specific amount by way of costs within a period of 30 days. Two of said probationary orders fixed the amount to be paid under each at the sum of $7,500. The condition imposed on three defendants required the payment of $5,000 each within the time prescribed, and the other orders specified amounts ranging from $1,000 to $2,500.
Claiming that the costs fixed by the orders were excessive, unauthorized by statute, and determined without reference to the actual expenses of the prosecution in connection with said case, defendants moved the trial court to correct and modify the orders. The motion was denied. Thereafter defendants applied to this Court for leave to appeal from the order denying the motion. Following the granting of the application the prosecuting attorney moved that the cause be remanded to the trial court for the purpose of making 'an official record of the complexity of the matter involved and to establish the costs involved in the apprehension, examination, trial and probationary oversight of the defendants' for assigned reasons. The motion was granted and thereafter a hearing was had before the trial judge. No testimony was received, however, the proceeding consisting of a colloquy between the judge and the assistant prosecutor in charge of the case, together with objections from counsel representing defendants. At its conclusion the judge indicated that the orders as originally made would not be altered by him.
No question is raised as to the validity of the orders of probation aside from the conditions therein with reference to the payment of costs. The provision under which the court acted is found in C.L.1948, § 771.3, Stat.Ann. § 28.1133, and reads as follows:
'The court may impose such other lawful conditions of probation, including restitution in whole or in part to the person or persons injured or defrauded, as the circumstances of the case may repuire or warrant, or as in its judgment may be meet and proper; and in case it requires the probationer to pay any costs it shall not be confined to or governed by the laws or rules governing the taxation of costs in ordinary criminal procedure, but may summarily tax and determine such costs without regard to the items ordinarily included in taxing costs in criminal cases and may include therein all such expenses, direct and indirect, as the public has been or may be put to in connection with the apprehension, examination, trial and probationary oversight of the probationer.'
The primary question at issue in the case is the interpretation of the above provision. It is evident that the legislature had in mind granting to the court discretionary authority to require a probationer, as a condition of the order of probation, to reimburse the public for expenditures reasonably and properly made in connection with the case. Such a condition is not by way of punishment. Obviously the order of probation is in the final analysis based on the conclusion of the court that the public interest does not require the imposition of the penalty provided by law. Probation implies a withholding of punishment rather than prescribing it. That the language quoted was intended to provide for reimbursement to the public was recognized by this Court in People v. Robinson, 253 Mich. 507, 511, 235 N.W. 236, 237, where it was said:
'In the new Criminal Code, section 3, chapter 11, Act [No.] 175, of the Public Acts of 1927 (3 Comp.Laws 1929, § 17373), it is provided that, if the court, in fixing the conditions of probation, requires the probationer to pay costs, they may be summarily fixed at an amount sufficient to reimburse the county for all expenses incurred in connection with the 'apprehension, examination, trial and probationary oversight of the probationer.''
A like view was accepted in State v. Morehart, 149 Minn. 432, 183 N.W. 960, in construing a statute relating to costs in criminal cases. It was there said:
'The evident purpose of the statute is not the punishment of the offender but the reimbursement of the state.'
Such a construction is in accord with the provision of the statute relating to restitution by a probationer, to one who has been injured by his conduct, as a condition of an order of probation. The theory of the statute clearly is that if the law violator is not punished he properly any be required, as evidence of good faith on his part, to compensate one who has sustained a pecuniary loss because of the unlawful act, and likewise to reimburse the public for expenditures thereby occasioned.
The provisions of an order of probation are not valid unless in accordance with the statute from which the authority of the court is derived. People v. Good, 287 Mich. 110, 117, 282 N.W. 920. In the...
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...of prosecution”; (3) whether the general principles set out in People v. Wallace, 245 Mich. 310, 222 N.W. 698 (1929), People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952), and People v. Dilworth, 291 Mich.App. 399, 804 N.W.2d 788 (2011), which dealt with statutory costs of prosecution and ......
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