People v. Tennyson

• Decision Date: 13 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 57061,57061
• Citation: 9 Ill.App.3d 329,292 N.E.2d 223
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter TENNYSON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 223

292 N.E.2d 223

9 Ill.App.3d 329

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Walter TENNYSON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 57061.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fourth Division.

Dec. 13, 1972.

Frederick F. Cohn, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., County of Cook, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Elmer C. Kissane, David Novoselsky, Mark Zubor, Asst. State's Attys., Chicago, of counsel.

DIERINGER, Presiding Justice.

On April 26, 1971, Walter Tennyson was convicted of murder in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Following a conference, the defendant entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to a term of from fourteen to twenty-five years in the Illinois State Penitentiary. On October 5, 1971, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his guilty plea under both the Post Conviction Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 38, § 122--1 et seq.) and Section 72 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act (Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 110, § 72). Relief under such motion was denied, and the defendant herein appeals.

The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial judge erred in failing to admonish the defendant of the nature of the charge against him of his right to confront witnesses, as required by Supreme Court Rule 402, prior to the court's acceptance of his guilty plea.

The record reflects that on April 26, 1971, prior to accepting the defendant's plea, the trial court ascertained the voluntariness of the defendant's guilty plea as well as the defendant's understanding of what a jury trial was. The judge also informed the defendant of his right to a jury trial and the minimum and maximum sentences which he could receive if he entered a guilty plea.

The defendant contends the trial court accepted his guilty plea without first informing him of the nature of the charge against him and of his right to confront witnesses, both of which are required by Supreme Court Rule 402. (Ill.Rev.Stat., Ch. 110A, § 402.) In support of this contention the defendant on oral argument cited the case of People v. Cummings, (1972) 7 Ill.App.3d 306, 287 N.E.2d 291, wherein the judgment of the trial court was reversed as being contrary to the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 402.

Supreme Court Rule 402 requires a defendant be informed of the nature of the charge against him and of his right to confront witnesses prior to acceptance of his guilty plea. The rule, however, requires only substantial compliance with its provisions. People v. Reed, (1972) 3 Ill.App.3d 293, 278 N.E.2d 524. Moreover, the Illinois Supreme Court has indicated a realistic approach to the construction of Rule 402. People v. Mendoza, (1971) 48 Ill.2d 371, 270 N.E.2d 30.

The rule that a defendant be informed of the nature of the charge against him does not require a recitation of all facts and elements therein. The admonishment of the crime by name has been held sufficient to conform to the rule. People v. Wright, (1972) 2 Ill.App.3d 304, 275 N.E.2d 735.

The rule that a defendant must be warned of his right to confront witnesses against him does not require a lengthy detailed explanation of each possible witness. In People v. Mendoza, Supra, the defendant argued that he was not informed of his right to confront witnesses. The defendant therein was similarly informed of his right to a jury trial and the minimum and maximum penalties facing him. In confirming his conviction, the Supreme Court stated:

'The record of the trial court's admonition to the defendant at the change-of-plea proceedings shows substantial compliance with our Rule 402.'

The present record establishes that the defendant was...