People v. Terneus

• Citation: 239 Ill.App.3d 669,180 Ill.Dec. 499,607 N.E.2d 568
• Decision Date: 30 December 1992
• Docket Number: No. 4-92-0383,4-92-0383
• Parties: , 180 Ill.Dec. 499 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas D. TERNEUS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 568

607 N.E.2d 568

239 Ill.App.3d 669, 180 Ill.Dec. 499

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas D. TERNEUS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 4-92-0383.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Fourth District.

Dec. 30, 1992.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 24, 1993.

Daniel D. Yuhas, Deputy Defender, Office of the State Appellate Defender, Lawrence J. Essig, Asst. Defender, Springfield, for defendant-appellant.

Lawrence R. Fichter, State's Atty., Decatur, Norbert J. Goetten, Director, State's Attys. Appellate Prosecutor, Springfield, Robert J. Biderman, Deputy Director, Timothy J. Londrigan, Staff Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Presiding Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In January 1992, the State charged defendant, Thomas D. Terneus, with aggravated criminal sexual assault (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 12-14(b)(1)). On March 24, 1992, the date the case was set for jury trial, defendant pleaded guilty as charged pursuant to an agreement that the State would recommend a sentence of 11 years in prison, to be served concurrently with a five-year prison sentence on an unrelated forgery charge. The trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea and sentenced him as the parties agreed. The next day, the court entered a written judgment order which, in pertinent part, ordered that "defendant pay the costs of these proceedings." On March 30, 1992, defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court later conducted a hearing on that motion and denied it. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) denied him procedural due process by entering a money judgment for costs without notice following his guilty plea, and (2) imposed an excessive sentence.

We affirm.

I. IMPOSITION OF COSTS

Section 13 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence" (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 180-3) (hereinafter the costs statute) covers costs in criminal cases and reads, in pertinent part, as follows: "When any person is convicted of an offense under any statute, or at common law, the court shall enter judgment that the offender pay the costs of the prosecution." (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to this statute, the trial court imposed costs upon defendant shortly after he pleaded guilty and thus stood "convicted of an offense." Defendant correctly points out that the court made no mention of the costs statute or the assessment of costs when it accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him; instead, the first indication that the court assessed costs appeared in its written order entered the next day concerning the judgment and sentence.

Defendant argues that the trial court denied him procedural due process because it entered a money judgment against him without notice. Defendant further argues that this judgment improperly modified the plea agreement reached by defendant and the State. We disagree with both claims.

A. Procedural Due Process on Imposing Costs of Prosecution

Defendant primarily cites People v. Estate of Scott (1977), 66 Ill.2d 522, 6 Ill.Dec. 876, 363 N.E.2d 823, in support of his claim that imposing costs here violated procedural due process. In Estate of Scott, the trial court accepted defendant's guilty plea to attempt (robbery) and sentenced her to probation. The State moved for judgment for costs pursuant to the costs statute (see Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 180-3) in the amount of $60. The trial court denied that request and held that the statutory cost scheme was unconstitutional. Estate of Scott, 66 Ill.2d at 524, 6 Ill.Dec. at 877, 363 N.E.2d at 824.

The State appealed, and the supreme court reversed. In the process, the supreme court rejected all constitutional objections defendant made regarding the costs statute. One of those claims was that, as here, the statute denied the defendant procedural due process because it failed to provide for a hearing prior to the entry of a judgment for costs. The court addressed this claim as follows:

"A defendant against whom such a motion is directed has the right to resist the entry of judgment on any grounds which appear to be appropriate, and defendant did so in this case. Although the statute is silent on the subject, no reason appears why the circuit court, in the event of objection to the judgment, could not conduct a hearing to the extent necessary to decide the issues, and, indeed, the circuit court did so. We hold that nothing in the statute served to deny procedural due process." Estate of Scott, 66 Ill.2d at 526-27, 6 Ill.Dec. at 878, 363 N.E.2d at 825.

We find nothing in Estate of Scott which supports defendant's argument here. We note that the costs statute leaves no discretion in the trial court because it directs that court to give judgment against the convicted offender to pay the costs of the prosecution. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 180-3; People v. Vaughn (1979), 75 Ill.App.3d 121, 123, 31 Ill.Dec. 103, 104, 394 N.E.2d 19, 20; People v. Barringer (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 168, 169, 317 N.E.2d 331, 332.) Thus, the costs statute required the trial court here to enter the order it did on March 25, 1992, directing defendant to pay court costs, and the court could not do otherwise.

We hold that a defendant's notice of the requirement that the trial court impose costs upon his conviction is premised upon the well-settled doctrine of law that one is presumed to know the law and ignorance of it is no excuse. (People v. Ivy (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 647, 653, 88 Ill.Dec. 786, 790, 479 N.E.2d 399, 403.) For example, if the law presumes that one knows that possessing a shotgun having a barrel less than 18 inches in length is illegal, and the law will reject any effort by a defendant to premise a defense to such a charge upon her claimed ignorance (Ivy, 133 Ill.App.3d at 653, 88 Ill.Dec. at 790, 479 N.E.2d at 403), then surely the law can and should presume that persons convicted of crimes know that they will suffer collateral consequences as a result of those convictions, such as the requirement that they pay costs of prosecution. The law is also well settled that imposing costs does not punish a defendant in addition to the sentence he receives, but is instead a collateral consequence. People v. DuMontelle (1977), 49 Ill.App.3d 187, 192, 7 Ill.Dec. 108, 112, 364 N.E.2d 95, 99, rev'd on other grounds (1978), 71 Ill.2d 157, 15 Ill.Dec. 770, 374 N.E.2d 205 ("[i]n contrast to fines which are punitive, costs of prosecution are purely compensatory").

Finally, we note that Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 402(a)) does require a trial court to inform a defendant who is offering to plead guilty of the minimum and maximum sentences prescribed by law. However, that rule does not require the trial court to inform a defendant of collateral consequences, such as paying the costs of prosecution. "It is well settled that a trial court is not responsible for advising an accused of the civil or collateral consequences of a guilty plea. [Citations.] Thus, the court's failure to admonish defendant of the revocation of his driving privileges is of no consequence * * *." People v. Smith (1989), 188 Ill.App.3d 387, 392, 135 Ill.Dec. 917, 920, 544 N.E.2d 413, 416; see also People v. Thomas (1968), 41 Ill.2d 122, 125-26, 242 N.E.2d 177, 178-79 (discussing statutory predecessor to Rule 402 which required the trial court to "fully explain[ ] to the accused the consequences of entering [a guilty] plea" before accepting that plea (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, ch. 38, par. 732) and holding that the trial court need not inform the guilty-pleading defendant of collateral consequences in order to comply with that statute); People v. Jenkins (1970), 128 Ill.App.2d 351, 355, 262 N.E.2d 105, 107.

Based on the foregoing authority, we hold that defendants pleading guilty to criminal charges are on notice that the trial court must and will impose costs. We further hold that a trial court need not admonish a defendant who has offered to plead guilty that the court will impose costs if it accepts that guilty plea.

Considering the above holdings, we reject defendant's claim in the present case that he was denied procedural due process because the trial court did not specifically provide for a hearing before it imposed costs. We first note that defendant never asked for such a hearing, even though both his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and the hearing thereon occurred after the trial court entered its written order imposing court costs. Second, defendant nowhere explains the nature of the hearing to which he claims to be entitled. After all, if the imposition of costs is mandatory, as we have previously noted, then requiring the trial court to routinely conduct a hearing on that issue is to require a nugatory act. We cannot permit the limited judicial resources of this State to be so expended.

B. Defendant's Claim That Imposing Costs Improperly Modified

the Plea Agreement

Defendant next argues that the trial court's imposition of costs "in effect improperly modified the plea agreement reached between the defendant and the prosecution." In Barringer, the court rejected the defendant's argument that the trial court failed to comply with Supreme Court Rule 402(d)(1) (see 50 Ill.2d R. 402(d)(1)) " 'when it modified the plea agreement by insisting that the sentence include the defendant's payment of court costs.' " (Barringer, 22 Ill.App.3d at 168, 317 N.E.2d at 331.) The appellate court held that the trial judge committed no impropriety by "merely insert[ing] the condition that the defendant pay the court costs" because "the trial judge was not only authorized but required to have the defendant pay the court costs." (Barringer, 22 Ill.App.3d at 169, 317 N.E.2d at 332.) Defendant argues that the Barringer court erred in its conclusion and that we should decline to follow it. We are unpersuaded.

Because we earlier held that the law places all defendants on notice that they will be assessed costs upon conviction, we reject defenda...