People v. Terry
| Decision Date | 06 May 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 75--8,75--8 |
| Citation | 38 Ill.App.3d 517,347 N.E.2d 869 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Keith TERRY, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Ralph Ruebner, Deputy State App. Defender, J. Daniel Stewart, Asst. Deputy State App. Defender, Elgin, for defendant-appellant.
Robert H. Rice, State's Atty., St. Clair County, Belleville, for plaintiff- appellee; Robert L. Craig, Asst. State's Atty., Belleville, of counsel.
Keith Terry and Tom Manon were indicted for four counts of armed robbery. Keith Terry ('defendant' hereinafter) was brought to trial before a jury in October of 1974. He was found guilty on all four counts and was sentenced to four concurrent terms of imprisonment of four to six years. From the judgment of conviction and sentence on each count defendant brings this appeal.
The evidence presented at the trial showed the following. At approximately 4:00 a.m., September 23, 1972, Donald Lee Armstrong, Rober Dworak, Maureen McShane, and Debbie (Barrington) Burt stopped at a motel in or near Fairmont City, Illinois. They parked their auto thirty or forty feet from the motel office and Armstrong and Dworak walked to the office to try to get a room. They were unable to awaken anyone in the motel, and as they stood outside the office door, two Negro males (defendant and Manon) approached them and told them that it was hard to find an attendant at that particular time. Dworak and Armstrong then returned to their car. When they reached the car, Manon drew a gun and stated that he wanted their valuables. As Manon held the gun, defendant got a billfold and a watch from both Armstrong and Dworak, a dollar from Maureen McShane, and a dollar, a watch, and some keys from Debbie Burt.
Manon and defendant then asked for the keys to the victims' car. Armstrong argued with the robbers about the keys, and Manon and defendant agreed that they would throw the keys back to the victims as they made their escape. The robbers then walked to their own car, which was also parked in the motel lot, and tried to start it. Their car would not start, so they returned to the victims' car and announced to the victims that they would take that car. Defendant, who then had the gun previously held by Manon, got into the back seat with Armstrong and Maureen McShane. Manon got into the driver's seat. Next to him was Dworak and next to Dworak was Debbie Burt. Defendant held the gun in Armstrong's side; Manon drove the car. As they were riding along, defendant said that he would like to go to a country road; Manon said he would rather go into the city.
After riding for approximately five minutes, they all saw a police car parked along side the road in the same direction they were travelling. The policemen, Sergeant Cruz and Patrolman Howard of the Fairmont Police Department, had stopped a speeder; and while Patrolman Howard was talking to the motorist, Sergeant Cruz was seated in the police car. As the car being driven by Manon neared the police car, Dworak grabbed the steering wheel and turned it sharply, causing the car to collide with the police car. Debbie Burt immediately jumped out of the car and shouted that they were being robbed and that the robbers had a gun. Armstrong grabbed the gun from defendant and told him to get out of the car. Sergeant Cruz ran to the car, opened the door, and pulled defendant out of the rear seat. Sergeant Cruz searched defendant and found some wrist watches and money in his pockets. In the meantime Patrolman Howard had taken custody of Manon.
The policemen took Manon and defendant to the Fairmont City Police station, where Sergeant Cruz read them their 'Miranda rights' and asked each of them to make a written statement. After Sergeant Cruz questioned defendant about the incident, defendant did write out a statement. The Fairmont City Chief of Police, Ray Holley, then took the statement and typed it, handed the typed statement to defendant, and asked him to read it. Defendant did so and then signed the typed statement. The statement was read to the jury at trial and appears in the report of proceedings. The body of the statement reads:
Defendant raised the affirmative defense of insanity at trial (Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, sec. 6--2). Defendant, his mother, his grandmother, and a psychiatrist testified in support of defendant's claim of insanity. The thrust of their testimony was that defendant had had a heart attack and a kidney problem. He had been hospitalized for a lengthy period and afterward had become 'angry with the world,' appeared 'quite bitter,' and 'so much different' than he had before, and had memory losses. On direct examination the psychiatrist, Dr. Frank Perez, testified that the type of physical ailments and medical treatment defendant had undergone might or might not affect a person's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. On cross-examination Dr. Perez stated that defendant's activity during the robbery incident, as presented in the State's case-in-chief was 'rational,' 'ordered,' 'purposeful,' and 'reasonable' behavior.
At the close of all the evidence the court gave proper jury instructions, including an instruction on the defense of insanity. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all four counts.
In this appeal defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trial because of an improper question asked of defendant's mother on cross-examination by the Assistant State's Attorney, and because of improper closing argument by the Assistant State's Attorney. The State argues that by failing to raise the impropriety of the objected-to question in defendant's written post-trial motion, defendant has waived that issue. The State also argues that, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, both of these alleged errors are harmless.
The question to which defendant draws our attention occurred during the following colloquy:
'(Assistant State's Attorney Kuehn): There were no incidents prior to this where he (defendant) showed any type of antisocial behavior?
A. Before this thing?
(Assistant State's Attorney Kuehn): Before this happened to him--no purse snatching?
A. No, none.
Mr. Johnson: I will object to that; I don't see the relevance.
The Court: I will overrule the objection.'
There was no attempt by the Assistant State's Attorney to follow up this question with proof of any such prior criminal activity on the part of defendant, and the record shows that the question was without foundation. Defendant's only prior criminal record consisted of an arrest and conviction for driving without a license.
The portion of the Assistant State's Attorney's closing argument, to which defendant refers was the following:
Without a doubt, the question about purse snatching was uncalled for and highly improper. It amounted to a totally unsupported and unsupportable insinuation of misconduct (See People v. Nuccio, 43 Ill.2d 375, 253 N.E.2d 353). The portion of the closing argument set out above was also improper in that it asked the jury to consider matters which were not supported by evidence in the case and which, in any event, could not be material to defendant's guilt or innocence. (People v. Harris, 33 Ill.App.3d 600, 338 N.E.2d 129.) Nevertheless, we conclude that these errors were harmless and that...
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...v. Prim (1972), 53 Ill.2d 62, 289 N.E.2d 601, Cert. denied (1973), 412 U.S. 918, 93 S.Ct. 2731, 37 L.Ed.2d 144; People v. Terry (1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 517, 347 N.E.2d 869; People v. Thomas (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 328, 2 Ill.Dec. 75, 356 N.E.2d 1362). It is clear from these cases that the convi......
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...Fifth District Court of Appeals has questioned Nicks as being contrary to the mainstream of cases on the subject. People v. Terry, (1976) 38 Ill.App.3d 517, 347 N.E.2d 869. However, Terry and other cases in the "mainstream" involve not only the robbery of several persons, but the taking of ......
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... ... (People v. Stahl (1962),26 Ill.2d 403, 186 N.E.2d 349.) In light of the isolated nature of the marijuana reference and the trial court's instruction, any error which may have occurred must be considered harmless. See People v. Terry (1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 517, 347 N.E.2d 869 ... Finally, Grenshaw contends that the trial court erred by giving a misleading jury instruction, and by refusing to give a special "reasonable doubt" instruction that he had offered. As to the first contention, it is clear from the ... ...
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