People v. the Mayor

• Decision Date: 30 June 1869
• Citation: 1869 WL 5266,2 Am.Rep. 278,51 Ill. 17
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. EZRA B. MCCAGG et al. Commissioners of Lincoln Park,v.THE MAYOR, COMPTROLLER AND CITY CLERK Of the City of Chicago.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

51 Ill. 17

1869 WL 5266 (Ill.)

2 Am.Rep. 278

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ex rel. EZRA B. MCCAGG et al. Commissioners of Lincoln Park,

v.THE MAYOR, COMPTROLLER AND CITY CLERK Of the City of Chicago.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June Term, 1869.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

This is an application to this court, in the name of the people, on the relation of Ezra B. McCagg and others, Commissioners of Lincoln Park, for a writ of mandamus, to compel the mayor, comptroller and city clerk of the city of Chicago, to issue and deliver to the relators, the bonds of the city, as required by the 12th section of the act of February 8, 1869. entitled “An act to fix the boundaries of Lincoln Park, and provide for its improvement.”

Mr. W. C. GOUDY, for the relators.

The legislature had the power to require the mayor, comptroller and clerk, to issue the bonds upon the demand of the relators, and it was not necessary to submit the question of creating such indebtedness to the municipal corporation of Chicago, or to the common council, or to the may or and comptroller.

1. The legislature has full power over municipal corporations; they are only agents of the legislative will, parts of the machinery by which the people or a portion are governed, within the rules and limitations of the constitution, and are without vested right. Cooley's Const. Lim. 192, 193, 231, 235 and 250; Field v. People, 2 Scam. 79; Mason v. Wait, 4 ib. 127; People v. Reynolds, 5 Gilm. 13; Shaw v. Dennis, ib. 416; Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co. 12 Ill. 1; Springfield v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; The People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill. 233; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 67; Town of Guilford v. Chenango, 3 Kern. 143; Kirby v. Shaw,19 Pa. St. 258; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. St. 166; Burrough Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. 374; State v. St. Louis Co. Court, 34 Mo. 572; Dayton v. New Orleans, 12 La. An. 515; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Slack v. Maysville & Lex. R. R. 13 B. Mon. 26; Nicol v. Mayor, 9 Humph. 265; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 462; People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 500; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704; Aspinwall v. Commissioners Daviess Co. 22 How. 377; People v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y. 377.

2. The legislature has full control of the property and money of a municipal corporation, and may direct its use for any purpose consistent with the public interests, of which it is the judge. Cooley's Const. Lim. 235; Richland Co. v. Lawrence Co. 12 Ill. 1; Trustees v. Tatman, 13 Ill. 30; Greenleaf v. Trustees, 22 Ill. 236; Springfield v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; The People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill. 233; East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co. 10 How. 532; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 462; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704; Same v. Same, 29 Vt. 19; State v. St. Louis, 34 Mo. 572; People v. Morris, 13 Wend. 395; People v. Batcheldor, 22 N. Y. 128.

3. The legislature may authorize the authorities of a municipal corporation to levy and collect taxes for corporate purposes. State Constitution, art 9, sec. 5; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 416; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330.

The legislature may also authorize the levy and collection of taxes for local purposes, by others than the corporate authorities, or those denominated officers under the municipal charter. Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill. 233.

The legislature may create a debt or impose local taxes without the agency or consent of the corporate authorities. Cooley's Const. Lim. 231; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; People v. Ottawa, 48 Ill. 233; Kirby v. Shaw,19 Pa. St. 258; Sharpless v. Mayor, 21 Pa. 166; Burrough Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. 374; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 67; Town of Guilford v. Chenango, 18 Barb. 615; Same v. Same, 3 Kern. 143; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; Same v. Same, 35 N. Y. 551; People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich. 500; Nicol v. Mayor, 9 Humph. 266; Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 462.

The purchase of land for a park for a city, is a proper corporate object. Owners Ground v. Mayor, 15 Wend. 376; Matter Central Park, 16 Abb. Pr. R. 56.

The 5th sec. of art. 9 of the constitution, is not a prohibition or limitation on the exercise of power by the legislature so as to prevent the imposition of taxes without the agency of the corporate authorities. The object of this section was, perhaps, to remove any doubts as to the power of the legislature to delegate the power of taxation. Nicol v. Mayor, 9 Humph. 266.

But the clear object was to prescribe a uniform rate of taxation within the limits of the municipal corporation, and to limit the exercise of the power to corporate purposes. Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 12.

There is no such express prohibition or limitation, and no constructive restriction will be allowed as against the power of the legislature. Mayor v. State, 15 Md. 462; People v. Marshall, 1 Gilm. 689.

The mayor, comptroller and clerk are corporate authorities.

The relators are not authorized by the act to, and do not fix the amount of the debt or tax. The legislature have decided that the public interest required Lincoln Park to be extended to the limits fixed in the act itself, and provided means for its purchase and condemnation. The amount of bonds, not exceeding $500,000, is to be determined and fixed by the value of the land described in the act. The only power in the relators is to judge of the amounts required, and if an over amount is issued, they cannot be negotiated or used for any other purpose than paying for the land.

This act does not impose any tax whatever. It authorizes the purchase or condemnation of the land, the fee to vest in the city, and the creation of a debt to pay the purchase or condemnation money. The constitution does not, in terms or by implication, prohibit the legislature from taking land for a public park, the expense to be paid out of the revenues of the city in the future. It does not follow that such debt is to be paid by taxation. The city owns real and personal estate of large value, which may be converted into money. The last legislature authorized, by what is known as the “lake front bill,” the sale and conversion of property of the city which will immediately produce $800,000, and before this debt will mature, $10,000,000 or $12,000,000 to the city, which is to be used for public parks.

The act set out in the writ does not expressly or by implication take away from the city the power previously conferred to lay out and improve parks.

The legislature did not, in the charter, divest itself of the right to create a park.

If it did, the passage of the act recited in the writ repealed the charter provision. Robertson v. Rockford, 21 Ill. 458.

Mr. THOMAS HOYNE, also for the relators, in support of the proposition that the legislature had the constitutional power to require the officers of the city named in the act to issue the bonds of the city, without submitting the question to the people or to the corporate authorities of the city, cited Nichols v. Mayor, etc. of Nashville, 9 Humph. 266; Bank of Rome v. The Village of Rome, 18 N. Y. 39; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barbour, 211; People v. Mahoney, 13 Mich.

In answer to the objection that, by the act in question, the issue of the bonds to the park commissioners, imposed an obligation on the city against the will of the citizens and without the assent of the corporation, and that they will be compelled to discharge this debt by an ultimate exercise of the power of taxation, counsel cited Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, pp. 232-3, where the learned author says, if the cases he refers to are sound, “the limitations which rest upon the power of the legislature to compel municipal corporations to assume and discharge obligations can only be such as spring from the general principles governing taxation--namely, that the demand or purpose for which the tax is levied, shall be such as to constitute a proper charge or burden upon the State or portion of the State taxed to pay or accomplish it. But, upon this question the legislature is vested with discretionary and compulsory power, and its decisions are not subject to review in the courts. They must be final, unless in clear cases, where there being no ground to adjudge the purpose to be a proper one for taxation, the legislature may be held to have proceeded unwarrantably.”

The cases cited are: Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend. 67; Guilford v. Supervisors Chenango, 18 Barb. 615, same case, 13 N. Y. 143; People v. Mitchell, 45 Barb. 208; People v. Power, 25 Ill. 187; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Cheany v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Burrough Dunmore's Appeal, 52 Pa. 374; Louisiana v. Layton, 12 La. An. 315.

In support of the absolute power of the legislature over the whole subject of taxation, the counsel cited Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. 417; City of Ottawa v. The People ex rel Caton, 48 Ill. 233; Town of Keithsburgh v. Frick, 34 Ill. 421; Robertson v. City of Rockford, 21 Ill. 459; Dennis v. Maynard, 15 Ill. 477; Kirby v. Shaw,19 Pa. St. R. 258.

Messrs. STORRS & WILSON and Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the respondents.

After reviewing the authorities cited in behalf of the relators, counsel said, the fact that no instance can be found, where for purely local purposes the legislature has seen fit to compel local authorities to impose taxes within their limits, without their consent, is of great force in showing that, as a general principle, the power does not exist, and wherever it is exercised, as in the cases cited from 24 Wendell and 3 Kernan, the right can be supported upon some recognized power in the legislature other than that of taxation. And denying the power of the legislature to compel municipalities to incur debts against their will, and thereby to compel a resort to taxation for the payment of such debts, counsel cited Hampshire v. Franklin, 16 Mass. 87; Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 338; Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 234-5; 4 N. H. 566; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2 Peters, 627.

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