People v. Thomas, 022521 COCA, 17CA2132
| Opinion Judge | NAVARRO, JUDGE |
| Party Name | The People of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Kyle Christopher Thomas, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Attorney | Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant |
| Judge Panel | JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE YUN concur. |
| Case Date | February 25, 2021 |
Jefferson County District Court No. 17CR248 Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel K. Mercer, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
NAVARRO, JUDGE
¶ 1 This case presents the novel question whether the community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement permits a police officer to impound a vehicle whenever the driver is arrested and no one else is present to take custody of the vehicle. We conclude that the answer is "no." Because the prosecution here did not show that the seizure furthered a valid community caretaking function, impounding the legally parked vehicle was unreasonable. The evidence discovered during the subsequent inventory search of the vehicle was therefore inadmissible. As a result, we reverse the judgment of conviction entered against defendant, Kyle Christopher Thomas, and we remand for further proceedings.
I. Factual and Procedural History
¶ 2 Around midnight, Arvada Police Officer Brandon Valdez saw a vehicle roll through a stop sign and fail to signal a turn. The officer activated his overhead lights to stop the vehicle, and the vehicle's driver promptly pulled it over to the right-side curb of a residential street. Thomas, the driver and sole occupant, provided his identification and the vehicle's registration to the officer, but Thomas could not produce proof of current insurance. When the officer checked Thomas's identification, the officer discovered an outstanding warrant for Thomas's arrest for failure to appear in court regarding a "larceny" charge. The officer arrested Thomas.
¶ 3 According to Thomas's later testimony at a motions hearing, he asked the officer if he could call his wife - who co-owned the vehicle and was at their home a few blocks away - to pick up the vehicle. Officer Valdez did not deny that Thomas had made such a request. Instead, the officer testified that he did not ask Thomas whether Thomas's wife could retrieve the vehicle because he did not know that Thomas was married. In any event, Thomas's wife was not given the chance to pick up the vehicle from its parking space.
¶ 4 Evidence presented at the hearing showed that the Arvada Police Department had the following policy: "Whenever the driver of a vehicle is arrested, the officer will have the vehicle towed unless a properly licensed driver authorized by the vehicle owner is readily available to take control of the vehicle." As Officer Valdez understood that policy, he was required to tow a vehicle any time the driver was arrested unless a licensed, authorized driver was physically present to take the vehicle. Because Thomas was the only person present, Officer Valdez requested a tow.
¶ 5 To prepare the vehicle for towing, Officer Valdez conducted an inventory search. He found a handgun, methamphetamine, a knife, and a blackjack. Based on that evidence, the prosecution charged Thomas with possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, three counts of possession of a weapon by a previous offender, and possession of an illegal weapon.1
¶ 6 Thomas moved to suppress all evidence discovered during the inventory search as the fruits of an illegal seizure. As pertinent here, he argued that impounding the vehicle was unreasonable because (1) his wife was only a few blocks away and could have retrieved the vehicle and (2) the vehicle was legally parked on a residential street in his neighborhood, was not blocking any driveway, and was not obstructing traffic. The prosecution responded that police policy required the officer to tow the vehicle because Thomas had been arrested and no one else was present to take the vehicle.
¶ 7 The district court agreed with the prosecution and denied Thomas's motion to suppress. The court reasoned that, because an arrested person is unable to safeguard their vehicle, Officer Valdez needed to impound it for safekeeping.
¶ 8 Thomas was tried before a jury and convicted as charged.
II. Standard of Review and Background Principles
¶ 9 Thomas maintains that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the inventory search. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 10 Review of a district court's order regarding a defendant's motion to suppress involves a mixed question of fact and law. People v. Allen, 2019 CO 88, ¶ 13. We defer to the district court's factual findings if they are supported by competent evidence in the record, but we review de novo the court's application of those facts to the law. Id.
B. The Protection Against Unreasonable Seizures
¶ 11 Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article II, section 7 of the Colorado Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Allen, ¶ 15.2 A warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and thus unconstitutional. Id. Because the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, however, the warrant requirement is subject to several exceptions. Id.; People v. Cattaneo, 2020 COA 40, ¶ 17. The prosecution bears the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies. Allen, ¶ 15.
¶ 12 When an officer obtains evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment, "the exclusionary rule ordinarily bars the prosecution from introducing that evidence against the defendant in a criminal case." People v. Vaughn, 2014 CO 71, ¶ 10. The exclusionary rule applies both to illegally obtained evidence and to derivative evidence - often called "fruit of the poisonous tree." People v. Schoondermark, 759 P.2d 715, 718 (Colo. 1988) (quoting Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340-41 (1939)). Thus, evidence discovered during an otherwise reasonable search ordinarily will be suppressed if the search resulted from an unreasonable seizure. See People v. Brown, 2018 CO 27, ¶¶ 17-18 (Brown II) (suppressing evidence discovered during inventory search where the predicate seizure was unreasonable); People v. Brown, 2016 COA 150, ¶ 32 (Brown I), aff'd,
Brown II.
C. The Community Caretaking Exception
¶ 13 Under one exception to the warrant requirement, officers may seize and remove vehicles from the streets as part of their administrative community caretaking responsibilities, provided that the seizure conforms to standardized criteria limiting police discretion. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Allen, ¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. After impounding a vehicle, an officer may search the vehicle to inventory its contents, again provided that the search conforms to standardized criteria limiting police discretion. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); Allen, ¶ 20; Brown II, ¶¶ 8-9. Such inventory searches "serve to protect an owner's property while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from danger." Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
¶ 14 Accordingly, the first question when analyzing the constitutionality of an officer's decision to impound a vehicle is whether standardized criteria authorized the impoundment. See Allen, ¶¶ 20-21 ("[T]he existence of standardized criteria or policies is a necessary condition of the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement . . . ."). If not, the seizure was unreasonable, and the analysis ends. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 21 (finding seizure unreasonable solely because "the People did not present any evidence at the motions hearing to establish that the officers [impounded the vehicle] in accordance with any written or oral standardized criteria or policies"). But the fact that a seizure conforms to standardized criteria is not sufficient to survive Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Brown II, ¶ 12; see also 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.3(c), Westlaw (6th ed. database updated Sept. 2020) ("It is nonetheless possible . . . [that] an impoundment regulation could be deemed so irrational as to not fall within what the [Bertine] Court there characterized as the requisite 'reasonable police regulations.'").
¶ 15 Rather, even if a seizure complies with standardized criteria, the court must also ask "whether the impoundment and subsequent inventory serve an administrative community caretaking function." Brown II, ¶ 12.3 Valid community caretaking purposes may include the need to remove vehicles that impede traffic or threaten public safety or convenience and the need to protect the vehicle and its contents against vandalism or theft. See id. at ¶ 14 (identifying such purposes where the driver was unable to drive his vehicle lawfully because his license was suspended); see also Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005) (identifying the same purposes in a case involving impoundment from the defendant's driveway).
¶ 16 To determine whether impounding a vehicle furthers some community caretaking purpose, courts should consider the totality of the circumstances, including whether the driver was arrested, the time and location of the arrest, whether the driver could produce proof of ownership, whether a licensed and authorized person was available to take custody of the vehicle, and whether an arrested driver could return promptly to the vehicle after posting bail. See Brown II, ¶ 13; LaFave, § 7.3(c) ("[I]t would appear that impoundment is generally impermissible where the driver has...
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