People v. Thomas
| Decision Date | 13 December 1985 |
| Docket Number | 83-1865,Nos. 83-1680,s. 83-1680 |
| Citation | 93 Ill.Dec. 527,139 Ill.App.3d 163,486 N.E.2d 1362 |
| Parties | , 93 Ill.Dec. 527 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darryl THOMAS and Wesley Robinson, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Deputy Defender, Office of State Appellate Defender (Deborah Liebow, of counsel), for defendant-appellant Robinson.
Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County (Joan S. Cherry, Mary Ellen Dienes and Maureen O'Brien, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellee.
Following simultaneous trials, defendants Robinson and Thomas were convicted by the court and a jury, respectively, of murder and attempted armed robbery and each was sentenced to an extended term of 60 years for murder and a term of 15 years for attempted armed robbery to be served
[93 Ill.Dec. 530] concurrently with the murder sentence. On appeal, Thomas contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement made while in police custody; (2) the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty after the denial of his pre-trial motion to waive a jury for sentencing denied his (a) sixth amendment right to a representative jury and (b) right to equal [139 Ill.App.3d 166] protection; (3) the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude all black persons from the jury violated his sixth amendment right to a representative jury; (4) he was denied a fair trial by (a) certain objections made by counsel for Robinson which implied that Robinson disputed defendant's version of the occurrence; (b) evidence and argument regarding the victim's wife and children; and (c) testimony that the victim was a police officer; (5) he was improperly sentenced to an extended term for murder; and (6) he was denied a fair sentencing hearing where the prosecutor used his silence as evidence of his guilt of another crime. Robinson joins in Thomas' contention with respect to the impropriety of the extended-term sentence for murder and also contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress his statements.
Defendant Thomas testified that on September 12, 1981, when the police came to his home they did not show him an arrest warrant or tell him there was one outstanding. They asked him to accompany them to their car which he did. He was not told that he was under arrest or that he could not leave. The officers asked him whether he knew what they wanted to talk to him about but that is the only conversation they had in the car. He was taken to an interrogation room at the police station where, after being handcuffed to a ring on the wall, he was advised of his rights and questioned. He gave the officers a summary of his knowledge of the Weinschenk stabbing and then had a conversation with an assistant State's Attorney following which he gave a court-reported statement. Defendant stated on cross-examination that when the police came to the house, his sister was downstairs talking to them. They called him downstairs and asked whether he would walk to the car with them. They did not have their guns out nor did they handcuff him and they agreed that his sister and mother could accompany him. He was not handcuffed nor advised of his rights while in the car.
Officer O'Connor testified that from other officers he learned that the victim said two black males were involved and that approximately six other people had observed two black males in their early twenties in the vicinity of the incident. Articles of clothing, two garment bags, a shoulder bag, and a piece of paper with three telephone numbers on it were found in an alley about 2 1/2 blocks from the stabbing. Further investigation connected those numbers to defendant, who was not at home when O'Connor and another officer went there. They returned later and talked to his sister who told them that she had seen Robinson shortly after their earlier visit and when she told him that the police were looking for her brother, Robinson said, "I don't know why they are looking for Darryl, I stabbed the man." O'Connor testified also that he and the other officer had not entered the building and were still talking to defendant's sister when they were joined by defendant. He agreed to go with them to the station for an interview. While in the car defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and while he was not told then that he was free to go, neither was he placed under arrest. Defendant's mother and sister went to the second-floor offices at the police station but were not present with him in the interview room. O'Connor did not remember whether defendant was handcuffed during the interview.
Officer Markham testified that defendant was not handcuffed in any manner when he was in the interview room nor was he searched or fingerprinted when he was brought into the station. On cross-examination, he stated that defendant agreed to tour the area with them and to go to the station. He gave defendant his Miranda Tiola Phillips, defendant's mother, testified that it was Linda Parks, defendant's girl friend, rather than his sister, Denice, who accompanied them to the police station. The officers did not handcuff defendant when they got into the police car but when they got out of the car at the station, his arms were handcuffed behind his back. He and the officers went to a room on the second floor and when the door opened she could see that defendant was sitting in a chair along a wall but she could not tell whether he was handcuffed at that time. The trial court denied the motion to suppress finding that defendant was not in custody when he gave the statement.
[93 Ill.Dec. 531] rights when he got into the car but testified that he was not in custody at that time and was free to leave. There were no conversations in the car with him concerning the Weinschenk homicide and at the station he interviewed in a room with a glass window. Markham also said the use of an interview room did not indicate that the defendant was in custody because witnesses are always interviewed in those rooms. He was not handcuffed in that room and he made his statement as soon as he was asked what happened at the loop parking garage.
Officer Markham testified that he and his partner, Officer O'Connor, were at the violent crimes office when defendant Robinson came to the station with his attorney. In the presence of his attorney, Robinson was informed of his rights. He declined to make a statement and was placed in a holding room while the police tried to contact the witnesses for a lineup. Robinson's attorney left after learning that lineup arrangements were being made. Markham had no further conversations with Robinson after he was placed in the interview room. On cross-examination, Markham stated that he did ask Robinson certain questions necessary in making out the arrest slip but he did not question him about the crime because Robinson declined to make a statement. He was not present when anyone else questioned Robinson about the crime and to his knowledge, his partner, Officer O'Connor, did not do so.
Officer Robertson testified that when he came on duty he made several telephone calls, but was not able to locate witnesses for Robinson's lineup. He did not speak to Robinson while he was on duty and, as far as he knew, none of the other officers talked to him regarding the Weinschenk homicide.
Officer O'Callaghan testified that, early in the afternoon of September 16, 1981, he brought Robinson to the second floor of the station and, after informing him that he was going to conduct some lineups, told him that he should notify his attorney and also advised him of his rights. Robinson said that he didn't think he had to call his lawyer; that he would cooperate and could probably straighten out the whole matter. Markham again explained Robinson's rights to him and after acknowledging that he understood them, Robinson said that he thought he could put the whole case toghether. Robinson then gave the following version of events:
He had some knowledge of the case because he had been sitting in a schoolyard on the west side talking to a friend of his named Darryl and to another guy. While they drank and smoked marijuana, Darryl and his friend talked about going downtown to rob some people and all three of them later rode an "L" toward the loop with Darryl carring a briefcase with tools and wire for hot-wiring cars. Robinson got off the "L" at some point and the other two individuals continued on their way. Darryl told Robinson about the Weinschenk homicide that night and Robinson thought he could lead Officer O'Callaghan to the other party.
O'Callaghan and Officer Triggs then took Robinson to the alleys in the area of the homicide because Robinson said that he could help them find the murder weapon, the briefcase, and some other evidence. Based on information he said he had received from Thomas, Robinson directed the Stuart Palmer, an assistant State's Attorney, testified that Robinson initially told him that he didn't want to talk to the State's Attorney's office, stating that "I have already told my story to the detective and I told him the truth and the reason I don't want to talk to the states' attorneys' office is because I have to leave myself a fighting chance." Palmer did not have a chance to say anything to Robinson before he made the above comments and he left immediately after the comments. He noticed nothing unusual about Robinson nor did Robinson complain about his treatment.
[93 Ill.Dec. 532] officers through certain alleys. The second alley was the same alley in which the police had obtained the clothing on the night of the homicide. They found nothing else and...
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