People v. Thompson

• Citation: 83 N.Y.2d 477,633 N.E.2d 1074,611 N.Y.S.2d 470
• Parties: , 633 N.E.2d 1074 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Angela C. THOMPSON, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 30 March 1994
• Court: New York Court of Appeals

Page 470

611 N.Y.S.2d 470

83 N.Y.2d 477, 633 N.E.2d 1074

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Angela C. THOMPSON, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 30, 1994.

Robert M. Morgenthau, Dist. Atty., of New York County, New York City (Donald J. Siewert and Mark Dwyer, of counsel), for appellant.

Ronald R. Laskorski, and Larry J. Sheehan, Scarsdale, for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

LEVINE, Judge.

Defendant was indicted and convicted after trial of the sale of two ounces, 33 grains of cocaine (a class A-I felony) to an undercover police officer on August 31, 1988. The trial testimony established that, in a known drug location, defendant sold the undercover officer 214 vials of cocaine for $2,000 and promised to "take care of" him "the next time" he came. At the time of the sale she was 17 years old. Conviction of a class A-I felony carries a mandatory indeterminate prison sentence, the minimum of which is not less than 15 years and not more than 25 years, the maximum of which is life imprisonment (Penal Law § 70.00[2][a]; [3][a][i]. The trial court, however, determined that in defendant's case, imposing even the minimum mandatory sentence of 15 years to life would constitute cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const. 8th Amend.; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 5). The court, therefore, imposed an indeterminate sentence of eight years to life imprisonment. A divided Appellate Division affirmed (190 A.D.2d 162, 596 N.Y.S.2d 421), the dissenters voting to reverse the sentence and remand the case to Supreme Court for resentencing in compliance with the Penal Law's mandatory sentencing provisions for an A-I felony conviction. A Justice of the Appellate Division granted the People's application for leave to appeal, and we now reverse.

In People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338, cert. denied 423 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 372, 46 L.Ed.2d 287, this Court in an opinion by Chief Judge Breitel, albeit not without doubts expressed regarding the wisdom of the severity of the sentencing scheme for drug offenses enacted in 1973 (L. 1973, chs. 276-278), upheld the facial and as applied validity of the mandatory maximum life imprisonment sentence and various mandatory minimum prison sentences in that legislation as against challenges under the cruel and unusual punishment prohibitions of the State and Federal Constitutions. In Broadie, this Court adopted the principle that a sentence may constitute cruel and unusual punishment by being " 'cruelly' excessive, that is, grossly disproportionate to the crime for which [it is] exacted" (37 N.Y.2d, at 125, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 [citations omitted]; see also, id., at 111, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338). A majority of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, reaffirmed the same principle, that gross disproportionality of a sentence of imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause (id., 501 U.S. at 997-998, 111 S.Ct., at 2703, 115 L.Ed.2d, at 866 [Kennedy, J., concurring with O'Connor and Souter, JJ.]; id., 501 U.S. at 1013-1016, 111 S.Ct., at 2711-2713, 115 L.Ed.2d, at 877-879 [White, J., dissenting with Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.]; see also, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289-290, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3009, 77 L.Ed.2d 637; Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377, 30 S.Ct. 544, 553, 54 L.Ed. 793).

In assessing the proportionality of the mandatory sentences in People v. Broadie, our analysis focused on the following factors: (1) the gravity of the offense, primarily in terms of the harm it causes society, but also in comparison with punishments imposed for other crimes in this State as well as with punishments for the same or similar crimes in other jurisdictions (supra, at 112, 115, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338); and (2) "the character of the offender and the gravity of the threat he [or she] poses to society" (id., at 113, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338; see also, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S., at 290-293, 103 S.Ct., at 3009-3011, supra ).

In People v. Broadie, we found that "[m]easured thus by the harm it inflicts upon the addict, and, through him, upon society as a whole, drug dealing in its present epidemic proportions is a grave offense of high rank " (supra, at 113, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 [emphasis supplied]. Although the statutory sentencing scheme at the time equated the punishment level for drug dealing with that for the most heinous crimes of violence defined in the Penal Law, this Court found such severity not to be unreasonable because "drug-related crimes may be much more prevalent, that is, have a higher and rising incidence, than other crimes comparably punished or equally grave crimes not as severely punished, requiring greater isolation and deterrence" (id., at 116, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338).

Turning in our constitutional analysis to the character of the eight defendants whose sentences were reviewed in People v. Broadie, the Court recognized that, although not all of the defendants were "hardened" criminals, each was convicted of at least "street" sales or possession of large amounts of narcotics and none was what might be described as merely an "accidental" offender; therefore, we concluded that each could reasonably be considered a serious threat to society meriting severe punishment (id., at 113-114, 117, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338). Accordingly, in Broadie, we found none of the sentences was grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, and concluded that the mandatory imprisonment provisions for drug-related crimes withstood both the facial and as applied challenges to their constitutionality. We nonetheless cautioned that, in the future, the mandatory drug sentencing laws might present "some rare case on its particular facts [where it could] be found that the statutes have been unconstitutionally applied" (id., at 119, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338).

In People v. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694, 385 N.Y.S.2d 525, 350 N.E.2d 913, this Court was again called upon to determine whether the imposition of the mandatory maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a drug-related offense violated the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments. The defendant, a "millhand" in a large-scale heroin packaging and distribution operation, was arrested in a January 1970 raid and charged with joint possession (with 14 others) of over four pounds of heroin seized in the raid. She was offered (as were the other millhands) an opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser offense with a one-to-three-year sentence. She declined the offer and was found guilty after trial. A majority of this Court ruled that the mandatory sentence she received did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. In so ruling, the majority rejected the dissent's conclusion that the marked discrepancy between her sentence and the sentence meted out to the other millhands, who had accepted the prosecution's plea proposal, constituted cruel and unusual punishment because it presented such a gross violation of the principle of equality of treatment for equally culpable offenders and had the effect of penalizing the defendant for exercising her right to a trial.

We last measured mandatory sentences for drug selling and possession against the constitutional proscriptions of cruel and unusual punishments in People v. Donovan, 59 N.Y.2d 834, 464 N.Y.S.2d 745, 451 N.E.2d 492, affg. 89 A.D.2d 968, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118. As disclosed in the dissenting memorandum of Presiding Justice Milton Mollen at the Appellate Division (89 A.D.2d, at 968-971, 454 N.Y.S.2d 118, supra ), the defendant was convicted of first degree criminal sale and first degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, in connection with the sale of just under four ounces of cocaine by her boyfriend, a narcotics dealer, to an undercover officer. Defendant's involvement in the transaction was in procuring the drugs, apparently without personal profit, at her boyfriend's behest (the presentence report stated that the offense was "out of character" for her). She rejected an offer of a one-to-three-year sentence in exchange for a plea to a lesser offense. Her conviction after trial resulted in the imposition of the minimum mandatory sentence, 15 years to life imprisonment, while her boyfriend, the principal actor in the transaction, received a sentence of lifetime probation for subsequently cooperating with the authorities. We again rejected the defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim (People v. Donovan, 59 N.Y.2d, at 836, 464 N.Y.S.2d 745, 451 N.E.2d 492, supra ).

Considered in light of the analysis developed in our own and Supreme Court precedents, we must conclude that the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishments were not transgressed on the record and facts of this case. Manifestly, the Legislature may constitutionally define criminal punishments without giving the courts any sentencing discretion (Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 466-467, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1928, 114 L.Ed.2d 524, 539). Even the most severe mandatory sentences may be fixed for sale or even possession of quantities of cocaine so large as to support the inference that they were held for purposes of sale, because of the pernicious effect of drug trafficking on society (Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001-1003, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2705-2706, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 870, supra ). Thus, in Harmelin, the majority of the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for possession of over 650 grams of cocaine. Indeed, the most salient factor cited by the dissenting Justices in voting to overturn the mandated sentence was the absence of any possibility of parole for the lifetime of the offender, a result the dissenters found only permissible if the conduct was "so atrocious that society's interest in deterrence and...