People v. Thompson, Docket No. 130825.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Taylor
• Citation: 477 Mich. 146,730 N.W.2d 708
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Keith Demond THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee.
• Docket Number: Docket No. 130825.,Calendar No. 6.
• Decision Date: 01 May 2007

730 N.W.2d 708 477 Mich. 146 PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Keith Demond THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellee. Docket No. 130825. Calendar No. 6. Supreme Court of Michigan. May 1, 2007.

[730 N.W.2d 709]

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, David S. Leyton, Prosecuting Attorney, and Donald A. Kuebler, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, Flint, for the people.

Patrick K. Ehlmann, East Lansing, for the defendant.

Before the Entire Bench.

TAYLOR, C.J.

The issue in this case is whether MCL 333.7405(1)(d), which, among other things, forbids a person from knowingly "keep[ing] or maintain[ing]" a vehicle that is used for keeping or selling controlled substances, requires for a conviction that the prosecutor show, as was stated in People v. Griffin, 235 Mich.App. 27, 32, 597 N.W.2d 176 (1999), that the defendant's actions occurred "continuously for an appreciable period."

We reject the Griffin Court construction of the statute and hold that while the statute precludes a conviction for an isolated incident without other evidence of continuity, the statute does not require the prosecution to show that a defendant's actions occurred "continuously for an appreciable

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period." Because the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle on the basis of the Griffin Court's construction of the statute, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for reconsideration in light of the test we adopt today.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Acting on a tip that defendant, who had the nickname of "Doughboy," was going to deliver some drugs at a parking lot of a restaurant, several law enforcement officers went to that location. A white van fitting the description of the vehicle "Doughboy" was expected to be driving entered and parked. A woman who appeared to have been waiting for the white van got out of a nearby red sedan and got into the van through its rear passenger door. A few minutes later she stepped out of the van, got back into the sedan, and started to back up the sedan in order to drive away. After the police stopped the sedan, they found four rocks of crack cocaine on the floorboard of the driver's side of the sedan, and a crack pipe and lighter were found on the floor near the backseat. A passenger hiding in the back of the sedan was found to be in possession of a small amount of marijuana.

As one of the officers approached the white van, defendant started getting out of the van with a cell phone in his hand and he turned toward the van so that the officer could not see his hands.¹ Another officer observed a man in the passenger seat of the van remove a piece of plastic from his mouth and toss it to the floor. This man was later taken to the hospital when, with increasingly slurred speech, he told an officer that he had swallowed some cocaine. While no drugs were found in the van or on the defendant, a $50 bill was found on the console of the van as well as an empty and ripped plastic bag that had been twisted in a manner typical of drug packaging. As for the woman who had entered the van, a detective testified that defendant said that the woman had owed him money and had paid him the $50 she owed him, and that he had then given her a $20 rock of crack cocaine.²

After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv), and maintaining a drug vehicle, MCL 333.7405(1)(d).³

The Court of Appeals affirmed the cocaine delivery conviction but reversed the conviction of maintaining a drug vehicle for the reason that there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction.⁴ The

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Court of Appeals, relying on Griffin, summarized its holding as follows:

The prosecution did not present evidence that defendant exercised authority or control over the white van for an appreciable period of time for the purposes of making the van available for selling or keeping drugs. The prosecution only presented evidence that defendant used the van for selling or keeping drugs on the night of April 9, 2003. Because defendant's conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, we reverse defendant's conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle.⁵

The prosecutor filed an application for leave to appeal regarding the reversal of the conviction for maintaining a drug vehicle, and defendant filed an application for leave to file a cross-appeal regarding the affirmance of his delivery conviction. We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal, but denied defendant's cross-application.⁶

We limited the grant of leave to appeal to the issues whether a defendant must "keep or maintain" a vehicle used for the purpose of selling a controlled substance "continuously for an appreciable period of time" as required by Griffin, supra at 32-33, 597 N.W.2d 176, in order to sustain a conviction under MCL 333.7405(1)(d) and whether the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to sustain the defendant's conviction for keeping or maintaining a drug vehicle.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether MCL 333.7405(1)(d) requires the prosecutor to show that a defendant's actions occurred "continuously for an appreciable period" is a legal question, and we review legal questions de novo. People v. Morey, 461 Mich. 325, 329-330, 603 N.W.2d 250 (1999). Our fundamental obligation when interpreting statutes is "to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute." Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). Pursuant to MCL 8.3a, undefined statutory terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning, unless the undefined word or phrase is a term of art.⁷ We consult a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that lack a unique legal meaning. Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 456, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). This is because the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary, not in a legal dictionary. Horace v. City of Pontiac, 456 Mich. 744, 756, 575 N.W.2d 762 (1998).

III. ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTE

We have not previously had the occasion to construe MCL 333.7405(1)(d). The Court of Appeals, however, has issued two published opinions addressing it in the context of a charge of maintaining a drug house. First, in People v. Bartlett, 231 Mich.App. 139, 147, 585 N.W.2d 341 (1998), the panel, citing Wahrer v. State, 901 P.2d 442, 444 (Alaska App., 1995), explained, "Alas Stat. 11.71.040(a)(5), which mirrors MCL 333.7405(d); MSA 14.15(7405)(d), requires proof that the defendant knew that the premises were being used for continuing

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illegal drug activity ...." The Court rejected the defendant's claim that the jury instructions were erroneous when the trial court refused to tell the jury that "keep or maintain" required "general supervisory control" rather than merely control or "general control." Second, in Griffin, supra, another panel, without reference to Bartlett, considered a defendant's claim that the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to support his conviction of maintaining a drug house. The defendant did not contest the fact that the house at issue was a drug house; he only challenged whether there was evidence that he had kept or maintained it. The Court of Appeals determined that the prosecution had presented sufficient evidence. In its opinion the panel stated:

We hold that to "keep or maintain" a drug house it is not necessary to own or reside at one, but simply to exercise authority or control over the property for purposes of making it available for keeping or selling proscribed drugs and to do so continuously for an appreciable period. [Griffin, supra at 32, 597 N.W.2d 176 (emphasis added).]

With this in mind, we turn to an analysis of the proper meaning of this phrase.

MCL 333.7405(1)(d) provides, as relevant here, that a person "[s]hall not knowingly keep or maintain a ... vehicle ... that is used for keeping or selling controlled substances in violation of this article." To determine the proper meaning of "keep or maintain" we first examine the statute itself. As with most statutory phrases, neither the individual word "keep" or "maintain" nor the phrase "keep or maintain" is defined in the statute.

Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991) defines "keep" as "to maintain ..., to cause to continue in a given position, state, course, or action." (Emphasis added.) It defines "maintain" as "to keep in existence or continuance." Id. (emphasis added).⁸ "Keep" is defined as "to maintain" and "maintain" is defined as "to keep." Thus, it appears that the terms "keep" and "maintain" are synonyms. The dissent contends that these two terms must be given distinct meanings because they are separated by the word "or." We respectfully disagree. The word "keep" is commonly understood to mean "maintain" and the word "maintain" is commonly understood to mean "keep." We cannot define these terms in a manner that is inconsistent with how they are commonly understood just because they are separated by the word "or." In other words, the fact that these two terms are separated by the word "or" does not give us the authority to give these two terms distinct meanings when they are commonly understood to have the same meaning. If two words have the same meaning, then we must give them the same meaning even where they are separated by the word "or."

As discussed above, "keep" is defined as "to cause to continue" and "maintain" is defined as "to keep in existence or continuance." Id. (emphasis added). The words "keep" and "maintain" both contain an element of "continuity." Even the dissent's definitions of these terms contain an element of "continuity." The dissent defines "maintain" as "to keep in an existing state." Post at 717, quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (19...