People v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 06 June 1932
• Docket Number: April Term.,No. 168,168
• Citation: 259 Mich. 109,242 N.W. 857
• Parties: PEOPLE v. THOMPSON.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

259 Mich. 109

242 N.W. 857

PEOPLE

v.THOMPSON.

No. 168, April Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 6, 1932.

Appeal from Recorder's Court of Detroit; Sherman D. Callender, Judge.

Prosecution by the People against Laurel D. Thompson. Judgment granting defendant's motion to quash the information, and the People appeal.

Remanded, with directions.

Argued before the Entire Bench. Paul W. Voorhies, Atty. Gen., Harry S. Toy, Pros. Atty., and Eugene A. Walling and Edmund E. Shepherd, Asst. Pros. Attys., all of Detroit, for the People.

Benjamin D. Burdick, of Detroit, for appellee.

NORTH, J.

Defendant's motion to quash the information filed against him was granted on the ground that the statute (1 Comp. Laws 1929, §§ 4693 to 4754 inclusive) under which defendant was charged is unconstitutional. The people's appeal is from this holding. The pertinent portions of this statute, commonly known as the Uniform Motor Vehicle Act, read:

Title: ‘An Act to regular the operation of vehicles on highways; providing for traffic signs and signals; defining the power of local authorities to enact or enforce ordinances, rules or regulations in regard to matters embraced within the provisions of this act; providing for the enforcement of this act and for penalties for violations thereof; to make uniform the law relating to the subject matter of this act and to repeal certain acts and sections of acts.’

‘Sec. 30. Duty to stop and report in event of accident.

‘(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in section fifty-six (56) of this act.

‘(b) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in damage to property shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident and any person violating this provision shall upon conviction be punished as provided in section fifty-three-a (53-a) of this act.

‘(c) The driver of any vehicle involved in any accident resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to property shall also give his name, address, and the registration number of his vehicle, also the name and address of the owner, and exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance including the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or is requested by the injured person.

‘(d) The driver of every motor vehicle involved in an accident resulting in a vehicle or vehicles becoming so disabled as to be incapable of being propelled in the usual manner, or resulting in personal injury or death of any person shall report such accident to the nearest or most convenient police station or police officer within forty-eight (48) hours after such accident. The officer receiving such report shall forthwith forward the same to the commissioner of public safety on forms to be prescribed by him. Such report shall not be available for use in any court action, but it shall be for the purpose of furnishing statistical information as to the number and cause of accidents.’

‘Sec. 53. Penalties for Misdemeanors.

‘(a) It shall be unlawful and constitute a misdemeanor for any person to violate any of the provisions of this act unless such violation is by this act or other law of this state declared to be a felony.

‘(b) Every person convicted of a misdemeanor for a violation of any of the provisions of this act for which another penalty is not provided shall for a conviction thereof within one (1) year be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred (100) dollars or by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not more than ten (10) days. * * * [The section also includes the penalty for second and third or subsequent convictions.]’

Section 54 provides the penalty for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or narcotics.

Section 55 provides the penalty for reckless driving.

‘Sec. 56. Penalty for failure to stop in event of accident involving injury or death to a person.

‘Every person convicted of knowingly or wilfully violating section thirty (30) of this act relative to the duty to stop in the event of certain accidents shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or municipal jail for not less than thirty (30) days nor more than one (1) year, or in the state prison for not less than one (1) nor more than five (5) years, or by fine of not less than one hundred (100) dollars nor more than five thousand (5,000) dollars or by both such fine and imprisonment. The secretary of state shall have the power to suspend the operator's or chauffeur's license of the person so convicted for as long a period as he sees fit.’

Defendant asserts unconstitutionality:

(I) Because the act embraces more than one object and subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 30 of said act embrace subjects not included in the title.

(II) Because section 30 is so ‘vague, indefinite, uncertain and ambiguous' that it takes liberty and property without due process of law. This objection is also made to sections 53 and 56 when read by themselves or in connection with section 30. And, further, because section 30 compels all persons without regard to their culpability to perform the things enumerated therein, it takes liberty and property without due process of law.

(III) Because the act by the uncertainty of its language delegates to the court and jury legislative power to create or define the offense charged, contrary to article 5, § 1, of Michigan's Constitution, which provides that the legislative power of the state of Michigan is vested in the Senate and House of Representatives.

(IV) Also because subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 30 compel the accused person to perform acts and give information that may compel him to be a witness against himself in a criminal case contrary to article 2, section 16, of Michigan's Constitution, which reads: ‘No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. * * *’

One. The insufficiency of the title is not stressed in defendant's brief, except the contention is made that subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 30 ‘require something to be done by any accused after the operation of the automobile has ceased.’ This has reference to the requirement that the driver of a motor vehicle involved in an accident shall give certain specified information, render assistance in certain cases, and make report of the accident. Decision in the trial court was not based upon this contention, and we think it is not well founded. It is self-evident that the subdivisions (c) and (d) of section 30 are germane to the general purpose of this act which is ‘to regulate the operation of motor vehicles on the highways,’ etc. It is well within the purport of the title of the act to include provisions governing the conduct of parties incident to highway accidents.

Two. In support of his contention that section 30 should be held invalid because it is so vague, indefinite, uncertain, and ambiguous as to result in depriving one of his liberty and property without due process of law, defendant stresses a lack of certainty in the meaning of the following words or expressions as used in this statute: ‘Accident;’ ‘involved in an accident;’ ‘immediately stop;’ ‘resulting in injury or death to any person or damage to property;’ ‘reasonable assistance, including the carrying of such person to a physician or surgeon for medical or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary;’ and ‘involved in an accident resulting in a vehicle or vehicles becoming so disabled as to be incapable of being propelled in the usual manner.’ A contention so similar in character as to be controlling here was made in behalf of the defendant in People v. McMurchy, 249 Mich. 147, 228 N. W. 723, 733. Justice Butzel, writing for the court, quoted with approval the following: ‘The question whether given legislative enactments have been thus wanting in certainty has frequently been before this court. In some of the cases the statutes involved were upheld; in others, declared invalid. The precise point of differentiation in some instances is not easy of statement; but it will be enough for present purposes to say generally that the decisions of the court upholding statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that they employed words or phrases having a technical or other special meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to correctly apply them, Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U. S. 497, 502, 45 S. Ct. 141, 69 L. Ed. 402;Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348, 38 S. Ct. 323, 62 L. Ed. 763, or a well-settled common-law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the definition as to which estimates might differ, Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 376, 33 S. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232;International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, supra (234 U. S. [216]) at page 223, 34 S. Ct. 853, 58 L. Ed. 1284, or as broadly stated by Mr. Chief Justice White in United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81, 92, 41 S. Ct. 298, 301, 65 L. Ed. 516, 14 A. L. R. 1045, ‘that for reasons found to result either from the text of the statutes involved or the subjects with which they dealt, a standard of some sort was afforded.’' Connally v. Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (46 S. Ct. 126 ).

Justice Butzel added: ‘As pointed out in the opinion upholding the constitutionality of the law in the Maki Case [245 Mich. 455, 223 N. W. 70], there are many crimes on our statute books which must be defined by the use of words of a general and flexible meaning, and the existence or nonexistence of the essential elements of these crimes becomes a question of...