People v. Thornton, Docket No. 58839
Decision Date | 31 August 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 21,Docket No. 58839,21 |
Citation | 403 Mich. 389,269 N.W.2d 192 |
Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Maurice THORNTON, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar 403 Mich. 389, 269 N.W.2d 192 |
Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Edward Reilly Wilson, Principal Atty., Appeals, Craig L. John, Asst. Pros. Atty., Detroit, for plaintiff-appellant.
Carl Ziemba, Detroit, for defendant-appellee and cross-appellant.
The Court of Appeals held that where a plea-based conviction is vacated by the trial court on the defendant's motion for a new trial, the defendant may not be charged with a higher offense arising out of the same transaction. 70 Mich.App. 508, 246 N.W.2d 9 (1976). We agree.
Defendant, charged with second-degree murder, pled guilty to an added count of manslaughter on March 5, 1975. Two weeks later, on the day set for sentencing, substituted defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw the plea. The trial judge said: "If you want self-defense, I will grant your motion, and we will have a trial in 30 days." The defendant and his counsel then agreed that the plea of guilty of manslaughter would be maintained, but they wished to describe for the judge the facts relating to the self-defense theory in mitigation of the sentence. Defendant was then sentenced to imprisonment for 8 to 15 years.
New counsel was appointed on April 10, 1975. On May 2, 1975, defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" claiming that he had a possible defense of self-defense and alleging that the plea agreement was never affirmatively acknowledged by the defendant as required by GCR 1963, 785.7(2).
On May 13, 1975, the motion was heard. The trial judge said: When the defendant appeared before him on May 29, 1975, the following occurred:
Defendant was recharged with second-degree murder over his objection that People v. McMiller, 389 Mich. 425, 208 N.W.2d 451, Cert. den. 414 U.S. 1080, 94 S.Ct. 599, 38 L.Ed.2d 486 (1973), precluded his being recharged with any offense greater than manslaughter. A jury convicted him as charged and he was sentenced to 15 to 30 years in prison.
We held in McMiller that if the procedures prescribed in GCR 1963, 785 are not followed in accepting a plea of guilty and on that account the conviction is reversed on appeal, on remand the defendant may not be prosecuted for a higher offense arising out of the same transaction. We based our decision on reasons of policy recognized because of our desire to encourage compliance with the procedures prescribed by the court rule:
"Allowing trial on a higher charge following reversal of a plea-based conviction of a lesser offense would (1) discourage exercise of the defendant's right to appeal a conviction claimed to be based on an improperly accepted plea, and (2) tend to insulate from appellate scrutiny non-compliance with the guilty plea procedure established by the statute and the court rule." 389 Mich. 432, 208 N.W.2d 453.
Both in their brief and at oral argument the people conceded that, assuming McMiller's continuing vitality, 1 the Court of Appeals was correct in applying McMiller to the trial court's action in vacating the plea-based conviction. The people, however, urge us to reverse McMiller. The people maintain that the policy-based decision announced in McMiller should be overruled because (1) it involves a legislative determination best left to the Legislature; (2) it is contrary to the conclusions reached by the majority of jurisdictions that have addressed the issue; (3) it is unfair to hold the people to their bargain while allowing the defendant to "breach" with impunity; and (4) it is unnecessary as an incentive for the proper taking of a guilty plea in light of the sanctions imposed for noncompliance with the prescribed plea-taking procedures set out in Guilty Plea Cases, 395 Mich. 96, 235 N.W.2d 132 (1975).
The people's arguments, while not without some force, include no contention we have not considered and expressly noted in previous decisions developing the McMiller rule. In McMiller we recognized that our decision would defeat the prosecutor's expectation that the defendant would stand convicted of the plea, would require the prosecutor to prove the lesser included offense at trial, and may limit the state to "a conviction less than the proofs may justify". 389 Mich. 432-434, 208 N.W.2d 453. In Guilty Plea Cases we observed that McMiller has prompted trial judges and prosecutors to express concern about a defendant's ability under McMiller to breach the plea-bargain contract with impunity and, by doing so, receive a "free ride". 395 Mich. 135, 235 N.W.2d 132.
Balanced against these considerations is our responsibility to ensure the integrity of the plea-taking process, the process that disposes of a significant portion of our criminal cases. McMiller, 389 Mich. 432-433, 208 N.W.2d 451. We strike the balance no differently today. Our responsibility to ensure careful adherence to the carefully worked-out guilty plea procedures is one that we have taken, and will continue to take, seriously. That apparently a majority of our sister states do not find McMiller's policy basis to be compelling gives us pause, and we have considered the reasoning of those courts carefully, but we do not understand that our responsibility can be discharged by unreflectively following the call of the majority.
While application of McMiller's strictures May limit the state "to a conviction less than the proofs may justify", we reject the assumption that...
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