People v. Timmsen

Citation401 Ill.Dec. 610,50 N.E.3d 1092
Decision Date24 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. 118181.,118181.
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jacob D. TIMMSEN, Appellee.
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Stephanie Hilton, State's Attorney, of Carthage (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Drew Meyer, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel and Justin A. Nicolosi, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Thomas A. Karalis, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the

State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice FREEMAN

delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The question presented in this appeal is whether police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant Jacob D. Timmsen's vehicle when he made a U-turn approximately 50 feet before a police roadblock. The circuit court of Hancock County found that defendant's U-turn justified the stop and denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the stop. A divided panel of the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted. 2014 IL App (3d) 120481, 383 Ill.Dec. 656, 14 N.E.3d 1267

. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015); R. 612(b) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The following facts are not in dispute.1 At approximately 1:15 a.m. on Saturday, December 17, 2011, defendant was driving eastbound on U.S. Highway 136 from Iowa to Illinois. The highway is a four-lane road, with two lanes in each direction. Just across the Illinois border, Illinois State Police had erected a safety roadblock. The roadblock was marked by an orange, diamond-shaped sign with black lettering. As defendant traveled into Illinois, he saw the police roadblock and made a U-turn at a railroad crossing, which was the only location to turn around before reaching the roadblock.2 The railroad crossing was located approximately 50 feet from the roadblock. After the U-turn, Hancock County Deputy Travis Duffy stopped defendant's vehicle as he proceeded westbound on Highway 136. Illinois State Police Officer Heath Miller was stationed at the roadblock and saw Deputy Duffy pull over defendant's vehicle. Deputy Duffy requested assistance and Trooper Miller went to the location where defendant's vehicle was stopped. Defendant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, in violation of section 6–303(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a)

(West 2010)).3 Defendant was also issued a citation for driving “to the left of center of roadway” in violation of section 11–706(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11–706(a) (West 2010)).4 Officers conducted an inventory search incident to arrest and recovered a metal pipe and less than one gram of marijuana from the vehicle.

¶ 4 Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that was recovered from the vehicle as well as evidence that he was driving with a suspended license. At the hearing on the motion, only defendant and Trooper Miller testified. Defendant testified that he saw the roadblock and made a U-turn at the railroad crossing, but did not give a reason for turning around and heading back toward Iowa. Trooper Miller stated that he saw Deputy Duffy stop defendant's vehicle, but he did not know why Deputy Duffy stopped the vehicle. Trooper Miller also stated that none of the police officers knew who was in the vehicle or that defendant's license had been suspended. He further admitted that the officers knew of no arrest or search warrant authorizing the stop of the vehicle or its occupants. The circuit court denied the motion, finding that defendant's U-turn 50 feet prior to the roadblock provided a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity that justified the stop. The parties subsequently agreed to proceed by way of a stipulated bench trial on the license charge and the court found defendant guilty of driving with a suspended license (625 ILCS 5/6–303(a)

(West 2014)). Defendant was sentenced to 24 months' conditional discharge and 90 days in the county jail.

¶ 5 On appeal, defendant argued that the police did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle and that his motion to suppress should have been granted. A divided panel of the appellate court agreed and found that, absent any other suspicious activity, the U-turn itself did not provide specific, articulable facts that a criminal offense had been or was about to be committed. 2014 IL App (3d) 120481, ¶ 16, 383 Ill.Dec. 656, 14 N.E.3d 1267

.5 The majority concluded that defendant's motion to suppress evidence should have been granted and reversed his conviction and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. Id. ¶ 17. The dissent disagreed and concluded that defendant's U-turn to avoid the roadblock provided the police with reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Pointing out that the majority failed to consider the totality of the circumstances, the dissent noted that the majority placed too much emphasis on the possibility of defendant's innocent conduct rather than the suspicious nature of making a U-turn in the middle of the night over railroad tracks shortly before a police roadblock. Id. ¶ 42 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). The State now appeals to this court.

¶ 6 ANALYSIS

¶ 7 The State makes two arguments on appeal. First, defendant's avoidance of the police roadblock provided reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop; and, alternatively, Deputy Duffy's reasonable mistake of law justified the stop. In response, defendant maintains that his legal U-turn, shortly before the police roadblock, did not rise to the level of reasonable suspicion; and, Deputy Duffy's purported mistake of law was not objectively reasonable.

¶ 8 Reasonable Suspicion

¶ 9 The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, which applies to the states under the fourteenth amendment, and article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution

protect people against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV ; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6.6

Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)

. The touchstone of the fourth amendment is “the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The law is well settled that stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants constitute a “seizure” within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255–56, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007) ; People v. Close, 238 Ill.2d 497, 504, 345 Ill.Dec. 620, 939 N.E.2d 463 (2010). Such a seizure is analyzed pursuant to the principles set forth in Terry, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (a routine traffic stop is a relatively brief encounter similar to a Terry stop rather than to a formal arrest); People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶ 25, 370 Ill.Dec. 804, 989 N.E.2d 192. Pursuant to Terry, a police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer reasonably believes that the person has committed, or is about to, commit a crime.7

Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 ; Close, 238 Ill.2d at 505, 345 Ill.Dec. 620, 939 N.E.2d 463. The officer must have a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that criminal activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000). Although “reasonable, articulable suspicion” is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer's suspicion must amount to more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The investigatory stop must be justified at its inception and the officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the governmental intrusion upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen. Id. at 20–21, 88 S.Ct. 1868. In judging the officer's conduct, we apply an objective standard and consider, “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. at 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Further, when evaluating the validity of the stop, we consider ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’ United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ).

¶ 10 Moreover, just as an officer must have reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a stop, an individual has the right to avoid an encounter with the police in the absence of reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court has made clear that “when an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673

; see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). Further, an individual's refusal to cooperate, without more, does not amount to reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. 673 ; Royer, 460 U.S. at 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319.

¶ 11 Since we are reviewing the circuit court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence, we apply a two-part standard of review. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill.2d 530, 542...

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  • People v. Boyd
    • United States
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    ...of "the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 50 N.E.3d 1092. "Although reasonable, articulable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause, an officer's suspicion must amount to more than......
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    ...the circumstances of the particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security.' " People v. Timmsen, 2016 IL 118181, ¶ 9, 50 N.E.3d 1092 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)). Our supreme court has interpreted the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution ......
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