People v. Town of Oran

• Decision Date: 27 September 1887
• Citation: 121 Ill. 650,13 N.E. 726
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel., etc., v. TOWN OF ORAN and others.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

121 Ill. 650

13 N.E. 726

PEOPLE ex rel., etc.,

v.TOWN OF ORAN and others.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September 27, 1887.

Appeal from appellate court, Third district.

Blinn & Hoblit, for appellants.

Oscar Allen and Beach & Hodnett, for appellees.

CRAIG, J.

This was a petition, in the name of the people, on relation of the town of Atlanta, in Logan county, for mandamus to compel the supervisor and assessor of the town of Oran to meet with the supervisor and assessor of the town of Atlanta, and agree as to the amount of indebtedness of the town of Atlanta which the town of Oran shall assume on account of certain territory being detached from the town of Atlanta, and joined to the town of Oran. It appears from the petition that in March, 1872, by an order of the board of supervisors of Logan county, six sections of land were detached from the town of Atlanta, and joined to the town of Oran. It also appears that, at the time the order was made, there was a legal bonded indebtedness existing against the town of Atlanta which the people of the six sections had assisted in making, amounting to the sum of $50,000. It also appeared that the town of Oran had never paid or assumed any portion of such indebtedness, but refused to make any arrangement with the town of Atlanta in relation thereto. To the petition the town of Oran pleaded the statute of limitations, as follows: And for a plea in this behalf defendants say that the petitioner ought not to maintain the said petition against them, the said defendants, because they say that the supposed cause of action in said declaration mentioned did not accrue to the petitioner within five years next before the commencement of this suit, in manner and form as petitionerhas above complained against them, the defendants, and this the defendants are ready to verify.

The petitioner demurred to the plea, but the court overruled the demurrer, and, petitioner electing to abide by its demurrer, the petition was dismissed, and judgment rendered against it for costs. The judgment of the circuit court was affirmed in the appellate court, and to reverse the latter judgment the petitioner brings the record here by appeal.

The petition was filed under sections 32, 33, 35, c. 139, Rev. St. 1874, which statute it is claimed required the supervisor and assessor of the town of Oran to meet the supervisor and assessor of the town of Atlanta, on notice, and determine the proportion of the indebtedness to be borne by each town. The three sections of the statute are as follows:

‘Sec. 32. When a town possessed of or entitled to money, rights, or credits, or other personal estate, shall be divided or altered, such personal estate, including moneys, shall be apportioned between the towns interested therein by the supervisors and assessors of such towns according to the amount of taxable property in the town divided or altered, as the same existed immediately before such division or alteration, to be ascertained by the last assessment list of such town, and such supervisors and assessors shall meet, for the purpose aforesaid, as soon as may be after the first town meeting subsequently held in such towns.

‘Sec. 33. Whenever a meeting of the supervisors and assessors of two or more towns shall be required, in order to carry into effect the provisions of this article, such a meeting may be called by either of said supervisors, but the supervisor calling the same shall give at least ten days' notice, in writing, to all the other officers, of the time and place at which such meeting is to be held.’

‘Sec. 35. Debts owing by a town so subdivided or altered shall be apportioned in the same manner as the personal propertyof the town, and each town shall thereafter be charged with its share of such debts, according to such apportionment.’

As has been seen, no steps were taken by the town of Atlanta to require the town of Oran to assume or pay a portion of the debt until more than 10 years after the territory was taken from one town and added to the other; and the question raised by the demurrer is whether this long delay is a bar to the proceeding. If, after the territory was detached from Atlanta, and added to Oran, the result was that the latter-named town became indebted to the former or to the bondholders, that the debt was of an ordinary character, such as one individual or town may owe to another, no argument is required to show that the statute of limitations would run against such a debt. But it is insisted by counsel for appellant that such is not the nature or...