People v. Townsend

• Decision Date: 07 April 1975
• Docket Number: Docket No. 19316,No. 1,1
• Citation: 60 Mich.App. 204,230 N.W.2d 378
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TOWNSEND, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 378

230 N.W.2d 378

60 Mich.App. 204

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert TOWNSEND, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 19316.

Court of Appeals of Michigan, Division No. 1.

April 7, 1975.

Released for Publication June 26, 1975.

Keller, Cohn, Downs & Svenson by Vesta E. Svenson, Detroit, for defendant-appellant.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., William L. Cahalan, Pros. Atty., Dominick R. Carnovale, Chief, Appellate Div., Robert A. Reuther, Asst. Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before V. J. BRENNAN, P.J., and HOLBROOK, and O'HARA, ^* JJ.

V. J. BRENNAN, Presiding Judge:

Defendant, Robert Townsend, was convicted by a jury in Wayne County Circuit Court of breaking and entering an occupied dwelling house in violation of M.C.L.A. § 750.110; M.S.A. § 28.305. He was sentenced to from 10 to 15 years in prison and now appeals. We affirm.

Defendant first contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to suppress defendant's prior criminal record. See People v. Jackson, 391 Mich. 323, 217 N.W.2d 22 (1974). We disagree. Prior to trial defendant sought to prevent the prosecutor from using his prior criminal record for inpeachment by filling a motion to suppress. A hearing was held wherein both parties agreed that the decision to suppress this evidence rested in the sound discretion of the trial judge, but then presented competing factors for the trial judge's consideration. Defendant's attorney argued that since two of the crimes were of the same kind as that for which defendant was presently being tried, any probative value they may have was outweighed by their prejudicial effect. The prosecutor, on the other hand, seeking to use only defendant's felony convictions for impeachment purposes, argued that the evidence of defendant's prior convictions was relevant, not remote in time and, therefore, admissible despite their similarity to the present offense. The trial judge, after listening to the arguments, denied defendant's motion. After reviewing the record we find ourselves unable to say that the trial judge abused his discretion. The convictions, which were ultimately introduced into evidence by defendant's own attorney after defendant took the stand to testify, were not for offenses violent or assaultive in nature, were not remote in time, and did reflect on defendant's honesty. While it is true the offenses were similar to the one for which defendant was on trial, this alone does not Require their exclusion. We find no error.

Defendant next contends that his conviction must be reversed because the trial judge erred in not granting his pretrial motion to suppress evidence of allegedly improper and prejudicial photographic identifications. In support of his claim in this regard, defendant first argues that he was denied his right to an attorney when certain photographs, at the request of the police, were shown to a witness by the complainant at a time when defendant was not provided the opportunity to have counsel present. Defendant, arguing that at the time the photographs were shown the police investigation had focused on him, maintains he was entitled to...