People v. Traughber
| Decision Date | 19 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 81206 |
| Citation | 439 N.W.2d 231,432 Mich. 208 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. David TRAUGHBER, Defendant-Appellant. 432 Mich. 208, 439 N.W.2d 231 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, and Janice M. Joyce Bartee and Janet Napp, Asst. Pros. Attys., Detroit, for the People.
Eric J. Colthurst, P.C. by Eric J. Colthurst, Plymouth, for defendant-appellant.
The issues presented in this case are whether the information for negligent homicide was sufficient to allow the defendant to adequately present a defense against specific acts of negligence, and whether the defendant was held to the correct standard of care.
We find that the information, coupled with the preliminary examination, did offer the defendant adequate notice of the acts of negligence for which he was being charged. However, we further find that while the trial court identified the correct standard of care, that of a reasonable person, the court failed to apply the reasonable-person standard to the emergency situation which confronted the defendant. Therefore, we reverse the conviction of David Traughber.
After waiving his right to a jury trial, defendant was convicted in the Wayne Circuit Court of negligent homicide, M.C.L. Sec. 750.324; M.S.A. Sec. 28.556. The judge sentenced defendant to three years probation, with the first three months to be served in the county jail. 1
The accident occurred at approximately 12:15 a.m. on December 22, 1984, on Denton Road, a dark, unlighted two-lane road with a 45 mph speed limit, in rural Canton Township, Wayne County.
Defendant was traveling south on Denton Road at approximately 35 mph, an uncontested fact, when he noticed the oncoming headlights of Linus Parr's automobile approximately three-quarters of a mile in front of him. Mr. Parr testified that he was traveling between 45 and 50 mph. As the two cars approached each other, each in its respective lane, defendant suddenly saw a large metal sign, later identified as a real estate sign, lying flat on the road. The defendant, now approximately thirty feet from the oncoming car, was faced with a split-second decision in an attempt to avoid the sign. Judging that he had enough space between himself and Mr. Parr's automobile the defendant swerved to the left, into the northbound lane, to go around the sign. Upon seeing defendant's car enter his lane and assuming it either would continue in the left lane or go completely off the road, Mr. Parr swerved his car into defendant's lane, the southbound lane. Simultaneously, as Mr. Parr was turning into the southbound lane, the defendant, now around the sign, was returning into his own lane. The two cars collided head-on just inside defendant's lane, the southbound lane. 2 Rochelle Richmond, who was sitting in Parr's passenger seat, was fatally injured. Mr. Parr and the defendant, as well as Jennifer Sellers, who was riding in the back seat of Mr. Parr's car, and Irene Baker, who was riding in the passenger seat of the defendant's car, received relatively minor injuries.
The Canton police arrived moments after the accident. Defendant was administered a preliminary breath test at the scene of the accident which showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.05 percent. After being taken to the Canton Police Department, defendant was administered two more Breathalyzer tests, one at 1:12 a.m. and another at 1:23 a.m. Each time the result was a blood-alcohol content of 0.04 percent. 3 Defendant was then charged with negligent homicide 4 and operating a motor vehicle without a valid license. 5
Defendant waived his arraignment, and a preliminary examination was conducted on February 14, 1985. After a bench trial, defendant was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle without a valid license, but was convicted of negligent homicide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion per curiam. 6 On March 22, 1988, we granted leave to appeal. 7
Defendant's first assertion is that the information for negligent homicide failed to specify the acts of negligence for which he was charged, and that due to this inadequate notice, he was unable to properly defend himself. The language of the negligent homicide statute, M.C.L. Sec. 750.324; M.S.A. Sec. 28.556, provides:
"Any person who, by the operation of any vehicle upon any highway or upon any other property, public or private, at an immoderate rate of speed or in a careless, reckless or negligent manner, but not wilfully or wantonly, shall cause the death of another, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or by both such fine and imprisonment."
The information filed by the prosecutor was in the statutory short form. 8 Specifically, the information read:
On the day of trial, prior to opening arguments, defense counsel requested that the prosecution identify "what actually was the act of negligence, carelessness, was it immoderate speed, what acts are they relying on, what acts do they intend to prove." 9 As the basis for this request, defense cited People v. Maki, 245 Mich. 455, 473, 223 N.W. 70 (1929), which held:
"Both in this State and elsewhere it is the rule that where a statute uses general or generic terms in describing an offense, does not sufficiently define the crime or set out all its essential elements, or where a charge in the language of the statute charges a mere legal conclusion, an information which alleges the crime in the words of the statute is not sufficient, but a more particular statement of facts is necessary."
The Maki Court reasoned that the word "negligence" is too indefinite and did not inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. Specifically, the Court said:
The negligent homicide statute expressly eliminates wilfulness and wantonness as elements of the crime, it sets up no definite standard of conduct or test of negligence, and does not even require that the accused shall have been conscious that he was negligent. Maki, supra at 475, 223 N.W. 70. It is for these reasons that an information for negligent homicide should set forth the specific acts of alleged negligence in order to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation. Id. Because the information in the instant case merely charged defendant in the language of the negligent homicide statute, we find it insufficient.
However, we believe that Judge Maher's concurrence in People v. Covington, 132 Mich.App. 79, 88, 346 N.W.2d 903 (1984), clearly and concisely sets forth what an information is intended to accomplish: "An information must be specific for two reasons: it affords the defendant due notice of the charges against him and protection against double jeopardy should he be retried." Thus, similar to the concern addressed in Maki, the dispositive question is whether the defendant knew what acts he was being tried for so he could adequately put forth a defense. Put another way, was the defendant prejudiced by the information which charged him with the statutory language of M.C.L. Sec. 750.324; M.S.A. Sec. 28.556. We hold that he was not.
Prior to trial, a preliminary examination was conducted. 10 The purpose of a preliminary examination is to determine whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause to believe that the defendant committed it. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 101 Mich.App. 772, 300 N.W.2d 516 (1980). During a preliminary examination, the prosecution is not required to prove that a defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Joyner, 93 Mich.App. 554, 287 N.W.2d 286 (1979). However, there must be evidence to establish each element of the offense, or evidence from which those elements may be inferred. Wayne Co. Prosecutor v. Recorder's Court Judge, 92 Mich.App. 119, 284 N.W.2d 507 (1979). In the instant case, evidence was presented at the preliminary examination that alleged the defendant was negligent because he swerved to the left, rather than to the right, when he attempted to avoid the fallen sign.
Further, in his response to the defense's pretrial request for a more specific information, the prosecutor stated that he did not believe there would be any proofs as to immoderate speed. The prosecution said that it would be "proceeding with evidence only as to operating a vehicle in a careless, reckless or negligent manner as the information states."
In sum, before trial began, defendant was aware that no proofs of immoderate speed would be offered...
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