People v. Troyer
| Decision Date | 22 February 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. S180759.,S180759. |
| Citation | 51 Cal.4th 599,120 Cal.Rptr.3d 770,246 P.3d 901 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert TROYER, Defendant and Appellant. |
J. Wilder Lee, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Donald E. DeNicola, Deputy State Solicitor General, David A. Rhodes, Daniel B. Bernstein and Doris A. Calandra, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Law Offices of Ronald Richards & Associates, Ronald Richards, Nicholas Bravo and Patrick T. Santos as Amici Curiae.
[1]"[T]he 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.' "
( Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639.) Thus, "searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." ( Id. at p. 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371.) "Nevertheless, because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is 'reasonableness,' the warrant requirement is subject to certain exceptions." ( Brigham City v. Stuart (2006) 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650.) In particular, "law enforcement officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." ( Ibid.)
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal found the record sufficient under the emergency aid exception to justify a warrantless entry by police into a residence to search for additional victims of a recent shooting. The Court of Appeal, however, reversed the judgment because it found the police erred in entering a locked upstairs bedroom, where marijuana, related paraphernalia, and firearms were found in plain view. Because the police did not need "ironclad proof of 'a likely serious, life-threatening' injury to invoke the emergency aid exception" to the warrant requirement in order to enter the bedroom but merely " 'an objectively reasonable basis for believing' that medical assistance was needed, or persons were in danger"( Michigan v. Fisher (2009) 558 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct. 546, 549, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (per curiam)), we reverse the Court of Appeal.
This was the situation confronting Elk Grove Police Department Sergeant Tim Albright, a 15-year veteran, on June 6, 2007, according to the testimony elicited at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress:
At 12:18 p.m., police dispatch broadcast a report of shots fired at 9253 Gem Crest Way in Elk Grove. An unidentified male had "possibly been shot twice," and the suspects were driving "a two-door Chevrolet product." Sergeant Albright, the first officer to respond, arrived at the scene at 12:20 p.m., but he was in plainclothes and an unmarked vehicle. The suspects' vehicle was nowhere in sight, so Albright approached the front porch of the residence, where a 40-year-old White male was administering first aid to a female victim (later identified as Mia Zapata) who had been shot multiple times. A Hispanic male, later identified as Adrien Abeyta, was also on the porch. He had a wound on the top of his head, and blood was streaming onto his face and T-shirt.
Zapata was in obvious distress and "an altered level of consciousness." She was not able to provide information to the officer. Albright turned to Abeyta to find out what had happened, but it was difficult to get information from him because he, too, was excited and agitated. Abeyta did say that two individuals were involved, a White male and a Black male, and that they had fled westbound in a blue or black two-door Chevrolet Tahoe.
Albright noticed there was blood on the front door—smudge marks and blood droplets in multiple areas, including "near the handle side of the door." This indicated to him that a bleeding victim had come into contact with that door "at some point," either by entering or exiting the house, so he asked Abeyta whether anyone was inside. Abeyta stared at the officer for 15 or 20 seconds but did not respond. When Albright repeated the question, Abeyta stared at him again but eventually said that he "did not think so." Needing clarification, Albright asked the question for a third time. Abeyta took a "long"pause to stare at the officer and then said "no."
The situation was "[v]ery chaotic." Zapata was screaming and asking for water over and over, and Albright was attempting to direct the citizen in providing first aid. Abeyta, too, was in an excitable state and was yelling and screaming for medical personnel. Sirens announced the arrival of both fire trucks and patrol vehicles. In the midst of this, Albright was concerned that Abeyta's eventual response that no one was inside the house was untruthful or, because of his head injury, inaccurate, and therefore was worried that there might be additional victims—or even additional suspects—inside. But the window blinds were closed, and, with all the noise, Albrightcould not focus on whether there were any sounds coming from inside the residence. Under these circumstances, Albright decided that he had a responsibility to verify whether there were additional victims or suspects in the house.
Albright asked Abeyta whether the keys attached to a lanyard in his hand were to the residence and explained the urgency in locating potential victims or suspects inside. Abeyta replied that the keys were to the residence, but declined to give permission to enter the house. When Albright warned him that the officers would otherwise have to kick in the door, Abeyta unlocked it. After announcing their presence (and hearing no response), a team of uniformed peace officers entered the house to look for victims and suspects. After clearing the downstairs, the officers headed upstairs, continuing to look in places where a body could be.
Officer Samuel Seo approached a locked bedroom door. He announced his presence outside the door and, hearing no response, kicked the door open. Seo immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana and observed an electronic scale and quarter-size balls of the drug. After verifying there was no one in the house, Seo relayed his observations to Detective Mark Bearor, who prepared an affidavit for a search warrant. The warranted search uncovered additional marijuana; a live marijuana plant; two semiautomaticpistols, a shotgun, a Winchester rifle, and ammunition; over $9,000 in cash; and indicia linking defendant Albert Troyer to the residence.
The parties stipulated that defendant, who was not home at the time of the search, had standing to challenge the police entry into and search of the residence. Following the hearing, the superior court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant then pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of marijuana for sale and unauthorized cultivation of marijuana, and admitted arming enhancements for both offenses. (Health & Saf.Code, §§ 11358, 11359; Pen.Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1).) The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on probation for five years on the condition he serve one year in jail.
A divided panel of the Court of Appeal reversed and directed the trial court to enter an order granting the motion to suppress. The majority reasoned that although the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the initial entry into the residence, it did not justify entry into the locked upstairs bedroom because "there were insufficient facts for the officers to reasonably believe there was somebody inside the locked upstairs bedroom who was seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury." The majority also found that the entry could not be justified as a protective sweep under Maryland v. Buie (1990) 494 U.S. 325, 110 S.Ct. 1093, 108 L.Ed.2d 276, inthat there were insufficient facts to justify a reasonable belief " there were dangerouspeople inside the house, let alone inside the locked upstairs bedroom." Justice Nicholson, dissenting, argued that the justification for the initial entry into the locked house under the emergency aid exception also justified entry into the locked bedroom and cautioned: " That, in hindsight, no other victim was found in the residence may make it more comfortable to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment, but it did not make the search less reasonable."
We granted the People's petition for review.
In California, issues relating to the suppression of evidence derived from governmental searches and seizures are reviewed under federal constitutional standards. ( People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156, fn. 8, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977.) Defendant contends that the police entry into his home was an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Because a warrantless entry into a home is presumptively unreasonable, the government bears the burden of establishing that exigent circumstances or another exception to the warrant requirement justified the entry. ( Rogers, at p. 1156, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977.)
The parties agree that "police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury." ( Brigham City v. Stuart, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 400, 126 S.Ct. 1943.) " 'The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency.' " ( Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290.) " ' "There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers." ' " ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) On appeal, we uphold the trial court's factual findings if they are...
To continue reading
Request your trial