People v. Trucchio

Citation605 N.Y.S.2d 649,159 Misc.2d 523
Decision Date23 November 1993
Docket NumberJ-7
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Ronald TRUCCHIO, Defendant
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New York)

Ronald Rubinstein, Kew Gardens, for defendant.

Richard A. Brown, Dist. Atty., Queens County by Joseph A. Lobosco and Peter J. McCormack, Asst. Dist. Attys., Kew Gardens, for People.

STEVEN W. FISHER, Justice.

The principal issue presented on this motion to dismiss involves whether an administrative finding on a traffic ticket may collaterally estop a District Attorney from offering evidence at a suppression hearing in a felony case.

The pertinent facts are largely undisputed.

On August 18, 1992, police stopped the defendant's vehicle for allegedly running a red light. The stop led to the discovery of a defaced weapon in the car and the defendant was arrested for its possession. At the precinct, the defendant was issued two traffic summonses, one charging him with passing the red light, the other with driving without a license.

On January 8, 1993, the instant indictment was filed. The first two counts each charged the defendant with criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. The third count alleged that he had failed to obey a steady red signal and therefore had committed the infraction of failure to obey traffic control signal indications in violation of V.T.L. 1111(d)(1).

On March 24, 1993, while the indictment was pending in Supreme Court, a hearing was held on the traffic summonses at the Department of Motor Vehicles. The detective who stopped the defendant's car testified and was cross-examined by defense counsel. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge announced: "I find [the defendant] not guilty on the red light [but] I do find him guilty on driving without a license." The defendant was fined $200.

On this motion, the defendant contends first that the Administrative Law Judge's not-guilty verdict on the charge of running the red light requires dismissal of the third count of the indictment on grounds of double jeopardy.

Second, the defendant maintains that, because the verdict was rendered after a full and fair hearing and constituted a finding that he did not run the red light, the People are now collaterally estopped from attempting to prove at a suppression hearing that he did. The defendant argues further that, because the alleged running of the light was the sole predicate for the stop of the defendant's vehicle and the consequent discovery of the gun, the weapon must be suppressed and the counts charging its possession must be dismissed.

Resolution of the defendant's double jeopardy claim would require consideration, inter alia, of the issues of whether an administrative hearing at the Department of Motor Vehicles has the attributes of a prior prosecution sufficient to place a person in "jeopardy" for the offense charged (cf. Matter of Barnes v. Tofany, 27 N.Y.2d 74, 313 N.Y.S.2d 690, 261 N.E.2d 617; Matter of Giudice v. Adduci, 176 A.D.2d 1175, 575 N.Y.S.2d 611 [3rd Dept.], and whether the Department was ousted of jurisdiction as an "inferior tribunal" immediately upon the filing of the indictment (cf. Matter of Oppenheim v. Williams, 40 Misc.2d 106, 107, 242 N.Y.S.2d 870 [Sup.Ct., Sullivan Co.] [COOKE, J.]; People v. Edwards, 19 Misc.2d 412, 414, 189 N.Y.S.2d 39 [Ct.Gen.Sess.N.Y.Co.]. I decline to decide these and other similar issues because they relate only to the relatively insignificant question of the continued viability of a petty offense charge in a felony indictment.

Instead, because the defendant was previously acquitted of the charge, because it would be, at the least, unseemly for him to face punishment a second time on a traffic offense, and because, in the context of this felony case, dismissal of the petty offense would have no discernible impact upon the public's confidence in the criminal justice system, I conclude that the third count should be dismissed in furtherance of justice (CPL 210.40). I turn then to the issue of collateral estoppel.

Sometimes called issue preclusion, collateral estoppel "is a common-law doctrine rooted in civil litigation that, when applied, prevents a party from relitigating an issue decided against it in a prior proceeding" (People v. Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 29, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519; see, also, People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 37, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996; Matter of McGrath v. Gold, 36 N.Y.2d 406, 411, 369 N.Y.S.2d 62, 330 N.E.2d 35). The doctrine applies generally to criminal matters (see, e.g., People v. Sailor, 65 N.Y.2d 224, 228, 491 N.Y.S.2d 112, 480 N.E.2d 701, cert. denied 474 U.S. 982, 106 S.Ct. 387, 88 L.Ed.2d 340; People v. Berkowitz, 50 N.Y.2d 333, 344, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783; see, also, Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469) but not in quite the same way as in civil cases (People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518).

In civil actions, society's overriding concern is to provide a means for the peaceful, expeditious and impartial resolution of private disputes, and a liberal application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel furthers that end by conserving the time and resources of the court and the parties, and avoiding possible inconsistent determinations. Thus, even an erroneous result may sometimes be given preclusive effect in order to serve other important societal goals (see, e.g., People v. Aguilera, supra, 82 N.Y.2d at p. 30, 603 N.Y.S.2d 392, 623 N.E.2d 519; People v. Berkowitz, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at p. 345, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783).

In criminal cases, however, the pre-eminent concern is to reach the correct result, and therefore repetitive litigation is more readily tolerated (see, e.g., People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 64, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518, supra; People v. Berkowitz, supra, at p. 344, 428 N.Y.S.2d 927, 406 N.E.2d 783). Thus, for reasons of public policy, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is more sparingly applied in criminal cases than in civil cases (see, e.g., People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d 665; People v. Fagan, 66 N.Y.2d 815, 816, 498 N.Y.S.2d 335, 489 N.E.2d 222).

Consequently, it has been held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may not be applied in a criminal case unless the same parties were involved in a prior proceeding at which, after a full and fair hearing, the issue upon which preclusion is sought was necessarily decided against the party who opposes the estoppel (see, e.g., People v. Goodman, 69 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 511 N.Y.S.2d 565, 503 N.E.2d 996, supra; People v. Acevedo, supra, 69 N.Y.2d at p. 484, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d 665). Under these criteria, the defendant's claim in the instant case clearly must fail.

It is true that the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to give conclusive effect even to an administrative agency's quasi-judicial determinations provided that they are rendered pursuant to the agency's adjudicatory authority and by a tribunal employing procedures substantially similar to those used in a court of law (see, e.g., Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487). Thus, the hearing conducted at the Department of Motor Vehicles here may well qualify as a prior proceeding for the purposes of collateral estoppel. But there is considerable doubt as to whether the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles--the presumptive prosecutor at the administrative hearing--and the District Attorney of Queens County stand in sufficiently close relationship to be considered the same party for purposes of collateral estoppel (see, e.g., People v. Walsh, 139 Misc.2d 182, 522 N.Y.S.2d 419 [Co.Ct.Monroe Co.] [EGAN, J.]; People v. Riola, 137 Misc.2d 616, 618, 527 N.Y.S.2d 708 [Dist.Ct., Nassau Co.] [JONAS, J.]; People v. Lalka, 113 Misc.2d 474, 449 N.Y.S.2d 579 [City Ct., Rochester] [BRISTOL, J.]; cf. Matter of Mason v. Rothwax, 152 A.D.2d 272, 548 N.Y.S.2d 926 [1st Dept.], app. den. 75 N.Y.2d 705, 552 N.Y.S.2d 928, 552 N.E.2d 176 [federal and state prosecutors held not to be the same party for purposes of collateral estoppel]; People v. Morgan, 111 A.D.2d 771, 490 N.Y.S.2d 30 [2d Dept.] [N.Y.C. Housing Authority and Queens County District Attorney held not to be the same party for purposes of collateral estoppel]; see, also, Brown v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 897, 470 N.Y.S.2d 573, 458 N.E.2d 1250 [Corporation Counsel and District Attorney held not to be the same party for purposes of collateral estoppel]; Matter of Saccoccio v. Lange, 194 A.D.2d 794, 599 N.Y.S.2d 306 [2d Dept.] [County Attorney and District Attorney held not to be the same party for purposes of collateral estoppel]; but, see, People ex rel. Dowdy v. Smith, 48 N.Y.2d 477, 482, 423 N.Y.S.2d 862, 399 N.E.2d 894 [District Attorney and Parole Board stand in sufficiently close relationship to permit application of doctrine of collateral estoppel].

Moreover, there is serious question as to whether the District Attorney had a full and fair hearing at the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Any question as to whether a party had a full and fair opportunity to litigate a prior determination for purposes of collateral estoppel must be resolved in light of "the 'realities of the [prior] litigation', including the context and other circumstances which, although not legal impediments, may have had the practical effect of discouraging or deterring a party from fully litigating the determination which is now asserted against him [or her]" (People v. Plevy, 52 N.Y.2d 58, 65, 436 N.Y.S.2d 224, 417 N.E.2d 518; see, also, Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494, 501, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823, 467 N.E.2d 487, supra; People v. Aguilera, supra, 82 N.Y.2d at p. 32-33, 603 N.Y.S. 392, 623 N.E.2d 519). In...

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5 cases
  • State v. Brabson
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • February 25, 1998
    ...204 Conn. 156, 527 A.2d 1157 (1987) (no privity between department of consumer protection and prosecutor); People v. Trucchio, 159 Misc.2d 523, 605 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.Ct.1993) (commissioner of motor vehicles and prosecutor did not stand in sufficiently close relationship to be considered sam......
  • State v. Brabson, 1309-95
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • February 25, 1998
    ...204 Conn. 156, 527 A.2d 1157 (1987) (no privity between department of consumer protection and prosecutor); People v. Trucchio, 159 Misc.2d 523, 605 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup.Ct.1993) (commissioner of motor vehicles and prosecutor did not stand in sufficiently close relationship to be considered sam......
  • Reynolds v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
    • September 15, 1999
    ...e.g., State v. Fritz, 527 A.2d 1157, 1166-1167 (Conn. 1987); State v. O'Rourke, 442 S.E.2d 137 (N.C. App. 1994); People v. Trucchio, 605 N.Y.S.2d 649, 652-653 (Sup. 1993); People v. Lalka, 449 N.Y.S.2d 579, 582-583 (City Ct. The remaining cases are as unconvincing as Brabson, because they r......
  • Forney v. United States
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. District of New Jersey
    • April 21, 2015
    ...doctrine of collateral estoppel is more sparingly applied in criminal cases than in civil cases. See, e.g., People v. Trucchio, 159 Misc.2d 523, 605 N.Y.S.2d 649 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Aguilera, 82 N.Y.2d 23, 623 N.E.2d 519; People v. Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d 478, 485, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753, 508 N.E.2d......
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