People v. Trudeau, Docket No. 6785
| Decision Date | 26 February 1970 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 6785,No. 2,2 |
| Citation | 177 N.W.2d 171,22 Mich.App. 246 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward TRUDEAU, Defendant-Appellant |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Barry M. Grant, Southfield, for defendant-appellant.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Thomas G. Plunkett, Jr., Pros. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before J. H. GILLIS, P.J., and McGREGOR and V. J. BRENNAN, JJ.
Defendant Edward Trudeau was convicted of second degree murder, according to statute: C.L. 1948, § 750.317 (Stat.Ann.1954 Rev. § 28.549). Initially, defendant was arrested in the city of Detroit, for breaking and entering a United States Post Office. During his detention on this charge, investigation of a murder which had occurred at the Sharry Zedek synagogue was continuing. Part of the evidence acquired in the murder investigation was a heel print of the killer. While the defendant was incarcerated, and apparently without probable cause to arrest him for the synagogue murder, police took his shoes for the purpose of comparing the shoe impression at the scene of the crime and the impression of the defendant's shoes. The report of that study was subsequently admitted into evidence and the defendant was convicted. On appeal, as at trial, defendant alleges error in the admission of this evidence, claiming that it was improperly introduced in contravention of his federal constitutional rights under the 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments.
Defendant advances the argument that his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure was violated. It is his contention that a warrant was not obtained and that, in any event, probable cause did not exist to arrest him and take his shoes.
Defendant cites People v. Carr (1963), 370 Mich. 251, 121 N.W.2d 449 in support of his argument that the shoe impression was unlawfully obtained and, therefore, improperly admitted into evidence. In Carr, the defendant was in jail, serving a 30-day misdemeanor sentence, and was approached by police officers concerning a crime which had occurred in another county. Being unable to learn anything from defendant, the police--without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a felony had been committed by Carr--proceeded to make a thorough inspection of his automobile for the purpose of securing evidence which might possibly link the defendant to the out-county crime. Such a search and the resulting evidence were held inadmissible.
In the instant case, defendant was lodged in jail, subsequent to his arrest for the crime of breaking and entering. The police were investigating the synagogue murder and had evidence linking a shoeprint to the murderer. During their investigation, the defendant became a suspect; only his shoes, which were in open view, were taken for purposes of comparing their prints with the shoeprints found at the scene of the murder. The holding in Carr, supra, is different in vital respects. Defendant here was under arrest for a felony; no thorough search of his effects took place; only a shoe was taken for comparison, an intrusion which is minimal in light of the circumstances.
Defendant states that the recent case of Davis v. Mississippi (1969), 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676, supports his argument that his fingerprints and shoes were unlawfully taken in violation of the 4th amendment. The fact situation in obtaining the defendant's fingerprints in that case is not analogous to the taking of defendant's shoes here. In Davis, the police virtually conducted a dragnet of the local citizenry. At least 24 persons were fingerprinted and between 40 and 50 other youths were interrogated by the police. No attempt was made to employ procedures which might comply with the requirements of the 4th amendment. There was neither a warrant nor probable cause for Davis's arrest. At the time of his detention and when his fingerprints were taken, the police had no intention of charging Davis with the crime and were far from making him the primary focus of their investigation. The Court was clear in emphasizing that the prints were the result of several unlawful...
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People v. Trudeau
...On appeal, we affirm. The facts are fully set out in People v. Trudeau, 385 Mich. 276, 187 N.W.2d 890 (1971), reversing 22 Mich.App. 246, 177 N.W.2d 171 (1970), cert. den. 405 U.S. 965, 92 S.Ct. 1169, 31 L.Ed.2d 240 (1972). Reiteration is unnecessary to dispose of the issues Defendant asser......
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People v. Eddington
...on the basis of ample factual justification.' Terry v. Ohio, Supra, at 15, 88 S.Ct. at 1877. Cf. People v. Herrera, Supra; People v. Trudeau, Mich.App., 177 N.W.2d 171 (released to the parties February 26, 1970). Finally, we reiterate the absence of any invasion of defendant's In summary, w......
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People v. Griffin
...and the taking of clothing for purposes of investigation are not critical stages requiring assistance of counsel. People v. Trudeau (1970), 22 Mich.App. 246, 177 N.W.2d 171. Next, allegations are made that an unnecessary delay in taking defendant before a magistrate subsequent to his arrest......
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People v. Trudeau
...of second degree murder and breaking and entering in connection with the Shaarey Zedek crime. The Court of Appeals affirmed. (22 Mich.App. 246, 177 N.W.2d 171). We granted leave to appeal. (384 Mich. Defendant argues that his fourth, fifth and sixth amendment rights were violated while he w......