People v. Turner

• Decision Date: 23 October 1986
• Citation: 726 P.2d 102,42 Cal.3d 711,230 Cal.Rptr. 656
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 726 P.2d 102, 55 USLW 2286 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Melvin TURNER, Defendant and Appellant. Crim. 21618.

Page 656

230 Cal.Rptr. 656

42 Cal.3d 711, 726 P.2d 102, 55 USLW 2286

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Melvin TURNER, Defendant and Appellant.

Crim. 21618.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Oct. 23, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 18, 1986.

Frank O. Bell, Jr., and Quin Denvir, Public Defenders, under appointment by the Supreme Court, Steffan Imhoff, Joseph Levine, Donald L.A. Kerson, Deputy Public Defenders, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert F. Katz, Andrew D. Amerson, Lauren E. Dana and John S. Harrel, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

This is an automatic appeal (Pen.Code, § 1239, subd. (b)) from a judgment of death under the 1978 death penalty law (id., § 190.1 et seq.). The record demonstrates that the prosecutor used his peremptory challenges to strike Black prospective jurors in a racially discriminatory manner for the apparent purpose of obtaining an all-White jury to try this Black defendant for crimes against White victims. The trial judge compounded the error by failing in his duty to carefully evaluate the prosecutor's proffered explanations for these challenges in light of all the circumstances of the case. This patent violation of defendant's right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, guaranteed by article I, section 16, of the California Constitution, compels us to reverse the judgment. (People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)

In a recent landmark decision, the United States Supreme Court has also condemned such abuse of the peremptory challenge as a violation of yet another fundamental constitutional guarantee, the right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. (Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69.)

Defendant and another were jointly charged with robbing and murdering George S. Hill, Jr., and Joella Champion, and with stealing Hill's car. By way of special circumstances it was alleged that each murder was committed in the course of a robbery and that each defendant was guilty of both murders. Defendant's case was severed for trial. The jury convicted defendant on all counts and found the special circumstance allegations true. At the penalty phase the jury returned a verdict of death.

Because the dispositive issue arises from the jury selection process that took place before the introduction of any evidence, we need recite only the facts relevant to that issue. (See, e.g., People v. Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 743-744, 170 Cal.Rptr. 798, 621 P.2d 837.)

At the time of the crimes defendant was a young Black man on parole. The two persons he was accused of murdering were White, and both were well known and respected members of the community. ¹ At least three Blacks were in the venire summoned to hear the case; all three were called to the jury box, examined, and passed for cause. The prosecutor then struck all three Blacks from the jury by peremptory challenge. Defendant objected vigorously but in vain: the jury that ultimately tried him was all White. He contends that on the record of this case the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of all three Blacks violated his right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. His point is supported by settled law.

In a now-familiar series of decisions beginning with People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, we have made it clear that the courts of this state cannot tolerate the abuse of peremptory challenges to strip from a jury, solely because of a presumed "group bias," all or most members of an identifiable group of citizens distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. Such an abuse, we have repeatedly held, violates the defendant's right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the California Constitution. (Id. at pp. 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; accord, People v. Johnson (1978) 22 Cal.3d 296, 299, 148 Cal.Rptr. 915, 583 P.2d 774; People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 292, 152 Cal.Rptr. 454, 590 P.2d 30; People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 166-167, 197 Cal.Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854; People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 600, 217 Cal.Rptr. 416, 704 P.2d 176; People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 679-682, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719; see also People v. Fuller (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 403, 408, 186 Cal.Rptr. 283.) We need not recite yet another time the reasons of law and policy for this well-settled rule; they are exhaustively reviewed in the cited opinions (see also Com. v. Soares (1979) 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499, 508-518).

In addition, the United States Supreme Court has recently denounced the same pernicious practice as a violation of the federal equal protection clause. In Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, a Black defendant was tried and convicted by an all-White jury after the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the only four Blacks in the venire. The defendant had unsuccessfully objected on the dual grounds of violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. Reserving decision on the first ground, the United States Supreme Court struck down the practice on the second ground and overruled its contrary decision in Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759.

The high court held that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant." (Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712 .) The court reasoned that "Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try," but also reflects unfairly on the fitness and impartiality of those who are struck from the jury for that reason. (Id. at p. ----, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1717.) Indeed, "The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community." (Ibid.) "In view of the heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race." (Id. at p. ----, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1724.)

Although the high court did not directly address the contention that the practice also violates the defendant's right to a representative jury, it recognized the concerns protected by that right. Thus the court observed that "The petit jury has occupied a central position in our system of justice by safeguarding a person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.... For a jury to perform its intended function as a check on official power, it must be a body drawn from the community. [Citations.] By compromising the representative quality of the jury, discriminatory selection procedures make 'juries ready weapons for officials to oppress those accused individuals who by chance are numbered among unpopular or inarticulate minorities.' " (Id. at p. ---- & fn. 8, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1717 & fn. 8.)

The United States Supreme Court then adopted a procedure for enforcing its new rule: the burden is first on the defendant to make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination in the prosecution's use of its peremptory challenges; if the trial court finds he has made such a showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to justify the challenges on nondiscriminatory grounds; and the trial court must then determine if the discrimination is proved. (Id. at pp. ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 1722-1724.) Finally, the court rejected the state's contention that its new rule would either undermine the purpose of the peremptory challenge or create serious administrative difficulties. (Ibid.) This is essentially the same procedure, of course, that we adopted in Wheeler. (22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-282, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.)

Unable now to attack the Wheeler rule on either state or federal constitutional grounds, the Attorney General argues instead that its procedural requirements were not met in the case at bar. We may therefore focus on those requirements.

A. Prima Facie Case of Group Discrimination

Under Wheeler, "If a party believes his opponent is using his peremptory challenges to strike jurors on the ground of group bias alone, he must raise the point in timely fashion and make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, ... he should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias." (22 Cal.3d at p. 280, fn. omitted, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; accord, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. ---- - ----, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 1722-1724.) The Attorney General first contends that defendant failed to make a prima facie case of group discrimination. The record is otherwise.

Two of the first twelve prospective jurors called to the box, Delores Buchanan and Thomas Chappell, were Black. They were questioned on voir dire by the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, and neither was challenged for cause. The prosecutor, however, exercised peremptory challenges first against Mr. Chappell and then against...