People v. Turner

Decision Date24 January 2003
Docket NumberNo. 1-00-3452.,1-00-3452.
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James TURNER, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Office of the State Appellate Defender (Michael Pelletier, of counsel), and Joshua Sachs (Joshua Sachs, of counsel), Chicago, for Appellant.

Richard A. Devine, State's Attorney of Cook County, Chicago (Assistant State's Attorneys Renee Goldfarb, Michele Grimaldi Stein and John B. Henning, of counsel), for Appellee.

Justice QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

In 1984, following a jury trial, defendant, James Turner, was convicted of murder and sentenced to 40 years in prison. On May 2, 1986, defendant's conviction and sentence were affirmed by this court on direct appeal. People v. Turner, 143 Ill. App.3d 417, 97 Ill.Dec. 556, 493 N.E.2d 38 (1986).

On June 1, 1995, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. The trial court appointed counsel on June 19, 1995. On March 29, 2000, defendant's appointed counsel filed an amended postconviction petition. On September 14, 2000, the trial court dismissed the amended petition without an evidentiary hearing.

On appeal, defendant argues that dismissal of his postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing was improper where the allegations in the petition made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 13, 1984, defendant was convicted of murder. Defendant's conviction arose from the death of Roy Peterson. Briefly, the facts adduced at the jury trial established that defendant was indicted along with a codefendant, Eleanor Peterson, for the beating, strangling and scalding murder of Eleanor's husband Roy. The events transpired over a 24-hour period, culminating in Roy's death in the early morning hours of August 12, 1983. In People v. Turner, 143 Ill.App.3d 417, 97 Ill.Dec. 556, 493 N.E.2d 38, we set forth in detail the facts supporting defendant's conviction and sentence. To the extent that facts contained in that opinion pertain to the issues defendant raises in his petition, we will repeat them as we consider each issue.

On June 1, 1995, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. The petition asserted defendant's arrest was unconstitutional and that his confession was involuntary. On June 19, 1995, the trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant. On June 21, 1995, the State moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it was untimely, barred by res judicata, and failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. The record does not reflect, nor has either party provided, a ruling on that motion.

On March 29, 2000, defendant's counsel filed a document entitled "supplemental petition." The supplemental petition did not contain the original postconviction petition allegations. The supplemental petition alleged that defendant was denied his constitutional right to decide whether to tender a jury instruction for the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. On June 1, 2000, the State moved to dismiss the petition alleging the petition was untimely and failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.

On September 14, 2000, the trial court, following argument by the parties, dismissed the petition. The court noted:

"There is no question that the statute of limitations will dispose of this case * * *. I will not dismiss it on the basis of the statute of limitations. I will say that I will consider it, whether or not there should have been tendered an involuntary murder instruction. In that regard, happily, for the purpose of this ruling, I was the trial judge. * * * In light of all the attendant circumstances, I would in fact respectfully dismiss the petition based upon the fact that notwithstanding there is a valid motion under the statute of limitations argument by the State, I am dismissing it. In point of fact, even if I overlooked that and said he didn't know until he had counsel to review the transcripts and file the supplemental petition, that I would not have, under any circumstances in this case, given the instruction, even if tendered, on the voluntary [sic] manslaughter."

Defendant now appeals from that dismissal.

II. ANALYSIS

Defendant argues that dismissal of his supplemental postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing was improper where his allegation made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Specifically, defendant argues that although the facts developed at his jury trial warranted an instruction on the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter, his trial attorney decided not to tender a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Defendant maintains that the decision whether to request an instruction on a lesser-included offense was a fundamental personal decision, and therefore he was deprived of this constitutional right.

A. Timeliness

Initially, the State responds that defendant's pro se petition, filed eight years past the statutory deadline, and his amended "supplemental" petition, filed five years after that, should be dismissed where they are untimely. We agree.

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)) provides a mechanism by which criminal defendants can assert that their convictions and sentences were the result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution, the Illinois Constitution, or both. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994). An action for postconviction relief is a collateral proceeding and is not an appeal from the underlying conviction and sentence. People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill.2d 154, 170, 252 Ill.Dec. 1, 742 N.E.2d 251 (2000). In order to be entitled to postconviction relief, a defendant bears the burden of establishing a substantial deprivation of federal or state constitutional rights in the proceedings that produced the judgment being challenged. People v. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d 500, 528, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681 (1999).

The Act provides a three-stage process for the adjudication of postconviction petitions. In the first stage, the circuit court determines whether the postconviction petition is "frivolous or is patently without merit." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1994). The State does not have an opportunity to raise any arguments against the petition during this summary review stage. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d 410, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102 (1996). The circuit court is required to make an independent assessment in the summary review stage as to whether the allegations in the petition, liberally construed and taken as true, set forth a constitutional claim for relief. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). To survive dismissal at this stage, the petition must only present "`the gist of a constitutional claim.'" People v. Edwards, 197 Ill.2d 239, 244, 258 Ill.Dec. 753, 757 N.E.2d 442 (2001), quoting Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102.

If the petition is found to be "frivolous" or "patently without merit," the court "shall dismiss the petition in a written order, specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of law it made in reaching its decision." 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 1994). If the petition survives the initial stage, the court may appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant, and counsel will have an opportunity to amend the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994); People v. Watson, 187 Ill.2d 448, 241 Ill.Dec. 590, 719 N.E.2d 719 (1999). The State then may file a motion to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 1994); Gaultney, 174 Ill.2d at 418, 221 Ill.Dec. 195, 675 N.E.2d 102. If the State does not file a motion to dismiss or if the circuit court denies the State's motion, the circuit court will proceed to the third stage and conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 1994); People v. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d 89, 100 (2002).

Section 122-1 of the Act governs the limitations period on the institution of postconviction actions. The legislature has twice amended section 122-1. In this case, the controlling version of the statute is the version in effect on June 1, 1995, when the petition was filed. See People v. Bates, 124 Ill.2d 81, 84-86, 124 Ill.Dec. 407, 529 N.E.2d 227 (1988). At that time, section 122-1 stated, in relevant part:

"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or issuance of the opinion from the Illinois Supreme Court or 6 months after the date of the order denying certiorari by the United States Supreme Court or the date for filing such a petition if none is filed or 3 years from the date of conviction, whichever is later, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994).

The supreme court has recently held that the Act does not authorize the dismissal of a postconviction petition during the initial stage based on untimeliness. Boclair, 202 Ill.2d at 102. The court concluded that the matter of untimeliness should be left for the State to assert during the second stage of the postconviction proceedings.

In this case the State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely following the appointment of counsel, i.e., at the second stage. Pursuant to the controlling version of the statute, the right to file a postconviction action expired as soon as the later of any of the listed specified time periods had elapsed. In this case, the last such event to transpire was the expiration of three years after the date of defendant's sentencing on January 13, 1984. Defendant's pro se postconviction petition was filed on...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • People v. DuPree, 2-07-1276.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • January 6, 2010
    ...lesser included offense. Brocksmith, 162 Ill.2d at 226, 205 Ill.Dec. 113, 642 N.E.2d 1230. Nonetheless, in Turner, 337 Ill.App.3d at 91, 271 Ill.Dec. 685, 785 N.E.2d 879, the court held that a defendant's personal right to tender a jury instruction on a lesser included offense is a procedur......
  • People v. Walton, 1-06-1276.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • October 17, 2007
    ......Turner, 337 Ill.App.3d 80, 90, 271 Ill.Dec. 685, 785 N.E.2d 879 (2003). Though defendant correctly notes that second degree murder is properly ......
  • People v. Spiller
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 27, 2016
    ...the judge determines from the evidence whether the defendant is guilty of murder or of some lesser-included offense. People v. Turner, 337 Ill.App.3d 80, 90, 271 Ill.Dec. 685, 785 N.E.2d 879 (2003).¶ 36 To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must satisfy the ......
  • People v. Chaffin
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 29, 2021
    ...delay in filing a lawsuit." Lander, 215 Ill.2d at 588. It is "very difficult" to show a lack of culpable negligence (People v. Turner, 337 Ill.App.3d 80, 86 (2003)), and a "defendant bears a heavy burden to affirmatively show why the exception to the statute of limitations applies to his ca......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT