People v. Tyner
Decision Date | 22 January 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 36636,36636 |
Citation | 195 N.E.2d 675,30 Ill.2d 101 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Defendant in Error, v. Eugene TYNER, Plaintiff in Error. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Richard E. Powell, Chicago, for plaintiff in error.
William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Daniel P. Ward, State's Atty., Chicago , for defendant in error.
After a jury trial in the criminal court of Cook County, the defendant, Eugene Tyner, and a co-defendant, Herbert Kelley, were convicted of murdering one James Toney and were each sentenced to the penitentiary for a term of 199 years. In prosecuting this writ of error, Tyner (hereafter referred to as defendant) contends that the lower court made prejudicial remarks during the course of the trial and also erred in admitting into evidence the co-defendant's written statement.
It appears that the deceased lived in the front first floor apartment at 2326 West Monroe Street in Chicago. Willie Holman and his wife occupied the rear first floor apartment, and defendant lived on the second floor at the same address. Shortly after midnight on the morning of January 15, 1961, defendant and Kelley visited the Toney apartment where Toney, Holman, and others were playing cards but left within a few minutes only to return approximately one hour later. When Kelley then became abusive, both he and defendant were ordered to leave, and upon their refusal an altercation followed during which Toney struck both men about the head and face with the metal top of a pressure cooker. Defendant and Kelley then left the apartment house, but about thirty minutes later they returned and rang for admittance to the first floor. Willie Holman came to the door from his apartment, where he had retired shortly after midnight, and upon recognizing the callers refused to open the door until he observed the gun which Kelley was carrying in his hand. Holman then raised his hands, stepped back from the door, and permitted their entrance. Although Holman again returned to his apartment, defendant and Kelley walked to Toney's apartment and a few seconds later three shots were fired by Kelley after which Toney staggered from the building to the street and there collapsed. Although defendant and Kelley admitted the shooting, they claimed it was done in self-defense.
Willie Holman testified for the State and upon cross-examination insisted that he did not know what caused the earlier altercation at the Toney apartment. Nevertheless the court then proceeded to interrogate Holman concerning the same matter and when he repeated his answer the judge remarked that Holman had 'a terrible lapse of memory;' that he was 'sick and tired of this kind of testimony;' that Holman was in a position to give the jury a 'lot more information, beneficial to the State even if he would;' and that he was 'lying like a goat.' The court then concluded with this remark:
Kelley testified upon his own behalf, and following his cross-examination by the State concerning a discrepancy between the witness's testimony and a prior written statement he had given the police relative to defendant's participation in the crime, the court continued to interrogate concerning the discrepancy, particularly referring to the contradictory written statement. The court later questioned defendant as to this same matter, and after defendant had testified that he struck Toney only in self-defense, the trial judge by further interrogation caused him to admit that Toney's alleged attack upon him occurred after the shooting.
Although a trial judge may question witnesses for purposes of clarification or to bring enlightenment upon issues otherwise obscure, he should do so in a fair and impartial manner without showing bias or prejudice against either party and without impugning the credibility of any witness. Rarely, if ever, is a judge called upon to comment on the evidence during trial except where necessary in ruling upon its admissibility, and...
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