People v. Uribe
| Citation | 310 Mich.App. 467,872 N.W.2d 511 |
| Decision Date | 12 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 321012. |
| Parties | PEOPLE v. URIBE. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan (US) |
Bill Schuette, Attorney General, Aaron D. Lindstrom, Solicitor General, Douglas R. Lloyd, Prosecuting Attorney, and Brent E. Morton, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.
Ann M. Prater, for defendant.
Before: SAAD, P.J., and OWENS and KIRSTEN FRANK KELLY, JJ.
The prosecution appeals the trial court's order that suppressed evidence the prosecution sought to admit under MCL 768.27a. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the trial court's decision, and remand for entry of an order that permits the admission of the proffered evidence.
MCL 768.27a is an evidentiary statute that applies to cases in which a defendant is charged with a sexual offense against a minor. The statute provides that the prosecution may present any evidence that the defendant committed other sex crimes against children, and that evidence may be considered for its bearing on any relevant matter, including the defendant's propensity to commit sexual crimes against children. This statutory mandate is contrary to MRE 404(b), which generally provides that evidence of other acts may not be used at criminal trials to show propensity.1
By enacting MCL 768.27a, the Legislature made an important public-policy choice to limit the procedural rights of criminal defendants contained in MRE 404(b), by mandating the admissibility of this specific type of propensity evidence, to better protect the rights of children from sexual predators.2 Accordingly, under the plain meaning of the statute, if evidence that a defendant committed other sex crimes against a child is admissible under MCL 768.27a, a court must admit the evidence without reference to or consideration of the standard propensity rule set forth in MRE 404(b)(1). People v. Watkins, 491 Mich. 450, 471, 818 N.W.2d 296 (2012).
The Michigan Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to MCL 768.27a in Watkins, and upheld the statute's categorical mandate that requires the admission of propensity evidence in cases involving sex crimes against children. Id. at 476–477, 818 N.W.2d 296. In so doing, Watkins carved out a very limited role for the judiciary in making admissibility determinations under MCL 768.27a, by using the safety valve of MRE 403.3 Id. at 481, 818 N.W.2d 296.
Historically, MRE 403 has been used sparingly by trial courts4 TO EXCLUDE otherwise admissible evidence because the evidence is either overly sensational or needlessly cumulative.5 In Watkins, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the exclusionary power of MRE 403 should be used even more sparingly in the context of evidentiary determinations made pursuant to MCL 768.27a. Watkins, 491 Mich. at 487, 818 N.W.2d 296. This is because MCL 768.27a represents a clear public-policy choice to admit specific evidence to protect children from sexual predators.
Because MCL 768.27a mandates the admission of propensity evidence, which for many years had generally and routinely been excluded by the judiciary, in Watkins our Supreme Court expressed concern that trial courts might misapply MRE 403, and exclude the evidence by reverting to the traditional propensity analysis used under MRE 404(b). Id. at 486, 818 N.W.2d 296. The Court therefore held that the usual propensity analysis under MRE 404(b) has no applicability to evidentiary determinations made under MCL 768.27a. Id. at 471, 818 N.W.2d 296.
In sum, when the prosecution seeks to admit evidence under MCL 768.27a, a court determines the admissibility of the evidence in three steps. First, the court ascertains whether the proffered evidence is relevant to the case at hand. Second, the court determines whether the proposed evidence constitutes a "listed offense" under MCL 768.27a. Finally, the court analyzes, under MRE 403, whether the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. When it makes this analysis under MRE 403, the court must weigh the probative value of the evidence—i.e., its tendency to show defendant's propensity to commit sex crimes against children—in favor of admission. If the trial court finds that evidence submitted under MCL 768.27a is (1) relevant, (2) constitutes evidence of a "listed offense" under the statute, and (3) has probative value that is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403, the evidence must be admitted.
Here, the trial court suppressed evidence, submitted by the prosecution under MCL 768.27a, that defendant committed other sex crimes against his daughter that are separate from the charged offense. The prosecution says this ruling is erroneous, because the trial court misapplied MCL 768.27a and Watkins in two significant and dispositive ways when it held that the proffered evidence: (1) was not evidence of the occurrence of a "listed offense" under MCL 768.27a, and (2) was more prejudicial than probative under MRE 403.
We hold that the trial court misapplied MCL 768.27a when it suppressed the evidence at issue. In so doing, it appears the court did precisely what the Michigan Supreme Court feared and warned against in Watkins. Under the rubric of conducting an MRE 403 balancing test, the trial court improperly analyzed the admissibility of the evidence by using the traditional propensity analysis. Because the proffered evidence is admissible, we remand for entry of an order that admits the evidence.
Defendant lost his parental rights to his two daughters, JU and MU, in late 2013 because he sexually abused VG, JU's half sister.6 In January 2014, the prosecution charged defendant with five counts of criminal sexual conduct (CSC) for his molestation of VG. As part of its case, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence under MCL 768.27a that defendant had also molested JU. The prosecution filed a notice of intent indicating that it planned to use JU's testimony regarding defendant's abuse at trial and attached a Michigan State Police (MSP) report that summarized her anticipated testimony.7
In the report, which recounted a trooper's interview with JU, JU stated that sometime during summer 2011,8 she fell asleep with her father in the same bed.9 She woke up when she felt her father insert his fingers into her underwear.10 Defendant also attempted to place her hand on his penis on multiple occasions, but JU never actually touched her father because she repeatedly moved her body away from him each time he tried to make her touch his penis. Defendant never spoke to JU about the episode, apart from laughing after JU told him that she had seen his "private" during the night. JU noted that she did not want to tell anyone about the molestation, because she did not want her father to get in trouble.
Defendant objected to and moved to suppress the admission of JU's testimony. After a hearing,11 the trial court granted the motion and explained its reasoning in a holding from the bench. The trial court questioned the credibility of JU's testimony, because she had initially denied her father abused her during the proceedings for termination of parental rights,12 and her subsequent "statements ... [were] all over the place." The court also doubted whether JU's accusations against defendant constituted a listed offense under MCL 768.27a, and stated: "[I] t's more clear that if anything happened she's been consistent that [defendant's] hand was on the belly and [his] fingers maybe dropped below the belly button."
Despite its concerns over the veracity of JU's statements and belief that defendant did not commit a listed offense under MCL 768.27a, the trial court "[gave] the prosecutor the benefit of the doubt" that defendant's alleged actions constituted a listed offense under MCL 768.27a. Nonetheless, the court held that JU's testimony would still be barred under MRE 403,13 because the sexual abuse she detailed was "dissimilar" to the sexual abuse against VG alleged by the prosecution, which involved anal penetration. The former molestation also purportedly occurred while others were present, whereas the latter molestation did not.14 The trial court finally noted that defendant allegedly molested VG multiple times, while JU's molestation occurred once. The court closed its holding from the bench by opining that "the purpose of [MCL 768.27a ] honestly is to allow in other allegations that are more similar in nature to show a propensity; see, this is what the defendant does, this is what the defendant does." (Emphasis added.)
Issues that involve statutory interpretation or the interpretation of court rules "are questions of law," and are reviewed de novo. In re Bail Bond Forfeiture, 496 Mich. 320, 325, 852 N.W.2d 747 (2014). When it interprets a statute, a court must examine the statute's People v. McKinley, 496 Mich. 410, 415, 852 N.W.2d 770 (2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The principles that govern statutory interpretation also govern the interpretation of court rules. Watkins, 491 Mich. at 468, 818 N.W.2d 296.
In full, MCL 768.27a reads:
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