People v. Valdez

• Decision Date: 22 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. 119860.,119860.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Josue VALDEZ, Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2016 IL 119860

67 N.E.3d 233

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant,

v.Josue VALDEZ, Appellee.

No. 119860.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 22, 2016.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 21, 2016.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago, and Geno Caffarini, State's Attorney, of Princeton (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Michael M. Glick and Lindsay Beyer Payne, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, Terry A. Mertel, and Laura E. DeMichael Bailon, of the Office of the State's Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, of Ottawa, of counsel), for the People.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Peter A. Carusona, Deputy Defender, and Santiago A. Durango, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Ottawa, for appellee.

OPINION

Justice BURKE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Defendant, Josue Valdez, pleaded guilty to burglary in the circuit court of Bureau County and was sentenced to three years of probation. At the time of his plea, defendant was a citizen of the Dominican Republic and a resident alien of the United States based on his marriage to a United States citizen. During the plea hearing, the circuit court judge advised defendant that a burglary conviction "may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States." Defendant indicated he understood the potential consequences of a burglary conviction on his immigration status and still wished to plead guilty.

¶ 2 Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, alleging involuntariness and ineffective assistance of counsel. The circuit court denied defendant's motion. On appeal, defendant argued his attorney never warned him of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty to burglary, in violation of Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010). The appellate court agreed that defense counsel was ineffective and reversed the circuit court's judgment. 2015 IL App (3d) 120892, ¶¶ 23–24, 2015 WL 2374864.

¶ 3 This court allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315 (eff. July 1, 2013). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 4 BACKGROUND

¶ 5 In 2012, defendant was charged with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19–1(a) (West 2012)) for entering a building with the intent to commit a theft, after he allegedly took a ring and earrings from an unoccupied house in Sheffield, Illinois. The circuit court appointed a public defender and a Spanish-speaking interpreter for defendant.

¶ 6 At a pretrial hearing, the parties informed the court that they had reached a negotiated plea agreement. Under the agreement, defendant would plead guilty to burglary, a Class 2 felony. He would be sentenced to four months in the county jail, with credit for time served, followed by three years' probation.

¶ 7 The State presented a factual basis for the plea, which stated that, if the cause were to proceed to trial, the State would present evidence that Keith Peterson discovered that his class ring and a pair of his wife's earrings were missing from their house, which had sat uninhabited for a month. Further evidence would show that defendant was in possession of the ring and earrings and that defendant admitted to entering the Petersons' house.

¶ 8 The court admonished defendant about the charge and potential penalties in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402(a) (eff. July 1, 2012). The court then admonished defendant, pursuant to section 113–8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/113–8 (West 2012) ), that a burglary conviction "may have the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of naturalization under the laws of the United States." Defendant stated that he understood these admonishments and still wished to plead guilty. Later in the proceedings, the judge admonished defendant that pleading guilty to burglary meant he "could be deported from the country," a decision that would be "up to the federal government." Defendant again acknowledged that he understood the potential immigration consequences and wanted to go forward with his guilty plea. The court accepted defendant's guilty plea and sentenced defendant as agreed to by the parties in the plea agreement.

¶ 9 Within 30 days of entering his plea, defendant filed a pro se motion to "open and vacate" his burglary conviction. The circuit court construed the motion as a motion to withdraw guilty plea and appointed new counsel for defendant. Defendant's new counsel filed a second amended motion to withdraw guilty plea and vacate sentence. The motion alleged, in part, that defense counsel failed to inform defendant of the consequences of his plea on his resident alien status.

¶ 10 Following a hearing, the circuit court denied defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. While the facts showed defense counsel never informed defendant that a burglary conviction might affect his immigration status, the court held any prejudice resulting from counsel's deficiency was cured by the court's own admonishments to defendant, i.e., that his burglary conviction "may have the consequences of deportation."

¶ 11 A divided appellate court vacated the circuit court's order and remanded for further proceedings. 2015 IL App (3d) 120892. The majority held that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to inform defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea. According to the majority, under Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed.2d 284 (2010), counsel had a professional duty to inform defendant that deportation resulting from his burglary conviction was "presumptively mandatory" under federal law. 2015 IL App (3d) 120892, ¶¶ 22–24. Thus, counsel's failure to inform defendant of any immigration consequences prior to pleading guilty fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. Furthermore, the court held, defendant was prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance because he established a reasonable probability that he would have chosen to proceed to trial had he known he faced mandatory deportation. Id. ¶¶ 26–28.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 At issue is whether defense counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to inform defendant, prior to pleading guilty, that a burglary conviction subjected him to mandatory deportation from the United States. In Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held that an attorney's failure to correctly advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is subject to the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Padilla, 559 U.S. at 366, 130 S.Ct. 1473 ("[w]e conclude that advice regarding deportation is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel").

¶ 14 Under the first prong of the two-part Strickland test, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To satisfy the second prong, a defendant must show that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel's deficient performance. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A showing of prejudice requires proof of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Both parts of the Strickland test must be satisfied to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 283, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992).

¶ 15 I. Deficient Performance

¶ 16 In order to determine whether defendant has satisfied the first Strickland prong, we must first establish what professional duties were owed to defendant by his counsel. Padilla holds that defense counsel has a duty to give correct advice to a defendant about immigration consequences before the defendant enters a plea. padilla, 559 U.S. at 367, 130 S.ct. 1473 ("[t]he weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation"). This holding applies to affirmative misadvice, as well as the failure to give any advice at all. iD. at 370, 130 S.CT. 1473 ("there is no relevant difference between an act of commission and an act of omission in this context" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, prior to defendant entering a guilty plea, "[i]t is quintessentially the duty of counsel to provide her client with available advice about an issue like deportation, and the failure to do so ‘clearly satisfies the first prong of the Strickland analysis.’ " Id. at 371, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 62, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the judgment, joined by Stevens, J.)).

¶ 17 In Padilla, defense counsel advised defendant, prior to his entering a guilty plea for transporting a large quantity of marijuana, that he "did not have to worry about immigration status since he had been in the country so long." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 359, 130 S.Ct. 1473. This advice was clearly incorrect, according to the Supreme Court. In fact, Padilla's drug conviction subjected him to mandatory deportation from the country. On the face of section 1227 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the terms were "succinct, clear, and explicit in defining the removal consequence for Padilla's conviction." Id. at 359, 368, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (" ‘Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance * * *, other than a single offense involving possession for one's own use of 30 grams or less of...