People v. Valenzuela

• Citation: 198 Cal.Rptr. 469,151 Cal.App.3d 180
• Decision Date: 25 January 1984
• Docket Number: Cr. 12614
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank VALENZUELA, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 469

198 Cal.Rptr. 469

151 Cal.App.3d 180

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Frank VALENZUELA, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 12614.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 25, 1984.

Hearing Denied April 4, 1984.

Barbara L. Roberts, Paradise, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Roger E. Venturi and Anthony L. Dicce, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

Defendant, an inmate of Folsom prison housed in the maximum security unit on account of his conviction for murder, was found guilty by a jury of possession of a prison-made knife. (Pen.Code, § 4502.) The knife, which was approximately 4 3/4 inches long, was lodged in defendant's lower colon. Its presence was revealed by an X-ray taken after defendant activated a walk-through metal detector during a "shakedown" search of the maximum security unit.

On appeal, defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because the prosecution failed to justify the warrantless search of his person with the metal detector and because the trial court ordered physical restraints for defense witnesses from the maximum security unit of Folsom prison when they testified. We shall affirm.

DISCUSSION

I

Defendant's motion to suppress the knife as evidence (Pen.Code, § 1538.5) was denied by the superior court, which noted that probable cause is not necessary for a prison security search. ¹ Defendant's claim is that the prosecution failed to show the initial metal detector search was justified under the circumstances and that the court failed to balance the need for the procedure against the invasion of defendant's personal rights. We find no error.

A

We first address defendant's contention that the metal detector search violated defendant's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447, the Supreme Court considered challenges by unsentenced, pretrial detainees to various practices undertaken by custodial officials at a federally operated, short-term custodial facility. Among the challenged practices were unannounced searches of inmate living areas at irregular intervals and body cavity searches conducted after inmates visited with persons from outside the institution. (Id., at pp. 555-558, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1882-1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 479-480].)

The Bell court assumed without deciding that both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners retained a diminished expectation of privacy sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment protection. (Ibid.) The court then promulgated a rule requiring in each case a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails: "Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it is conducted. [Citations.]" (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 559, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 481]; see In re Alan R. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 601, 604, 183 Cal.Rptr. 325.) The court then upheld the legality of both the room search and the body cavity search. (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at pp. 557-560, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1883-1885, 60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 480-482].)

Like the court in Bell, we also assume arguendo that convicted prisoners retain some Fourth Amendment rights, and we therefore apply Bell's balancing test.

We examine first the scope of the particular intrusion and the manner in which it is conducted. The use of a walk-through metal detector is one of the least intrusive searches. (See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 559, fn. 40, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1885, fn. 40, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 482]; 3 LaFave, Search and Seizure (1978), Airport Searches, § 10.6 at pp. 348-350, and cases therein cited.) Countless thousands of citizens who have never been convicted of any crime routinely walk through metal detectors every day at our nation's airports. We conclude a walk-through metal detector search involves an insignificant invasion of personal rights.

We next examine the justification for initiating the search and the place where it was conducted. Defendant contends the prosecution failed to meet its burden of justifying the warrantless metal detector search (see People v. Sedillo (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 616, 623, 185 Cal.Rptr. 475) because the prosecution produced no evidence that the search was for weapons. We disagree.

The record indicates defendant was housed in Security Unit No. 1--the maximum security unit at Folsom State Prison, itself a maximum security facility within the Department of Corrections. On the day of the search, correctional officers were conducting a "shakedown" search of the Security Housing Unit. All inmates in the Security Housing Unit were taken from their cells while the cells were searched, and defendant was taken to the walk-through metal detector. Following the searches, two other inmates from the maximum security unit were taken for medical examination of weapons or contraband concealed in their bodies. From these facts, the trial court could reasonably infer that the purpose of the "shakedown search" of the maximum security unit, and the administration of the metal detector test, were for the purpose of locating weapons or other contraband.

When we balance the invasion of defendant's personal rights against the justification for the search (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 559, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 481] ), we readily conclude the metal detector search was justified. In Bell, the Supreme Court upheld as reasonable unannounced "shakedown" searches of the living quarters of unsentenced, pretrial detainees. (Id., at pp. 555-557, 99 S.Ct. at pp. 1882-1883, 60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 479-480].) A fortiori, a less intrusive metal detector search for weapons or contraband in a maximum security unit for sentenced prisoners passes muster under the Fourth Amendment. "Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." (Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S. at p. 547, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1878, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 474].) Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections officials and, in the absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters. (Id., at 441 U.S. p. 548, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1879, 60 L.Ed.2d p. 474].)

Finally, defendant contends the trial court applied an erroneous standard when it stated on the record that "people confined in a State Prison are subject to search without probable cause." We perceive no error.

We presume the trial judge was using "probable cause" in the sense in which it appears most frequently in search cases: a requirement that in order to conduct a search, and absent exigent circumstances, police officers must obtain a search warrant by demonstrating they have probable cause to believe there is specific property subject to seizure presently located in the particular place for which the warrant is sought. (People v. Superior Court (Corona) (1981) 30 Cal.3d 193, 203-204, 178 Cal.Rptr. 334, 636 P.2d 23; see People v. Carney (1983) 34 Cal.3d 597, 603, 194 Cal.Rptr. 500, 668 P.2d 807; People v. Chavers (1983) 33 Cal.3d 462, 467, 189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96.)

In Bell v. Wolfish, supra, the Supreme Court made it clear no warrant is required to conduct an unannounced "shakedown" search of the rooms of pretrial detainees. (Id., 441 U.S. at p. 557, 99 S.Ct. at p. 1883, 60 L.Ed.2d at p. 480].) We recently held that, "In respect to those who are lawfully detained, governmental authorities can conduct routine administrative searches without any 'cause' at all as long as reasonable and justified by legitimate state interests." (In re Alan R., supra, 132 Cal.App.3d at pp. 604-605, 183 Cal.Rptr. 325.)

The trial court correctly concluded that correctional officers did not need "probable cause" to believe defendant had weapons or contraband secreted on his person in order to subject him to the metal detector search under the Fourth Amendment.

B

Defendant next contends the metal detector search violated his rights under article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, which provides in part that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated ...."

Defendant notes that our Supreme Court has, on occasion, elected to construe the foregoing provision so as to afford suspects a broader security against unreasonable searches and seizures than that required by the United States Supreme Court. ² (See People v. Chavers, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 467, 189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528, 549, 119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099.) Here, defendant contends that in DeLancie v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 865, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142, the Supreme Court construed Penal Code section 2600 ³ so as to guarantee state prisoners some expectation of privacy. DeLancie held that, by virtue of Penal Code sections 2600 and 2601, the conversations between pretrial detainees and their visitors in a county jail cannot be monitored by jail officials absent a showing the monitoring is necessary to provide for the reasonable security of the institution. (DeLancie, supra, at p. 870, 183 Cal.Rptr. 866, 647 P.2d 142.) Defendant argues the metal detector search unreasonably violated a right of privacy granted by DeLancie's interpretation of Penal Code section 2600, so that the unreasonable violation of defendant's privacy constituted a violation of the state constitutional prohibition...