People v. Valladoli

• Decision Date: 18 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. S045411,S045411
• Citation: 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695,918 P.2d 999,13 Cal.4th 590
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 918 P.2d 999, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5350, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8657 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pedro VALLADOLI, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 695

54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695

13 Cal.4th 590, 918 P.2d 999, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5350,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8657

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Pedro VALLADOLI, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S045411.

Supreme Court of California.

July 18, 1996.

David H. Pierce, Los Angeles, and Mark Alan Hart, Northridge, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.

Charles H. James, Public Defender, and Ron Boyer, Deputy Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, George Williamson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Tricia A. Bigelow, Marc E. Turchin and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, Justice.

We granted review in this case to determine whether Penal Code section 969a (all further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise stated) permits the People to amend an information to include prior felony conviction enhancement allegations when (i) the jury has already rendered a verdict for the substantive crimes charged in the information, but (ii) the jury has not yet been discharged. We conclude the amendment, which occurred after the verdict but before sentencing, was permissible under section 969a.

FACTS

On October 12, 1993, Officer David Cochrane, working undercover, encountered Debbie Alvarez. He told Alvarez he was looking to buy some "black and white," street vernacular for tar heroin and powdered cocaine.

[918 P.2d 1001] When Alvarez suggested she could help him, he gave her a $20 bill whose serial number he had previously recorded. Alvarez held the bill in her right hand and walked over to where defendant Valladoli was standing. As Officer Cochrane watched from 15 feet away, Alvarez and defendant spoke, Alvarez gave defendant the $20 bill, and defendant removed two balloons from his mouth and handed them to her. As Alvarez walked away, police moved in and arrested her. She spat out the balloons and gave them to police. Police also arrested defendant, finding him in possession of the $20 bill Officer Cochrane had given Alvarez.

The People filed a felony complaint on October 28, 1993. Count 1 charged Alvarez with sale of heroin and cocaine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). Count 2 charged defendant with the sale of the same drugs (ibid.). Count 3 charged both Alvarez and defendant with possession of heroin and cocaine for sale. (Id., § 11351.) In addition, the complaint "further alleged as to Count(s) 2 & 3" that defendant had served three prior prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, subdivision (b), citing felony convictions for sale of narcotics on January 26, 1990, and February 15, 1990, and for receiving stolen property on October 7, 1992. The complaint also alleged the same prior convictions as enhancements under Health and Safety Code sections 11370.2 and 11352.5, subdivision (3). Finally, the complaint alleged the same convictions as a prohibition on the grant of probation or a suspended sentence. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4); Health & Saf.Code, § 11370, subds. (a), (c).)

After an information was mistakenly filed against defendant and then withdrawn, a preliminary examination was held for defendant on November 30, 1993. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate held defendant to answer on count 2 (sale of heroin and cocaine). Defendant's attorney asked that count 3 (possession for sale) be dismissed and the magistrate agreed. Page 7 of the November 30, 1993, felony complaint, is entitled "Felony Complaint--Order Holding to Answer--P.C. Section 872." On that page, someone, presumably the magistrate, crossed out the charges for count 3 as well as all 10 enhancement allegations. Striking the allegations was unwarranted, however, because the enhancements had been alleged as to both counts 2 and 3. Thus, dismissal of count 3 did not require dismissal of the enhancements as to count 2.

The People filed an information in superior court on December 14, 1994. The information originally charged defendant with two counts of sale of narcotics. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11352, subd. (a).) Count 2 of this information was later amended to charge possession for sale. (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.) For the first time, the applicable charging document--the December 14th information--failed to include the 10 enhancement allegations that were based on the trio of prior felony convictions. There is nothing in the record indicating either party successfully sought dismissal of the enhancement allegations, or that the magistrate ordered the allegations dismissed on her own motion. In short, it appears the lacuna was a simple clerical error. No one, apparently, noticed the omission, and the parties proceeded to trial. Following a trial, a jury found defendant guilty of both sale and possession for sale of heroin and cocaine.

Following the rendering of the verdicts, the jury was excused from the courtroom (but not discharged), and the following colloquy took place:

"THE COURT: So this matter has been proceeding on a bifurcated basis on the assumption that there were some priors alleged. I think technically, it has now been discovered that the priors were alleged in the complaint, but not in the information as filed. [p] But I understand you intend to make a motion?

"MR. FRISCO [the prosecutor]: Yes, your Honor. [p] I would just say it was an oversight that the felony complaint was not transcribed correctly and the priors were omitted because of inadvertence. [p] At this time, your Honor, I would like to amend the felony information and I would ask to allege prior convictions of this defendant...."

Defense counsel objected, claiming the amendment, if allowed, would violate both defendant's right to a speedy trial, as well as After additional argument, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to amend the information with the priors, and a hearing before the same jury commenced. The jury found defendant had suffered prior felony convictions for: (i) receiving stolen property in 1992 (§ 496); (ii) possession for sale of a controlled substance in 1990 (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351); and (iii) sale of a controlled substance in 1990 (id., § 11352). These convictions led to two consecutive three-year enhancement terms pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11370.2, a consecutive one-year term under section 667.5, subdivision (b), and a concurrent one-year term under the same section. Defendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years in prison, of which 7 years were attributable to the prior felony conviction enhancements.

[918 P.2d 1002] the rule requiring prior conviction enhancement allegations be pleaded and proved according to basic criminal pleading practice. Counsel specifically argued the amendment could not properly occur "after the verdict has been rendered in this case."

DISCUSSION

Although neither party cited section 969a to the trial court, both now concede the section controls this case. Section 969a states: "Whenever it shall be discovered that a pending indictment or information does not charge all prior felonies of which the defendant has been convicted either in this State or elsewhere, said indictment or information may be forthwith amended to charge such prior conviction or convictions, and if such amendment is made it shall be made upon order of the court, and no action of the grand jury (in the case of an indictment) shall be necessary. Defendant shall promptly be rearraigned on such information or indictment as amended and be required to plead thereto."

A. Plain Meaning of the Actual Words

Observing that section 969a explicitly requires that as a condition of amendment the information be "pending," defendant argues the plain meaning of this requirement prohibits postverdict amendments, because an information is no longer "pending" when the jury has finished its deliberations and returned a verdict. At that time, he argues, the information is no longer "pending" because the function of the information has been fulfilled. Accordingly, the People's statutory right to amend the information ceased when the jury returned a verdict.

In contrast, respondent relies on definitions found in two standard law dictionaries to conclude that the word "pending" means that period of time beginning at the inception of a legal proceeding "until the rendition of a final judgment. " (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed.1990) p. 1134, col. 2, italics added; see also Ballentine's Law Dict. (3d ed.1969) p. 930, col. 1 [a "pending action" is one that "has not been terminated by a final judgment or order"].) Because a verdict is not a final judgment (§ 1237, subd. (a) [sentence is a final judgment that may be appealed]; cf. People v. Gardner (1960) 177 Cal.App.2d 43, 45, 1 Cal.Rptr. 830 [verdict of guilty not appealable]; 6 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1989) Appeal, § 3164, p. 3919 ["The judgment is the oral pronouncement under [§ 1202] ..., not the jury's verdict"] ), respondent argues the information remains "pending" for section 969a purposes until pronouncement of sentence.

In sum, defendant claims the information ceases to be "pending" upon the rendering of the verdict, whereas respondent argues the information continues to be "pending" until pronouncement of sentence.

To determine the meaning of section 969a, we must "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386, 241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323 (hereafter Dyna-Med ).) Our first step is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning. (Mercer v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1991) 53 Cal.3d 753, 763, 280 Cal.Rptr. 745, 809 P.2d 404; Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.)

The critical language at issue here is the following...