People v. Vallance

• Decision Date: 23 April 1996
• Docket Number: Docket No. 170511
• Citation: 548 N.W.2d 718,216 Mich.App. 415
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lyle Robert VALLANCE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 718

548 N.W.2d 718

216 Mich.App. 415

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.Lyle Robert VALLANCE, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 170511.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Feb. 7, 1996, at Grand Rapids.

Decided April 23, 1996, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication June 11, 1996.

Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Joseph P. Kwiatkowski, Prosecuting Attorney, and Catherine Langevin Semel, Assistant Attorney General, for the People.

Farmer Law Office by Jeanne M. DeLorme, Rogers City, for defendant on appeal.

Before CORRIGAN, P.J., and BANDSTRA and CRANE, ^* JJ.

BANDSTRA, Judge.

Defendant was charged with two counts of "obstruction of justice,"M.C.L. § 750.505;M.S.A. § 28.773, on the basis of intimidation of a witness in criminal proceedings involving himself and Kevin Cochran.Defendant was convicted by a jury of only one count of violating M.C.L. § 750.505;M.S.A. § 28.773, involving the criminal proceedings pending against him.Defendant now appeals as of right.We affirm.

Defendant contends that the actshe was alleged to have committed do not constitute obstruction of justice, citing People v. Thomas, 438 Mich. 448, 475 N.W.2d 288(1991).In Thomas, the Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the charge of obstruction of justice arising from the making of a false statement in a police report in support of an arrest warrant.Id. at 450, 475 N.W.2d 288.Part of its endeavor required analysis of the common-law offense of obstruction of justice to determine if the charge could be maintained on the facts of the case.Id. at 455, 475 N.W.2d 288.Our Supreme Court stated:

Obstruction of justice is generally understood as an interference with the orderly administration of justice.This Court, in People v. Ormsby, 310 Mich 291, 300; 17 NW2d 187(1945), defined obstruction of justice as " 'impeding or obstructing those who seek justice in a court, or those who have duties or powers of administering justice therein.' "In People v. Coleman, 350 Mich 268, 274; 86 NW2d 281(1957), this Court stated that obstruction of justice is "committed when the effort is made to thwart or impede the administration of justice."While these definitions adequately summarize the essential concept of obstruction of justice, we believe they lack the specificity necessary to sustain a criminal conviction.

Early commentaries categorized offenses by what the particular offense wronged.For instance, some categories included offenses against property, persons, peace, health and public justice....

Like breach of the peace, at common law obstruction of justice was not a single offense but a category of offenses that interfered with public justice.Blackstone discusses twenty-two separate offenses under the heading "Offences against Public Justice."5 If we now simply define obstruction of justice as an interference with the orderly administration of justice, we would fail to recognize or distinguish it as a category of separate offenses.We find no basis for this at common law.

To warrant the charge of common-law obstruction of justice, defendant's conduct must have been recognized as one of the offenses falling within the category "obstruction of justice."Of the twenty-two offenses listed by Blackstone, the offenses of "barratry" and "conspiracy to indict an innocent man" are the closest to these facts.Common-law barratry was an offense committed when an individual filed meritless suits against others.A necessary element of barratry, however, is that it required the filing of more than one suit.The facts of this case do not support this finding.Further, conspiracy to indict an innocent man fails for the more obvious reason that no conspiracy has been claimed here.Therefore, we find no common-law precedent for the obstruction of justice charged against this defendant.[Thomas, supra at 455-458, 475 N.W.2d 288.]

Because the Court could "find no basis in the common law" for the charge of obstruction of justice, despite the fact that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial impediment to the administration of justice," the dismissal of the charge was affirmed.Id. at 458, 475 N.W.2d 288.

The problem presented by the Thomas opinion is the proper interpretation of its discussion regarding obstruction of justice.Did Thomas limit the scope of offenses constituting "obstruction of justice" to the twenty-two offenses listed by Blackstone?Or was the Court merely referring to Blackstone's list to illustrate the point that, at common law, "obstruction of justice" was not a single offense but rather a category of offenses?

We find nothing in the Thomas analysis to suggest that offenses recognized at common law as obstruction of justice are, nonetheless, not to be so considered if they are not included in the Blackstone list.AccordPeople v. Davis, 408 Mich. 255, 286, n. 7, 290 N.W.2d 366(1980)(Levin, J., concurring)("Blackstone's compilation did not purport to be comprehensive....").Accordingly, we conclude that the Supreme Court's reference in Thomas to Blackstone was merely to illustrate the point that at common law, "obstruction of justice" is not a single offense, but a category of offenses that interfere with public justice.Thomas, supra at 455-457, 475 N.W.2d 288.See alsoDavis, supra at 286-293, 290 N.W.2d 366(Levin, J., concurring).A charge of obstruction of justice was warranted if defendant's conduct would have been recognized as one of the many offenses falling within the rubric "obstruction of justice" at common law.Thomas, supra at 457-458, 475 N.W.2d 288.Intimidation of a witness in judicial proceedings is an indictable offense at common law, associated with the concept of obstructing justice.SeeDavis, supra at 286-288, 290 N.W.2d 366(Levin, J. concurring), citingThe King v. Steventon, 2...