People v. Van Norman

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ORR
• Citation: People v. Van Norman, 364 Ill. 28, 2 N.E.2d 891 (Ill. 1936)
• Decision Date: 10 June 1936
• Docket Number: No. 23464.,23464.
• Parties: PEOPLE v. VAN NORMAN.

364 Ill. 28

2 N.E.2d 891

PEOPLE

v.VAN NORMAN.

No. 23464.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 10, 1936.

Error to Circuit Court, Peoria County; Joseph E. Daily, Judge.

Donald Van Norman was convicted of robbery with a gun, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Theodore Korb, of Peoria, for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., E. V. Champion, State's Atty., of Peoria, and A. B. Dennis, of Danville (Clark B. Montgomery, of Peoria, of counsel), for the People.

ORR, Justice.

Donald Van Norman, charged with the crime of robbery with a gun, was tried and convicted by a jury in the circuit court of Peoria county. He was positively identified soon after his arrest, and prior to his trial he made a complete confession of the crime. The record is brought here for review by writ of error upon assignments that the trial court improperly (a) denied motions for a continuance, (b) ordered the clerk to correct the record, and (c) denied a petition for change of venue.

On November 18, 1935, Van Norman appeared in court without counsel and an attorney was appointed to defend him. His attorney was then furnished with a copy of the indictment, upon which appeared the names of three state's witnesses, all residents of Peoria and two of them city policemen. On the following day counsel appeared and the case was set for trial on November 20. A list of additional witnesses to be used by the people was furnished to Van Norman's counsel on November 20. At that time a motion was made by the latter for a continuance, supported by an affidavit asserting lack of time to prepare a good defense or to confer with the witnesses, and also that the state's attorney had refused to allow affiant to see the alleged confession. The motion for continuance was denied and the court then set the trial for the next day. When the case was called for trial on November 21, the motion for continuance was renewed and an additional affidavit filed, asserting that slightly less than three days was insufficient time for counsel to prepare a proper defense; that there were numerous witnesses who would testify that Van Norman was at a place far removed from the scene of the alleged crime, many of whom counsel had been unable to interview, and setting forth other grounds first stated in the original affidavit for continuance. This second motion for continuance was likewise denied by the court and the cause proceeded to trial.

No hard and fast rule can be laid down in criminal cases as to the length of time which a trial court must allow counsel to properly prepare a defense. Much latitude has always been allowed trial courts in the exercise of their discretion in such matters, depending upon the gravity of the offense, the character of the evidence, the number and residence of the witnesses, the nature of the defense, and other salient circumstances. In People v. Storer, 329 Ill. 536, 161 N.E. 76, 78, the defendant was brought to trial six days after the appointment of counsel, and it was there argued that the court had improperly denied a motion for continuance. In upholding the trial court's action and refusing to reverse the judgment of conviction we there said: ‘A defendant in every criminal case is entitled, under the law, to a reasonable time and full opportunity to prepare for his trial, and that right is one guaranteed to him by the Constitution. What is a reasonable time for the preparation of a case, and what time should be granted counsel for that purpose must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case, and is a matter largely resting in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, which will only be disturbed on review in a court of appeal when it is shown that that discretion has been abused. People v. Singer, 288...