People v. Vance
| Decision Date | 24 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 50675,50675 |
| Parties | , 28 Ill.Dec. 508 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellant, v. Jeffrey VANCE, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Chicago, and Ronald C. Dozier, State's Atty., Bloomington , for the People.
Marc M. Barnett, Marvin J. Glass, and Charles K. Piet, of Barnett, Ettinger, Glass, Berkson & Braverman, Ltd., Chicago, for appellee.
On December 4, 1974, an indictment was returned in the circuit court of McLean County charging Jeffrey M. Vance, defendant herein, with the unlawful delivery of less than 30 grams of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). Following allowance, in January 1975, of defendant's motion for substitution of judges because of the alleged prejudice of the original trial judge, the case was assigned to Judge Luther H. Dearborn. Thereafter various motions, including the substitution of counsel for defendant, were allowed, and, following a number of continuances of prior trial settings, the case came on for trial on July 22, 1976. On that morning defense counsel presented a motion under section 114-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c)). This motion alleged the prejudice of Judge Dearborn and requested trial before a different judge.
It was further alleged that Judge Dearborn had presided at an earlier trial of defendant on an unrelated drug-delivery charge in which defendant had been sentenced to the penitentiary, and which was then on appeal. Defendant's conviction in that case was subsequently affirmed by the appellate court in 1977, but the sentence was reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing by a different judge. (People v. Vance reported Sub nom. People v. Honn (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 378, 5 Ill.Dec. 777, 362 N.E.2d 90.) The sentence reversal in that case was said by the appellate court to be necessitated by what it characterized as Judge Dearborn's overwhelming concern "with the severe societal problem caused by the use and transfer of drugs and not with the particular circumstances presented in these individual cases." (47 Ill.App.3d 378, 385, 5 Ill.Dec. 777, 783, 362 N.E.2d 90, 96.) The motion further alleged that the judge was prejudiced against him, and that defendant belonged to a class of defendants particularly disfavored by Judge Dearborn, who, it was alleged, had never, in the absence of a plea agreement, sentenced a defendant convicted of possession or delivery of a controlled substance to other than a penitentiary term. It is further alleged that in the earlier trial Judge Dearborn had questioned defendant's honesty.
The motion for substitution of judges was denied. Since defendant had, more than a year earlier, and after Judge Dearborn's assignment to his case, waived a jury trial, a bench trial ensued in which defendant was found guilty and sentenced to 22 to 66 months' imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the case then on appeal.
In a Rule 23 order (58 Ill.2d R. 23), a divided appellate court held the motion for substitution should have been allowed. (56 Ill.App.3d 1122, 18 Ill.Dec. 250, 377 N.E.2d 403.) It reversed the conviction, stating that while "the mere fact of a defendant's prior conviction before a certain judge is not necessarily cause for recusal in a later case," the trial judge here The dissenting member was of the opinion that no prejudice on the issue of guilt or innocence had been shown, and that it was unnecessary to remand for a new trial.
The fundamental problem with the appellate court majority's disposition of this case is its remandment for a new trial. The appellate court in the earlier case apparently did not regard what it characterized as Judge Dearborn's serious abuse of sentencing discretion in a category of cases he "disfavored" (People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 593, 598, 13 Ill.Dec. 262, 370 N.E.2d 1289) as inhibiting his ability to fairly determine defendant's guilt, for it affirmed defendant's conviction, remanding only for resentencing. Now, however, the appellate court majority seemingly concludes that the trial judge could not fairly determine defendant's guilt or innocence in this case.
As earlier noted, defendant's motion for substitution was predicated upon section 114-5(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 38, par. 114-5(c)), which provides:
When asked by the judge whether he desired to introduce evidence in support of the motion, defense counsel offered only a transcript of the earlier trial, referred to Judge Dearborn's imprisonment of drug offenders, the absence of aggravation in the earlier case, and the judge's denial of a stay of mittimus or bond pending appeal as indicative of prejudice against this class of offenders and against defendant himself.
We digress momentarily to comment upon the fact that defendant voluntarily elected to waive a jury trial shortly after the case was assigned to Judge Dearborn more than a year earlier. It seems odd that defendant would choose to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge who, defendant now asserts, was then manifesting a prejudice against all persons charged with drug-related offenses. Additionally, it seems to us that the motives for delaying, until the morning of trial, presentation of a motion to disqualify a judge assigned to the case more than a year earlier might well be suspect, particularly when, as here, the grounds alleged for disqualification are not newly discovered. Since the motion was not objected to on these grounds, however, we consider its merit.
It is clear that ordinarily the fact that a judge has ruled adversely to a defendant in either a civil or a criminal case does not disqualify that judge from sitting in subsequent civil or criminal cases in which the same person is a party. (Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1369 (1968); 48 C.J.S. Judges § 82 (1947); People v. Jones (1971), 48 Ill.2d 410, 413, 270 N.E.2d 409; Merkie v. People (1959), 15 Ill.2d 539, 546, 155 N.E.2d 581; People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 601, 602, 13 Ill.Dec. 267, 370 N.E.2d 1294.) The appellate court has repeatedly indicated that the burden of establishing actual prejudice rests on the defendant, and the trial court need not justify retaining the case (People v. Nickols (1976), 41 Ill.App.3d 974, 979, 354 N.E.2d 474, and cases there cited), and this court has said that the trial judge is ordinarily in the best position to determine whether he has been prejudiced (People v. Polk (1973), 55 Ill.2d 327, 336, 303 N.E.2d 137). The lack of unanimity among the Fourth District Appellate Court judges on the disqualification question is highlighted by the fact that while a divided court in this case reversed because Judge Dearborn did not allow the motion for substitution of judges, a differently composed but also divided panel affirmed a conviction involving his denial of a similar motion in People v. Pinchott (1977), 55 Ill.App.3d 601, 13 Ill.Dec. 267, 370 N.E.2d 1294.
To conclude that a judge is disqualified because of prejudice is not, of course, a judgment to be lightly made. It will be viewed by some as reflecting unfavorably upon the judge, and it tends to disrupt the orderly functioning of the judicial system. (United States v. Valenti (D.N.J.1954),120 F.Supp. 80.) As was said in Cox v. United States (8th Cir. 1962), 309 F.2d 614, 619, quoting from In re J. P. Linahan, Inc. (2d Cir. 1943), 138 F.2d 650:
Every human is, consciously or subconsciously, partial to some degree in that he is influenced by the habits he has been trained in, the experiences he has had, occupationally or otherwise, the people with whom he associates, the area in which he lives and the innumerable unrecognized factors which subconsciously affect every individual's philosophy. As Cardozo said: "Deep below consciousness are other forces, the likes and dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts, and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge." (B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 167 (1921).) This, however, is nothing more nor less than one of the characteristics of human nature. The most that ought to be expected is that the judge will recognize that he has basic predilections and make a conscientious effort to set them aside and give dispassionate consideration to the case before him. More than that can scarcely be expected of any individual.
We note that the trial judge here explained at some length his reasoning in denying the motion.
"THE COURT: Well, with regard to the Defendant specifically, it is correct that there was a previous trial conducted by this Court involving the Defendant in this case and in which there was a conviction and which resulted in the Defendant being sentenced. From...
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