People v. Vasquez

• Decision Date: 27 July 2001
• Docket Number: Docket No. 116660, Calendar No. 7.
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark John VASQUEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

631 N.W.2d 711

465 Mich. 83

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Mark John VASQUEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 116660, Calendar No. 7.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 7, 2001.

Decided July 27, 2001.

Jennifer M. Granholm, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Larry J. Burdick, Prosecuting Attorney, and Mark H. Duthie, Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Mt. Pleasant, for the people.

Joseph T. Barberi, Mt. Pleasant, for the defendant.

Jeffrey L. Sauter, President, and Terrence E. Dean, Senior Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Muskegon, for amicus curiae Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

Opinion

MARKMAN, J.

We granted leave to consider whether defendant's alleged conduct of lying to a police officer about his name and age, constituted an "obstruction" within the meaning of Michigan's "resisting and obstructing" statute. MCL 750.479. Michigan's "resisting and obstructing" statute does not proscribe any manner of interference with a police officer, and it also does not proscribe only conduct that poses a threat to the safety of police officers; rather, it proscribes threatened, either expressly or impliedly, physical interference and actual physical interference with a police officer. Therefore, we would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the trial court's order dismissing the charge against defendant.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

While investigating a complaint about a loud party, a police officer found defendant urinating on the front lawn of a private residence. The officer approached defendant and asked him whether he had been drinking alcohol. Defendant responded, "Yes, but not very much." The officer suspected that defendant was an intoxicated minor. When the officer asked defendant his name and age, defendant said that his name was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he was sixteen years old. In fact, defendant's name was Mark John Vasquez, Jr., and he was seventeen years old.

The officer arrested defendant for being a minor in possession of alcohol. MCL 436.1703(1). During the booking process, the officer learned from another officer, who recognized defendant, that he was actually Mark John Vasquez, Jr. When confronted about the officer's knowledge of who he actually was, he admitted his true name and age.

The prosecutor charged defendant with being a minor in possession—second offense and "resisting and obstructing" a police officer. The trial court quashed the "resisting and obstructing" charge, relying on People v. Philabaun, 234 Mich.App. 471, 595 N.W.2d 502 (1999) (Philabaun I),

which this Court subsequently reversed, 461 Mich. 255, 602 N.W.2d 371 (1999) (Philabaun II). The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed and remanded, 240 Mich.App. 239, 612 N.W.2d 162 (2000), relying on our decision in Philabaun II, that a defendant's mere refusal to obey an order for a blood sample could constitute resisting or opposing.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to construe Michigan's "resisting and obstructing" statute. Questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo. Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co., 460 Mich. 243, 248, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999).

III. ANALYSIS OF STATUTE

"The primary goal of judicial interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature." McJunkin v. Cellasto Plastic Corp., 461 Mich. 590, 598, 608 N.W.2d 57 (2000). "The first step in that determination is to review the language of the statute itself." In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich. 396, 411, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999). The "resisting and obstructing" statute states in relevant part:

Any person who shall knowingly and willfully ... obstruct, resist, oppose, assault, beat or wound ... any person or persons authorized by law to maintain and preserve the peace, in their lawful acts, attempts and efforts to maintain, preserve and keep the peace shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.... [MCL 750.479.]

This statute proscribes conduct that "obstruct[s]" a police officer while the officer is attempting to "keep the peace."

A. "KEEP THE PEACE"

The "resisting and obstructing" statute proscribes certain conduct encountered by a law enforcement officer while the officer is attempting to "keep the peace." Therefore, the first issue is whether the police officer, in this case, was attempting to "keep the peace" when defendant lied to him. "[A]n officer's efforts to `keep the peace' include ordinary police functions that do not directly involve placing a person under arrest," People v. Little, 434 Mich. 752, 759, 456 N.W.2d 237 (1990). "[T]he broad statutory clause `maintain, preserve and keep the peace' includes all of the duties legally executed by a police officer." People v. Weatherspoon, 6 Mich.App. 229, 232, 148 N.W.2d 889 (1967).

In this case, the officer was responding to a complaint about a loud party when he found defendant urinating on the front lawn of a private residence. Because the officer suspected that defendant was an intoxicated minor, the officer asked defendant for his name and age. Defendant told the officer that his name was "John Wesley Chippeway" and that he was sixteen years old. In fact, defendant's name was Mark John Vasquez, Jr. and he was seventeen years old. Defendant was arrested for being a minor in possession of alcohol. MCL 436.1703(1). It is clear that, at the time defendant lied to the officer, the latter was responding to suspected criminal activity, which constitutes an ordinary police function. Because the officer was performing such a lawfully assigned function when he questioned defendant, the officer was attempting to "keep the peace" within the meaning of the "resisting and obstructing" statute, when defendant lied to him.

B. "OBSTRUCT"

The next issue is whether defendant "obstructed," within the meaning of the "resisting and obstructing" statute, the police officer when he lied to him. "[T]he meaning of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context." King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221, 112 S.Ct. 570, 116 L.Ed.2d 578 (1991). "Contextual understanding of statutes is generally grounded in the doctrine of noscitur a sociis: `[i]t is known from its associates,' see Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.), at 1060. This doctrine stands for the principle that a word or phrase is given meaning by its context or setting." Tyler v. Livonia Pub. Schs., 459 Mich. 382, 390-391, 590 N.W.2d 560 (1999). "[I]n seeking meaning, words and clauses will not be divorced from those which precede and those which follow." Sanchick v. Michigan State Bd. of Optometry, 342 Mich. 555, 559, 70 N.W.2d 757 (1955). "It is a familiar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning." Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. Impac Ltd., Inc., 432 U.S. 312, 322, 97 S.Ct. 2307, 53 L.Ed.2d 368 (1977)

.

In the present case, the statute uses the word "obstruct" as part of a list containing five other words, namely, "resist, oppose, assault, beat [and] wound." The meaning of the word "obstruct" should be determined in this particular context, and be given a meaning logically related to the five surrounding words of the statute. "Resist" is defined as "to withstand, strive against, or oppose." Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1991) at 1146. "Resistance" is additionally defined as "the opposition offered by one thing, force, etc." Id. "Oppose" is defined as "to act against or furnish resistance to combat" Id. at 949. "Assault" is defined as "a sudden violent attack; onslaught." Id. at 82. "Beat" is defined as "to strike forcefully and repeatedly; ... to hit repeatedly as to cause painful injury." Id. at 120. "Wound" is defined as "to inflict a wound upon; injure; hurt." Id. at 1537. Each of these words, when read together, clearly implies an element of threatened or actual physical interference.

The accompanying term "obstruct" is susceptible to several potential meanings. "Obstruct" is defined as: "1. to block or close up with an obstacle. 2. to hinder, interrupt, or delay the passage, progress, course, etc. of. 3. to block from sight; be in the way of (a view, passage, etc.)." Id. at 935. Accordingly, we understand the dissent's definition of "obstruct," which defines it as including both physical and nonphysical conduct. Although we understand that "obstruct" can be defined in such a manner, when read in context, we believe that the more reasonable interpretation is one that communicates an actual, or a threat of, physical interference.¹

The words "assault, beat, or wound" necessarily contain an element of violence; whereas, the words "obstruct, resist [or] oppose" may, but do not necessarily, contain an element of violence. For example, one cannot "assault, beat, or wound" an officer without being violent; however, one can "obstruct, resist, [or] oppose" an officer without necessarily being violent. What this leads us to believe is that when the Legislature used these six words together, it intended to proscribe both violent and nonviolent physical interference; physical interference being the only element common to all six words. Therefore, by grouping these six words together as a part of a single type of prohibited conduct, the Legislature has demonstrated a purpose of proscribing conduct amounting to actual or threatened physical interference.² In this case, defendant's conduct did not constitute threatened or actual physical interference. Defendant instead lied to the officer about his name and age. While certainly not laudatory, defendant's conduct did not physically interfere with or threaten to physically interfere with the officer.³

Moreover, the principal "purpose of [the `resisting and obstructing' statute] is to protect officers from physical harm." Philabaun II, supra, at 262, n. 17, 602 N.W.2d 371. "The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect persons (the officers) from physical violence and harm." People v....