People v. Vaughn

Decision Date09 July 2012
Docket NumberDocket No. 142627.
Citation491 Mich. 642,821 N.W.2d 288
PartiesPEOPLE v. VAUGHN.
CourtMichigan Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Kym L. Worthy, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of Research, Training and Appeals, and Thomas M. Chambers, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

State Appellate Defender (by Randy E. Davidson) for defendant.

Bill Schuette, Attorney General, John J. Bursch, Solicitor General, Richard A. Bandstra, Chief Legal Counsel, and Bruce H. Edwards, Assistant Attorney General, for the Department of the Attorney General.

Craig A. Daly, P.C., Detroit (by Craig A. Daly) on behalf of defendant.

YOUNG, C.J.

We granted defendant's application for leave to appeal to determine whether defendant is entitled to a new trial because the circuit court closed the courtroom during voir dire in violation of defendant's constitutional rights.1 We hold that a defendant's right to a public trial is subject to the forfeiture rule articulated in People v. Carines2 and that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that defendant's failure to assert his public trial right necessarily “forecloses the later grant of relief.” 3 In applying the Carines forfeiture rule to defendant's appeal, however, we conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial because he has not established that his forfeited claim of error “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 4 We further conclude that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel.5 Accordingly, we vacate the Court of Appeals' opinion to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion, affirm on alternative grounds the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and affirm defendant's convictions.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of June 14, 2002, defendant, Joseph Lashawn Vaughn, parked his car on a Detroit street so that it partially blocked the driveway of Emmitt Smith, a retired police officer. Smith and a neighbor went over to the car, which defendant had exited, and began talking to a woman in the passenger seat of the car. Defendant then emerged from a nearby alley and began shooting at Smith and the neighbor. In response, Smith returned fire, although defendant ran from the scene. Police traced the parked vehicle to defendant.

Defendant was arrested and charged with possession of a firearm by a felon (felon-in-possession),6 possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony (felony-firearm),7 and two counts of assault with intent to murder.8 He proceeded to a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court. After the circuit court discussed a preliminary matter with counsel of record, a court officer closed the courtroom in preparation for voir dire:

The Court: All right, we'll bring the jury in.

Court Officer: Okay, folks you're going to have to clear the courtroom until after the selection of the new jury.

Although the record is unclear regarding how many people were subject to the court's order, it is uncontested that the circuit court did not provide a reason for this closure. It is also uncontested that neither defendant nor his counsel objected to closure of the courtroom.

At the conclusion of defendant's trial, the jury found defendant guilty of felon-in-possession, felony-firearm, and two counts of assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder.9 Defendant raised several claims of error on appeal, among them that the circuit court's closure of the courtroom during voir dire violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial and entitled him to a new trial. Alternatively, defendant claimed that his trial counsel's failure to object to the circuit court's closure of the courtroom constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and likewise entitled him to a new trial.

The Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed defendant's convictions. 10 The Court of Appeals panel explained that while a defendant has “the right to have the courtroom open to the public during jury voir dire [,] ... this right is not self-executing [and] the defendant must timely assert the right.” 11 Accordingly, “the failure to timely assert the right to a public trial forecloses the later grant of relief.” 12 Because defendant's trial counsel did not object to the trial court's decision to close the courtroom to the public during the selection of his jury,” the courtroom's closure “does not warrant relief.” 13

The Court of Appeals also determined that defendant was not entitled to relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel because he could not show “that his trial counsel's decision not to object fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms....” 14 It explained that [d]efendant's trial counsel might have reasonably concluded that proceeding with a jury voir dire that was closed to the public benefitteddefendant” because a reasonable trial counsel might determine “that the potential jurors will be more forthcoming in their responses when the courtroom is closed, that the proceedings will be less likely to be tainted by outside influences, or ... [that] it will expedite the proceedings.” 15

This Court granted defendant's application for leave to appeal, limited to the following issues:

(1) whether the defendant was denied his right to a public trial pursuant to U.S. Const., Am. VI, and Const. 1963, art. 1, § 20, where the Wayne Circuit Court excluded persons other than jurors from the courtroom during the jury voir dire, see Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. [209], 130 S.Ct. 721, 175 L.Ed.2d 675 (2010); (2) whether the defendant, by failing to object, forfeited or waived any error resulting from the exclusion of the public from the courtroom during the jury voir dire, and, if so, whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object; (3) whether, if some structural errors can be forfeited, the denial of the right to a public trial is among those forfeitable errors; and (4) whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial as a consequence of the trial court's exclusion of the public during the jury voir dire.16

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendant claims that the circuit court violated his constitutional right to a public trial when it closed the courtroom during voir dire.17 Alternatively, defendant claims that his trial counsel's failure to object to the courtroom's closure rendered the assistance of his counsel constitutionally deficient.18 Whether the circuit court violated defendant's right to a public trial presentsa question of constitutional law.19 Whether defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and constitutional law. 20 We review for clear error a circuit court's findings of fact. 21 We review de novo questions of constitutional law.22

III. RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

The right to a public trial “has its roots in our English common law heritage.” 23 The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution expressly enumerates this right and states that a criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial....” The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is incorporated to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Additionally, article 1, § 20 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution guarantees that a criminal defendant “shall have the right to a ... public trial....” 25 That the right to a publictrial also encompassesthe right to public voir dire proceedings is “well settled.” 26

Although the Sixth Amendment right “is the right of the accused,” a memberof the public can invoke the right to a public trial under the First Amendment.27 “The extent to which the First and Sixth Amendment public trial rights are coextensive is an open question, and it is not necessary here to speculate whether or in what circumstances the reach or protections of one might be greater than the other.” 28 The existence of this implied First Amendment right enjoyed by members of the public precludes a criminal defendant from enjoying a constitutional right to a private trial, even if he waives his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. 29 Because this case involves “the accused who invoked his right to a public trial,” albeit after the fact, this case proceeds solely under the Sixth Amendment.30

A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial is limited, and there are circumstances that allow the closure of a courtroom during any stage of a criminal proceeding, even over a defendant's objection:

[T]he party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and it must make findings adequate to support the closure.” 31

If there is a timely assertion of the Sixth Amendment public trial right, the remedy for a violation must be “appropriate to the violation,” although “the defendant should not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief....” 32

Although the existence of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial during voir dire is not questioned, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of the United States has squarely considered whether the right can be forfeited or waived by a defendant's failure to assert the right in a timely fashion. We turn now to this question.

A. PRESERVATION OF RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL

This Court “has long recognized the importance of preserving issues for appellate review.” 33 As a result, [t]his Court disfavors consideration of unpreserved claims of error,” even unpreserved claims of constitutionalerror.34 In People v. Carines, this Court adopted the forfeiture standard articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Olano.35 Like this Court's jurisprudence, Olan...

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