People v. Vaughn
| Decision Date | 31 August 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 11,Docket No. 97279,11 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Derrick Terrance VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellee. Calendar |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
This appeal requires us to determine whether, in a prosecution for kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct, the trial court erred in failing to adequately instruct the jury that asportation necessary for kidnapping must not be merely incidental to commission of the underlying offense of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and that reversal is required. While we would hold that the trial court did err, because the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we find no actual prejudice to defendant and, accordingly, would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.
A
On the evening of September 24, 1989, complainant and a friend met the defendant at a Flint tavern. At approximately 1:40 a.m., after sharing some drinks and dancing, defendant asked the complainant to accompany him to a local party store. Complainant agreed to the excursion and joined defendant in his car.
At the store, defendant purchased some alcohol and glasses. Returning to the car, he poured drinks for himself and complainant. After leaving the store, complainant gave defendant the address of a friend and asked to be dropped off at that location. Complainant also asked to be returned to the tavern. Disregarding these requests, defendant drove to a gas station. While defendant remained in the automobile, complainant tried to use an outside pay phone to call for a ride, but was too nervous to remember any phone numbers. Reentering the automobile, complainant repeated her request to be dropped off either at her friend's home or at the tavern.
Again disregarding complainant's plea, defendant drove to a nearby parking lot, where he rolled a marijuana cigarette. After instructing complainant to take a "hit," defendant smoked some of the marijuana himself and then drove onto the I-69 expressway. After again asking to be returned either to her friend's home or the tavern, defendant told complainant that he needed to visit a friend's home. Upon learning this, complainant opened the door and tried to flee the moving vehicle. Grabbing her arm, defendant pulled the complainant back into the vehicle, slammed the door shut, and struck complainant in the head.
After traveling along the expressway for approximately twenty minutes, defendant arrived at his friend's home and began changing the oil in his car. According to complainant, this task took approximately fifteen to twenty minutes. Upon completion, defendant returned to the vehicle where he grabbed the complainant and ripped off her coat and sweater. Complainant fled from the car and began running down the road. Defendant followed in his automobile, catching up with her at a home some blocks away. Defendant got out of the vehicle, ran to the complainant, and punched her twice in the head. Defendant then grabbed complainant by the arm, lifted her off the ground, and forced her back into the car.
Defendant now drove directly to a motel. Already having a key to the room, he did not check in at the main office. Defendant told complainant that she could use the telephone in the room, but, upon entering, she discovered that the room did not have a telephone. Recognizing that she had been tricked, she tried to leave, but defendant locked the door and would not let her depart.
Defendant instructed complainant to sit on the bed and to undress, which she did. Complainant struck the defendant with an ashtray, and he responded by striking her in the face, knocking her off the bed. Defendant then threw the complainant back onto the bed and raped her. Defendant later drove the complainant to a local school where he dropped her off. According to complainant, defendant left her at the school just before dawn, approximately between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m.
Defendant was charged with first-degree criminal sexual conduct, penetration occurring in connection with the commission of a felony and with the separate offense of kidnapping. The prosecutor proceeded under theories of (1) actual forcible or secret confinement, and (2) forcible confinement with intent to secretly confine complainant or hold her in service against her will. M.C.L. § 750.349; M.S.A. § 28.581; see also People v. Wesley, 421 Mich. 375, 383, 365 N.W.2d 692 (1984). After a lengthy jury trial, at the close of evidence, both the prosecutor and defense counsel submitted jury instructions to the trial judge. Defendant's submission was based on CJI2d 19.1, which the trial judge accepted. After instructing the jury on both the kidnapping and first-degree CSC charges, the trial judge inquired if counsel had any corrections or comments pertaining to the instructions. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel expressed agreement with the instructions given. Defendant was subsequently found guilty of both charges and, after pleading guilty of being an habitual (second) offender, was sentenced to concurrent forty- to sixty-year terms.
Defendant appealed and argued, inter alia, that there was insufficient evidence of the asportation element to support his convictions. Defendant did not raise in the Court of Appeals his current challenge of the jury instructions. Rejecting defendant's sufficiency of the evidence claim, the Court of Appeals concluded:
[S]ufficient evidence was presented so that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the movement of the victim in this case was not "merely incidental" to the sexual assault. [200 Mich.App. 611, 614, 505 N.W.2d 41 (1993).]
Notwithstanding this conclusion, the Court of Appeals went on to reverse defendant's separate kidnapping conviction because it deemed the trial court's jury instructions insufficient to convey the essential point that the asportation necessary for kidnapping could not be merely movement incidental to commission of the CSC. This failure to adequately inform the jury about an essential element of kidnapping, the Court of Appeals reasoned, resulted in manifest injustice and required reversal. Id. at 614-617, 505 N.W.2d 41.
Because this kidnapping had served as the underlying felony for defendant's CSC-I and habitual offender convictions, the Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict on these counts as well.
On January 4, 1994, we granted the prosecutor's application to appeal. 444 Mich. 913.
It is well established that forcible-confinement kidnapping requires proof of asportation taken in furtherance of kidnapping and not merely movement incidental to the commission of an underlying offense. Wesley, supra, 421 Mich. at 388, 365 N.W.2d 692. 1 This essential element of asportation applies if the underlying offense is a coequal or lesser crime. See People v. Barker, 411 Mich. 291, 307 N.W.2d 61 (1981) (coequal offenses); People v. Adams, 389 Mich. 222, 205 N.W.2d 415 (1973) (lesser offenses) (hereinafter Adams I ). These rules pertaining to asportation have been incorporated into both the first and the second editions of the standard Criminal Jury Instructions. See CJI 19:1:01; CJI2d 19.1.
The importance of this distinction between asportation for kidnapping and movement incidental to an underlying offense cannot be overemphasized. As this Court explained in Wesley, because " 'virtually any assault, any battery, any rape, or any robbery involves some "intentional confinement," of the person of the victim,' " Wesley, supra, 421 Mich. at 385, 365 N.W.2d 692, quoting People v. Adams, 34 Mich.App. 546, 560, 192 N.W.2d 19 (1971), a forcible confinement kidnapping charge may be used by the prosecutor to "elevate[ ] a common-law misdemeanor to an offense punishable by life imprisonment." 421 Mich. 385. To avoid this potential problem, this Court has specifically demanded that the prosecution prove asportation unique to the commission of kidnapping. Adams I, supra, 389 Mich. at 237-238, 205 N.W.2d 415. This burden of proof, of course, means little if a jury is not informed of it. Accordingly, it is erroneous not to properly instruct regarding this essential element of asportation. Similarly, it is erroneous to instruct the jury in such a way that it may find the asportation element satisfied by movement not incidental to kidnapping but, instead, merely incidental to commission of a coequal offense such as first-degree CSC. Such an instruction circumvents the express demands of Adams I, Barker, and Wesley, and exposes the kidnapping statute to potential charges of unconstitutionality. Adams I, supra, 389 Mich. at 237-238, 205 N.W.2d 415.
It is equally well established that the criminal defendant has a right to have a properly instructed jury consider the evidence presented against him. See, e.g., People v. Liggett, 378 Mich. 706, 714, 148 N.W.2d 784 (1967); People v. Visel, 275 Mich. 77, 81, 265 N.W. 781 (1936). This prerogative emanates from a criminal defendant's right under the federal and state constitutions to a fair trial by jury, 2 and is entrusted, as an initial matter, to the able trial judges of this state, whose general duty to properly instruct is specifically mandated by M.C.L. § 768.29; M.S.A. § 28.1052:
The court shall instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case and in his charge make such comment on the evidence, the testimony and character of any witnesses, as in his opinion the interest of justice may require. 3
Under the common law of this state, trial judges are responsible for insuring that cases are presented to juries in an intelligent manner so that the jurors have a clear and correct understanding of what it is they are to decide. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 392 Mich. 553, 562, 221 N.W.2d...
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