People v. Vaughn

• Decision Date: 25 February 1972
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 71--7
• Citation: 280 N.E.2d 253,4 Ill.App.3d 51
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sylvester VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 253

280 N.E.2d 253

4 Ill.App.3d 51

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sylvester VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.

Gen. No. 71--7.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

Feb. 25, 1972.

Paul Bradley, District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, Mount Vernon, and Kenneth L. Jones, Acting District Defender, Illinois Defender Project, Mount Vernon, for defendant-appellant.

Robert H. Rice, State's Atty. of St. Clair County, Belleville, for plaintiff-appellee.

EBERSPACHER, Justice.

On March 12, 1969, the defendant was arrested, charged with the theft of a taxicab in St. Clair County and given two traffic tickets. On March 18, 1969, he was admitted to bail on the theft charge and on May 9, 1969, he was indicted for theft and a capias prepared. During the middle of May, he was picked up by the Chief Adult Probation Officer for the Twentieth Judicial Circuit and taken to the Randolph County jail to await a probation revocation hearing on a previous conviction in Randolph County. On May 15, the theft charge in St. Clair County was called on the arraignment docket, and, since the defendant was not present, his bond was forfeited. A bench warrant was issued on May 19 on the St. Clair County charge. On May 23, the defendant's probation in Randolph County was revoked and he was sentenced to six months in the State Penal Farm. On May 28, a letter was sent from the St. Clair County Sheriff to the Penal Farm, containing two bench warrants and a capias to be lodged as detainers against the defendant, in which it was requested that the St. Clair County Sheriff be advised when defendant was to be released so deputies could be sent for him. On October 24, 1969, the defendant was released from the Penal Farm and was picked up by officials of St. Clair County and taken to the St. Clair County jail, where he remained until his trial on December 9, 1969, when he was found guilty and sentenced a minimum of seven and a maximum of ten years. The Capias and Bench Warrant reflect service on October 24, 1969, and defendant testified that no papers were served on him at the Penal Farm, although Penal Farm authorities advised him he would be picked up by St. Clair County authorities when he completed his time there.

On November 20, 1969, defendant filed his motion for discharge pursuant to Ch. 38, § 103--5, Ill.Rev."d. Statutes. In denying the motion for discharge the trial court stated that he was relying upon Ch. 38, § 103--5(e), the pertinent part of which provides:

'(e) If a person is simultaneously in custody upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, or simultaneously demands trial upon more than one charge pending against him in the same county, he shall be tried or adjudged guilty after waiver of trial, upon at least one such charge before expiration relative to any of such pending charges of the period prescribed by subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this Section.'

The State has not argued that this section is applicable to the facts of this case; rather, the State argues that the defendant was tried within the required 120 days, by computing the period from the date the defendant was returned to St. Clair County.

The critical question, then, is on what date the 120 day period started. The defendant argues that § 103--5(e) is inapplicable to the facts of the case since there was only one charge pending against the defendant in any county. He further argues that the critical date is when 'the warrants were Lodged against the defendant'. This would appear to be the time when the warrants and capias were received at the Penal Farm as detainers against him, May 29. If so, the period would be 195 days. Computing from October 24, there would only be a delay of 47 days.

The defendant bases his argument on People v. Gray, 83 Ill.App.2d 262, 227 N.E.2d 159 (1967). In that case, the defendant was convicted in Green County and was serving a sentence of one to five years at Menard. On September 7, 1965, a complaint was filed and a warrant of arrest was issued in Morgan County. On October 26, 1965, Morgan County officials discovered the defendant was at Menard and placed a detainer warrant with the warden at Menard for the arrest of the defendant. On May 25, 1966, the defendant was indicted in Morgan County and, on July 8, the State's Attorney procured a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. On July 21, the trial court considered the defendant's motion for discharge and dismissed the charge. The State appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court. The court reviewed those Illinois cases which had held that the State would not be permitted to evade the right of an accused to a speedy trial, People v. Fosdick, 36 Ill.2d 524, 224 N.E.2d 242 (1967); People v. Patheal, 27 Ill.2d 269, 189 N.E.2d 309 (1963); People v. Swartz, 21 Ill.2d 277, 171 N.E.2d 784 (1961), and held that the 'statute begins to run from the date defendant is in custody by reason of the service of a warrant, rather than the date of the indictment * * *'. The court concluded by holding, 227 N.E.2d 163--4:

'We conclude that under the decisions of the Supreme Court, the State's Attorney was under a duty to prosecute the charge through trial within 120 days from the discovery of the whereabouts of the defendant and the concurrent placing of the detainer warrant. We cannot satisfactorily distinguish the failure to serve the warrant in this case from the dismissal of a complaint and the voluntary relinquishment of custody to another agency * * *. To say that defendant, although within the jurisdiction of the State, is not in custody upon the arrest warrant issued in Morgan County but voluntarily withheld from service, supports a fiction and authorizes evasion of the constitutional and statutory provisions for a prompt trial, and would limit, if not completely thwart, the preparation of a possible valid defense to the charge.'

The opinion also points out that, in reply to questions during oral argument, counsel seemed to agree that the warrant was an arrest warrant which was not served promptly, but held by administrative authorities to be served at the time of the defendant's release. The court also noted...