People v. Vidauri

• Citation: 486 P.3d 239
• Decision Date: 19 April 2021
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 19SC933
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Alma VIDAURI, Respondent
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

486 P.3d 239

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner

v.Alma VIDAURI, Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 19SC933

Supreme Court of Colorado.

April 19, 2021

Rehearing Denied June 1, 2021

Attorneys for Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondent: The Noble Law Firm, LLC, Antony Noble, Taylor Ivy, Lakewood, Colorado

En Banc

JUSTICE HOOD delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 In this theft case, we review whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that Alma Vidauri committed a class 4 felony theft. A division of the court of appeals concluded that the evidence was insufficient because the prosecution had not shown the difference in value between the total amount of certain public benefits Vidauri received and the amount for which she might have been eligible had she accurately reported her household income. People v. Vidauri , 2019 COA 140, ¶ 1, ––– P.3d ––––. Therefore, the division reversed the trial court and entered judgment for the lowest level of theft, a class 1 petty offense. Id.

¶2 We reverse the division. The theft statute places no burden on the prosecution to establish that Vidauri would have been ineligible for any of the benefits she received. Eligibility is not entitlement. Because an applicant is not entitled to, and so has no legally cognizable interest in, any benefits until she has submitted accurate information demonstrating as much, we conclude that all the benefits Vidauri received by submitting false information were obtained by deception. Therefore, the original judgment of conviction for a class 4 felony must be reinstated.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶3 Vidauri was convicted of one count of theft and three counts of forgery in connection with filings she made with the Garfield County Department of Human Services ("Department") between 2009 and 2016 for medical assistance benefits. She submitted, and the Department approved, three applications for Medicaid benefits, one for each of her three children. In the two applications submitted in 2011, she reported that her husband worked for an electrical company and she worked for "Norma," and that their average monthly household income was about $2,600 to $2,900. She later submitted two statements to the Department in 2012 explaining that her husband was no longer employed and that her income was approximately $720 per month.

¶4 Every year thereafter, from 2013 to 2016, the Department sent Vidauri redetermination notices "to see if ... [her] family[ ] [was] still eligible for ... medical benefits." Despite being instructed that she needed to report any changes or missing information, Vidauri never updated her household income even though she reported more than four times that income on her federal income tax returns.

¶5 She also never disclosed to the Department that she and her husband were self-employed, even though she had owned a housecleaning business since 2006 and her husband had owned an electrical business since 2012. The fraud investigator created a spreadsheet of the two businesses’ incomes and expenditures, based on her interviews with Vidauri, records Vidauri provided to her, and Vidauri's tax returns. The spreadsheet, which was admitted into evidence at trial, shows that the housecleaning business generated between $17,000 and $37,000 in profit each year during this time. Although the electrical business lost money in its first year (about $2,000), it generated between $5,600 and $19,600 in profit each year between 2013 and 2015 (there is no data for 2016). The investigator also testified that not all deductions permitted for federal income tax purposes are permitted for benefit eligibility determination purposes.¹ Vidauri also failed to disclose that she and her husband owned multiple income-producing properties, several of which they sold between 2011 and 2016.

¶6 Based on Vidauri's incomplete and inaccurate reporting, the Department continued to re-enroll Vidauri's children in Medicaid from 2013 to 2016. It is undisputed that Vidauri and her children received over $20,000 in benefits between 2009 and 2016.

¶7 Vidauri appealed her convictions. As relevant now, Vidauri contended that the evidence was insufficient to support the felony theft conviction because there was evidence that she might have been eligible to at least receive some lesser amount of benefits had she accurately reported her income. Vidauri , ¶ 14. The division agreed. Id. It reversed her felony theft conviction and remanded the case for the trial court to enter a conviction for class 1 petty theft, the lowest level conviction for theft. Id. at ¶ 42.

¶8 We granted the prosecution's petition for certiorari review.²

II. Analysis

¶9 After identifying the standard of review and the statutory elements of theft, we review the different approaches taken by jurisdictions that have considered how to value public benefits obtained by deception. Adopting the total amount approach, we then apply that approach to the facts of this case and conclude that the original judgment of conviction should stand.

A. Standard of Review

¶10 In a criminal case, the prosecution must prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Kilgore , 2020 CO 6, ¶ 28, 455 P.3d 746, 751. In reviewing whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain that burden, we consider whether the evidence, "as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant is guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Harrison , 2020 CO 57, ¶ 32, 465 P.3d 16, 23 (quoting People v. Bennett , 183 Colo. 125, 515 P.2d 466, 469 (1973) ). We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and "may not serve as a thirteenth juror and consider whether [we] might have reached a different conclusion than the jury." Id. at ¶¶ 31, 33, 465 P.3d at 23.

¶11 Where, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence depends on the interpretation of statutory terms, we also review the court's interpretation of the statute de novo. Id. at ¶ 15, 465 P.3d at 20. In interpreting statutes, our goal is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Id. at ¶ 16, 465 P.3d at 20. To do so, "we look first at ‘the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language.’ " Nowak v. Suthers , 2014 CO 14, ¶ 20, 320 P.3d 340, 344 (quoting People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452, 457 (Colo. 2005) ). "A commonly accepted meaning is preferred over a strained or forced interpretation." Id. (quoting People v. Voth, 2013 CO 61, ¶ 21, 312 P.3d 144, 149 ). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we look no further and apply it as written. Harrison , ¶ 18, 465 P.3d at 20. If, however, the statute is ambiguous or silent on an issue, we may consider other interpretive aids to determine legislative intent. People v. Jones , 2020 CO 45, ¶ 55, 464 P.3d 735, 746.

B. Elements of Theft

¶12 In relevant part, the theft statute states as follows: "A person commits theft when he or she knowingly obtains ... anything of value of another ... by ... deception ... and ... [i]ntends to deprive the other person permanently of the use or benefit of the thing of value." § 18-4-401(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020). Property or a thing of value "is that of ‘another’ if anyone other than the defendant has a possessory or proprietary interest therein." §§ 18-4-101(3), - 401(1.5), C.R.S. (2020).

¶13 To prove the element of deception, the prosecution must prove that the defendant made a misrepresentation, which is "a false representation of a past or present fact," and that "the victim parted with something of value in reliance upon [the defendant's] misrepresentation[ ]." People v. Prendergast , 87 P.3d 175, 185 (Colo. App. 2003) ; see People v. Warner , 801 P.2d 1187, 1189–90 (Colo. 1990) (stating that theft by deception "requires proof that [the defendant's] misrepresentations caused the victim to part with something of value and that the victim relied upon the swindler's misrepresentations" (quoting People v. Terranova, 38 Colo.App. 476, 563 P.2d 363, 368 (1976) )).

¶14 Theft offenses are classified based on the value of the stolen items. § 18-4-401(2). For example, theft is a class 4 felony if the value of the stolen items is between $20,000 and $100,000. § 18-4-401(2)(h). Like the elements above, the prosecution must prove value beyond a reasonable doubt. See Armintrout v. People , 864 P.2d 576, 580 (Colo. 1993) ; see also People v. Tafoya , 2019 CO 13, ¶¶ 27–28, 434 P.3d 1193, 1197.

¶15 Here, the central issue is the value of the benefits Vidauri obtained by deception. Because we have not directly addressed this issue, and the theft statute is arguably silent or ambiguous as to this issue, we join the division in turning to valuation methodologies used by other jurisdictions in this setting. See LaFond v. Sweeney , 2015 CO 3, ¶ 19, 343 P.3d 939, 945 (explaining that where Colorado cases have not previously addressed the issue, "we may look to the decisions of other jurisdictions as persuasive authority").

C. Valuation Methodologies Used by Other Jurisdictions

¶16 The division described two primary valuation approaches—the total amount approach and the overpayment approach—that other jurisdictions have employed to address the same question we answer today. Vidauri , ¶¶ 30–33. As the names suggest, the total amount approach treats the total amount of benefits obtained by deception as the amount stolen, whereas the overpayment approach requires the prosecution to net out the amount for which the defendant would have been eligible.³

¶17 The total amount approach is found in State v. Edmondson , 92 Ohio St.3d 393, 750 N.E.2d 587, 589 (2001). There, the defendant was convicted of two counts of theft by deception for receiving government benefits based on false information in her application. Id. at 588. The Ohio theft statute is similar to Colorado's, providing that "[n]o...