People v. Voth

• Citation: 312 P.3d 144
• Decision Date: 21 October 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SA113
• Parties: In re: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff v. Paul Lesley VOTH, Defendant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

312 P.3d 144

In re: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff

v.Paul Lesley VOTH, Defendant.

Supreme Court Case No. 13SA113

Supreme Court of Colorado.

October 21, 2013

Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21, Chaffee County District Court Case No. 12CR72, Honorable Charles Barton, Judge.

Thom K. LeDoux, District Attorney, Eleventh Judicial District,Molly Chilson, Deputy District Attorney, Salida, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

The Marquez Law Office, P.C., Ernest F. Marquez, Salida, Colorado, Attorney for Defendant.

The Gasper Law Group, PLLC, Stephen A. Brunette, Allen C. Gasper, Caryn J. Adams, Matthew B. Drexler, Colorado Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae.

En Banc

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 In this original C.A.R. 21 proceeding, we review the trial court's oral order allowing the Defendant, Paul Voth, to assert involuntary intoxication as an affirmative defense under section 18–1–804, C.R.S. (2013). We issued a rule to show cause why the trial court's order should not be vacated. We now hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a virus qualifies as a “substance” that can result in intoxication under section 18–1–804. The trial court therefore also abused its discretion in finding that Voth was entitled to assert involuntary intoxication because this finding was based on an erroneous view of the word “substance.” Accordingly, we make the rule absolute and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

¶ 2 Because the trial court based its findings (in part) on our prior dictum suggesting that insanity cannot be temporary under Colorado's statutory framework, we take this opportunity to clarify People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 782 (Colo.2005), and Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 817 (Colo.1993). As we noted in People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 626 n.4, 632 (Colo.1987), Colorado does not have a special statutory provision for “temporary insanity” because the general definition of insanity outlined in section 16–8–101.5, C.R.S. (2013), encompasses both temporary and long-term bouts of insanity. Accordingly, a defendant who was found to be legally insane at the time of the offense, but shortly thereafter regains sanity, may assert insanity as an affirmative defense if he or she meets all of the other relevant requirements.

I. Facts

¶ 3 On June 16, 2012, Voth was arrested after firing several gunshots in a rural subdivision where he lived. David Arnold, one of Voth's neighbors, initially saw Voth shooting at a stack of wood pallets near Voth's garage. Shortly thereafter, Arnold, who was standing on the front deck of his home, called out to Voth from across the street, and Voth fired his handgun toward Arnold. Voth then fired a second shot toward Arnold, prompting Arnold to retreat into his home and call 911. While Arnold and his wife were waiting for police officers to arrive, they heard more gunfire and then saw Voth standing on their front deck. Police officers intervened when Voth began shaking the front door knob in an attempt to gain entry to the Arnolds' home.

¶ 4 Following his arrest, Voth was taken to the emergency room at Heart of the Rockies Regional Medical Center. He was then transferred to Denver Health Medical Center (“Denver Health”), where he remained from June 17 to July 2, 2012. Denver Health reported that Voth was disoriented when he arrived at the hospital due to visual and auditory hallucinations. Voth's delirium began to subside around July 25, 2012.¹ Although Denver Health suspected that viral encephalitis was the source of Voth's psychotic episode, it was unable to reach a definitive diagnosis.

II. Procedural History

¶ 5 The People charged Voth with the following six counts: (1) attempted second degree murder; (2) attempted first degree burglary; (3) second degree assault; (4) felony menacing; (5) illegal discharge of a firearm; and (6) reckless endangerment. On August 29, 2012, Voth entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) pursuant to section 16–8–101.5, and the trial court ordered a mental health evaluation as required by section 16–8–105.5, C.R.S. (2013).

¶ 6 Dr. Richard Pounds conducted the court-ordered mental health evaluation and diagnosed Voth with resolved delirium due to a general medical condition, sustained remission alcohol dependence, and hypertension. In his report, Dr. Pounds concluded that Voth was presently competent but that Voth met the statutory criteria for legal insanity on the date of the incident. Dr. Pounds opined that the most likely cause of Voth's psychotic episode was an unidentified viral infection. Significantly, Dr. Pounds considered and explicitly rejected the possibility that the psychotic episode was the result of intoxication.

¶ 7 After receiving Dr. Pounds's report, the People stipulated to the NGRI finding and requested that Voth be committed to a mental health facility pursuant to People v. Laeke, 2012 CO 13, ¶ 17, 271 P.3d 1111, 1115–16 (holding that a defendant does not have the right to a jury trial where a plea of NGRI is entered and the prosecution concedes that the defendant was insane at the time of the offense), and section 16–8–105.5(4) (requiring that a defendant found NGRI be committed to the department of human services for care and psychiatric treatment until he or she is deemed eligible for release). Thereafter, Voth attempted to withdraw his NGRI plea. The People objected, and the trial court scheduled a hearing to determine if Voth would be allowed to present evidence of his medical condition in the absence of an NGRI plea.

¶ 8 At the hearing, Voth raised the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication for the first time.² Dr. Pounds testified by phone in support of Voth's new defense. Specifically, Dr. Pounds testified that Voth had suffered a disturbance of mental capacities at the time of the incident as required by section 18–1–804 and that this disturbance was caused by an unidentified viral infection.³

¶ 9 Contrary to Dr. Pounds's initial report—where he concluded that Voth was legally insane on the date of the incident and that his condition “did not fit a pattern of intoxication for any substance [he was] familiar with”—Dr. Pounds testified that he now believed that Voth met the legal criteria for involuntary intoxication. Dr. Pounds stated that his new conclusion was based on his review of People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775 (Colo.2005), which suggests that Colorado's statutory framework does not recognize temporary insanity. ⁴ Acknowledging that he did not “think any medical physician would refer to [a viral] encephalitis as an intoxication,” Dr. Pounds made a point to confine his conclusion to the legal context. Transcript of Hearing at 33, People v. Voth, 2012CR72 (Chaffee Dist. Mar. 14, 2013) [hereinafter Transcript] (“[W]e're talking intoxication as a legal term.”).

¶ 10 Following Dr. Pounds's testimony, Voth asked the trial court to find that the evidence was sufficient to submit the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication to the jury. Despite the People's objection, the trial court issued an oral order finding that Voth's offer of proof met the requirements for involuntary intoxication as outlined in Garcia. Importantly, the trial court's finding was premised on its belief that a virus qualifies as a “substance” under section 18–1–804(4).

¶ 11 The People petitioned this Court under C.A.R. 21 for a review of the trial court's order. Specifically, the People contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that a virus constitutes a “substance” under section 18–1–804(4). We issued a rule to show cause why the trial court's order should not be vacated.

III. Original Jurisdiction

¶ 12 Original relief pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary remedy that is limited both in purpose and availability. People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 230, 232 (Colo.2005). This Court will exercise original jurisdiction to review whether the trial court abused its discretion in situations where the petition raises an issue of first impression that is of significant public importance, In re Marriage of Wiggins, 2012 CO 44, ¶ 12, 279 P.3d 1, 5, and where the normal appellate process would prove inadequate, Warden v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 CO 74, ¶ 16, 291 P.3d 30, 34.

¶ 13 In criminal cases, this Court has found the normal appellate process to be inadequate where the prosecutor would be barred from retrial post-acquittal due to double jeopardy. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 254 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo.2011) (electing to exercise original jurisdiction to hear the prosecutor's interlocutory appeal because wrongful suppression of the evidence at issue would force the prosecutor to wait for post-acquittal relief, which would preclude retrial per double jeopardy). This Court has also held that the normal appellate process is inadequate in criminal cases where the jury's decision could render the pretrial issue moot. See, e.g., Wood v. People, 255 P.3d 1136, 1141–42 (Colo.2011) (holding that the defendant had to appeal the trial court's pretrial determination that he failed to establish immunity under the “make-my-day” statute before trial via C.A.R. 21 because the issue became moot when the jury found that immunity did not exist beyond a reasonable doubt).

¶ 14 Exercise of our original jurisdiction is warranted in this case because the trial court's finding that a virus qualifies as a “substance” (1) raises an important issue of first impression for this Court regarding the scope of the involuntary intoxication affirmative defense following our decision in Garcia, and (2) would not be reviewable through the conventional appellate process due to potential double-jeopardy or mootness issues.

IV. Standard of Review

¶ 15 When a trial court has discretion to decide an issue, we review that decision under an abuse of discretion standard. People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033, 1043 (Colo.2002). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the...