People v. Wade

Decision Date04 March 1983
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Richard WADE, Defendant.
CourtNew York County Court

Jon S. Blechman, Binghamton, for defendant.

Patrick H. Mathews, Dist. Atty., Broome County for the People by James J. Franchi, Asst. Dist. Atty., Broome County Dist. Atty's. Office, Binghamton.

DECISION AND ORDER

PATRICK D. MONSERRATE, Judge.

Following the arraignment of the defendant on an indictment charging him with the class D felony crime of Assault in the Second Degree (Penal Law § 120.05(4)), as well as the unclassified misdemeanor crimes of Operating a Motor Vehicle while in an Intoxicated Condition (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192(3)), and Operating a Motor Vehicle while under the Influence of Alcohol (Vehicle & Traffic Law § 1192(2)), counsel for the defendant has moved this Court, pursuant to Article 710 of the Criminal Procedure Law, for an order suppressing the use by the People at the trial of this matter of the results of the chemical analysis for the presence of alcohol of a sample of the defendant's blood withdrawn for that purpose during the early morning hours of July 29, 1982.

The People oppose the motion to suppress.

An evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion was held before the Court on February 28, 1983.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following facts are found by the Court beyond a reasonable doubt and where the findings represent facts supported by differing or conflicting testimony, such discrepancies or contradictions are resolved beyond a reasonable doubt.

During the early morning hours of July 29, 1982, Trooper Anthony P. Elwood of the New York State Police, had occasion to respond to a call at the Twin Rivers Inn, a tavern located in the Village of Whitney Point (Broome County). One of the people whom he recalled seeing at the Inn during that call was the defendant. His observations of the defendant at that time did not lead him to conclude that the defendant was in an intoxicated condition and he did not suggest or direct that the defendant not operate a motor vehicle.

At about 3:00 A.M.--within minutes (more than ten but less than one hour) after this initial encounter with the defendant--Trooper Elwood received a radio transmission directing him to investigate a vehicular accident which had recently occurred in the northbound lanes of Interstate Route 81 at a point one-tenth of a mile north of the intersection of Route 81 with New York State Route 26 in the Town of Triangle (Broome County).

Proceeding to that location, Trooper Elwood found that there were two vehicles which had been in collision. A northbound tractor trailer was involved in a head-on collision with a passenger vehicle operated by the defendant (with one Dennis Enright as his passenger), which vehicle was being operated in a southbound direction in the northbound lanes of the limited access four lane divided highway. Trooper Elwood determined that additional assistance would be required in order to extricate the defendant and his passenger from the wreckage of their vehicle. While the rescue effort was in process, Elwood engaged the defendant in conversation. He found the defendant to be aware of his predicament: he repeatedly inquired after the welfare of his passenger and indicated he was "sorry" the accident had happened. During this conversation Trooper Elwood detected an odor of alcoholic beverage coming from the defendant's mouth. After some thirty-five minutes, the defendant and his passenger were freed from the vehicle and the defendant was taken by ambulance to Wilson Memorial Hospital in the Village of Johnson City.

The defendant arrived at the hospital at approximately 4:45 A.M. He was taken to the emergency room and placed in treatment room number four where he was attended to by nurses and doctors including a staff registered nurse named Judith Romanowski. The treatment took several forms. Two intravenous solutions were initiated into his veins, open wounds to his forehead and leg were cleansed and dressed, a urinary catheter was inserted, oxygen was administered through a nasal tube, and X-rays were taken. No drugs were administered to the defendant (due to the possibility that he had sustained some brain injury).

When first seen by nurse Romanowski, she described the defendant as being disoriented and confused with the pupil of his left eye in a "fixed and dilated" condition (indicating to her the possibility of brain trauma and/or injury to the eye). The nurse testified that after an unspecified period of time (probably in the vicinity of thirty to forty-five minutes), the defendant's condition had stabilized sufficiently in her judgment to permit him to be interviewed by the State Police.

Trooper Elwood had arrived at the hospital at about 5:00 A.M. and had made known his desire to see the defendant for the purpose of attempting to obtain a blood sample for later analysis to determine its alcohol content. After some twenty to thirty minutes, he was escorted to the treatment room where the defendant was confined and engaged him in conversation. He told the defendant that he was under arrest "for driving while intoxicated" to which the defendant responded, in words or substance, that he understood what the officer was saying. The defendant was then advised by Trooper Elwood, using a printed card which he carried for that purpose (a photocopy of which was received as Hearing Exhibit # 1), of his rights with respect to a chemical test for intoxication (pursuant to § 1194 of the Vehicle & Traffic Law). Upon being so advised, the defendant indicated that he would agree to the withdrawal of a blood sample for the purpose of a chemical test.

Before the blood sample was withdrawn, nurse Romanowski and other hospital personnel filled out a hospital consent form (of which Hearing Exhibit "A" is a certified photocopy). Romanowski attempted to explain the form to the defendant and she testified that he appeared to understand its meaning and "signed" the form. The defendant's "signature" is little more than a mark on the signature line (something resembling an "x"), which was explained by the nurse as being caused by the defendant's injuries and encumbrances (his inability to sit up due to his leg injury, the various intravenous needles in his arms, his being connected to a vital signs monitoring machine and the fact that his left eye was bandaged due to the laceration in that area). Within a few minutes thereafter (which the parties stipulated, and the record circumstantially supported, was within two hours from the time when Trooper Elwood indicated he had placed the defendant under arrest), a sample of the defendant's blood was withdrawn by a physician and handed to Trooper Elwood. 1 It is the subsequent chemical analysis of this blood sample which the defendant now moves to suppress from use in evidence against him.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND REASONS
I) THE GENERAL PROBLEM

New York State's declared war against the army of intoxicated drivers who daily--and nightly--threaten the citizen users of its highways has reached the courts. With increasing frequency, New York's tribunals are asked to decide questions of fact and law related to the prosecution of persons charged with criminal offenses under both the Penal Law [Manslaughter 2? ( § 125.15(1)), Criminally negligent homicide ( § 125.10), Assault 2? ( § 120.05(4)), Assault 3? ( § 120.00(2), (3)), Reckless endangerment 1? ( § 120.25); Reckless endangerment 2? ( § 120.20) ] and the Vehicle & Traffic Law [Operating while intoxicated ( § 1192(3)), Operating while under the influence of alcohol ( § 1192(2)), Operating while ability impaired by alcohol ( § 1192(1)) or any drug ( § 1192(4)), Reckless driving ( § 1190) ], arising out of the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs to some degree or extent.

Too often these cases involve instances where persons are killed or injured through the actions of the "drunken driver"--and often enough the poetry of justice finds the culprit to be one of his own victims. Where he, or she, survives (far more often than do their innocent victims) but sustains injury from the automobile accident they precipitated, law enforcement personnel deal with the dilemma of gathering evidence from a criminal suspect, who is at the same time a medical patient. Often central to this effort--as in the case under review--is the attempt to obtain (in time to assure its relevancy) a blood sample from the suspect/patient which may later be chemically analyzed for its alcohol (or other drug) content, and the results of such analysis may ultimately be used as incriminating evidence in a criminal prosecution.

In the recent past, several cases dealing with various aspects of the legal implications of this recurring fact pattern have provided the opportunity for a discussion of the problem by the Court of Appeals and the several Appellate Divisions [People v. Kates, 53 N.Y.2d 591, 444 N.Y.S.2d 446, 428 N.E.2d 852 (1981) aff'g. 77 A.D.2d 417, 433 N.Y.S.2d 938 (4th Dept., 1980); Matter of Abe A., 56 N.Y.2d 288, 452 N.Y.S.2d 6, 437 N.E.2d 265 (1982) rev'g. 81 A.D.2d 362, 440 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1st Dept., 1981); People v. Moselle, Daniel, Wolter, 57 N.Y.2d 97, 454 N.Y.S.2d 292, 439 N.E.2d 1235 (1982) aff'g. 83 A.D.2d 187, 444 N.Y.S.2d 331, 84 A.D.2d 916, 446 N.Y.S.2d 658 (4th Dept., 1981); People v. Curran, 90 A.D.2d 661, 456 N.Y.S.2d 281 (3rd Dept., 1982); People v. Hall, App.Div. 457 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2nd Dept., 1983) ].

From a reading of these cases, one is first impressed with the realization that they deal with an area of the law which is in transition; and that they have their common factual bases in diverse settings beginning with the blood and mental confusion of the highway accident scene, proceeding through the life-and-death atmosphere of a hospital emergency room and culminating in the cold dispassionate daylight of the courtroom.

The consensus of...

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6 cases
  • Com. v. Molino
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Superior Court
    • June 26, 1991
    ...Consent Law blood test results obtained against the wishes of the suspect should be suppressed from evidence); People v. Wade, 118 Misc.2d 330, 337, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870, 875 (1983) (noting that if a suspect refuses to permit the administration of a blood test, any test results would be exclude......
  • People v. Rosario
    • United States
    • New York City Court
    • July 30, 1987
    ...454 N.Y.S.2d 292, 439 N.E.2d 1235 (1982); People v. Hall, 91 A.D.2d 1002, 1003, 457 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dept.1983); People v. Wade, 118 Misc.2d 330, 336, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870 (Cty Ct., Broome Cty.1983). Where the police follow these procedural requirements, chemical evidence obtained from a defend......
  • Willis v. State
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • September 1, 1983
    ...of gathering evidence from a drunk driving suspect who may also be suffering from untreated medical injuries. People v. Wade, 118 Misc.2d 330, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870 (1983). This dilemma, upon closer examination, is more apparent than At the most basic level a police officer cannot be considered ......
  • People v. Dixon
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • July 24, 1989
    ...between the statutory means by which the blood sample is obtained and the nature of the offenses charged (see, People v. Wade, 118 Misc.2d 330, 340, 460 N.Y.S.2d 870; see also, People v. Curran, 90 A.D.2d 661, 456 N.Y.S.2d 281; 2 Callaghan, Criminal Procedure in New York, § 7.12). We have p......
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