People v. Wadle

• Decision Date: 30 January 2003
• Docket Number: No. 01CA1484.,01CA1484.
• Citation: 77 P.3d 764
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deborah L. WADLE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

77 P.3d 764

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deborah L. WADLE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 01CA1484.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

January 30, 2003.

Rehearing Denied April 24, 2003.

Certiorari Granted October 6, 2003.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Catherine P. Adkisson, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Dennis W. Hartley, P.C., Dennis W. Hartley, Colorado Springs, Colorado; Jean E. Dubofsky, P.C., Jean E. Dubofsky, Boulder, Colorado; Burke & Neuwirth P.C., Dean S. Neuwirth, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge ROTHENBERG.

Defendant, Deborah L. Wadle, appeals the judgment of conviction entered on a jury verdict finding her guilty of child abuse resulting in death. Because we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction, we reject defendant's contention that she is entitled to acquittal as a matter of law. However, we reverse the trial court's order denying defendant's motion for new trial based on juror misconduct and remand for a new trial.

I.

Defendant was the stepgrandmother of the victim, a four-month-old infant male. At the request of the victim's mother, defendant agreed to babysit the victim. She picked up the victim and took him to her apartment. About one hour later, she called 911 and reported that the victim had stopped breathing.

When paramedics arrived, the victim was blue from lack of oxygen. After clearing an airway and stabilizing the victim, paramedics transported him to the hospital where a CAT scan showed signs of a subdural hematoma, bleeding under the membrane that lines the skull. A pediatric ophthalmologist observed retinal hemorrhaging in the victim's eyes, and based on these observations, doctors concluded he suffered from shaken baby syndrome.

Three days later, the victim was determined to be brain dead. He was removed from life support and died. An autopsy confirmed the subdural hematoma and retinal hemorrhaging and also showed diffuse axonal injury, the disruption and shearing of nerves in the brain.

Defendant was charged with first degree murder, § 18-3-102(1)(f), C.R.S.2002, and child abuse resulting in death, § 18-6-401(7)(a)(I), C.R.S.2002. At her first trial, she was acquitted of murder, but the jury could not reach a verdict on the child abuse charge. At the second trial, defendant was convicted of child abuse resulting in death.

II.

Defendant first contends there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction and she is therefore entitled to acquittal as a matter of law. We disagree.

When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the reviewing court must determine whether any rational trier of fact could accept the evidence, taken as a whole and in the light most favorable to the People, as sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771 (Colo.1999).

It is the fact finder's function to consider and determine what weight should be given to all parts of the evidence and to resolve conflicts, inconsistencies, and disputes in the evidence. Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colo.1988). We may not disturb the jury's determination on issues of credibility and weight unless the evidence is legally insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brassfield, 652 P.2d 588 (Colo.1982).

The issue here was whether the victim died from having been violently shaken or from nontraumatic causes. Numerous experts testified for each side, and medical testimony interpreting the same physical evidence was offered to support both theories. The verdict in large part depended on the weight given each side's expert testimony.

According to the People's evidence, an autopsy of the victim revealed a subdural hematoma, retinal hemorrhaging, and diffuse axonal injury. There was expert medical testimony that the coincidence of these conditions is consistent with shaken baby syndrome and that the victim's death was not attributable to other causes. There was also testimony that the victim's injuries were sustained while he was in defendant's care.

Defendant called a number of experts who testified that the victim's death was not caused by trauma. A pediatric neurologist testified that the victim had a preexisting brain anomaly that may have caused his brain to seize, and two other specialists testified that the victim's CAT scan was consistent with cerebral venous thrombosis, or clotting of veins in the brain. Another expert testified that the victim's death was caused by the rebleeding of chronic subdural hematomas.

Defendant relies on Solis v. People, 175 Colo. 127, 485 P.2d 903 (1971), and Stevenson v. People, 148 Colo. 538, 367 P.2d 339 (1961), for the proposition that evidence equally consistent with a hypothesis of innocence as with that of guilt is insufficient to support a criminal conviction. She maintains that because the medical evidence presented at trial is as consistent with a natural cause of death as with death from shaking, it was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We are not persuaded.

The standard set forth in these decisions has been modified by later decisions. See People v. Sprouse, supra. Also, Solis and Stevenson are factually distinguishable. In Solis, the supreme court concluded the prosecution's only evidence, fingerprints found in a publicly accessible area, left too much to speculation and was therefore insufficient to support the defendant's burglary conviction. In Stevenson, another burglary case, the supreme court concluded the circumstantial evidence that the defendant was a friend of the person in whose house stolen goods were found was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Here, the cause of death was sharply disputed, and there was considerable evidence presented by both sides. The issue was not a paucity of evidence, but conflicting interpretations of the same evidence by the numerous experts. We therefore conclude the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient for the jury to have found that defendant committed child abuse resulting in death.

III.

Defendant next contends the trial court erred in denying her motion for new trial based on jury misconduct. She contends there is a reasonable possibility that information obtained from the Internet by a juror, in violation of the trial court's order, improperly exposed the jury to extraneous information and tainted the verdict. We agree and remand for a new trial.

A. Standard of Review

Rulings on motions for new trial are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, see People v. McNeely, 68 P.3d 540, 2002 WL 31600819

(Colo.App. No. 00CA1187, Nov. 21, 2002), and recent decisions by divisions of this court have applied this standard to motions for new trial based on jury misconduct. See People v. Sherman, 45 P.3d 774 (Colo. App.2001); People v. Hayes, 923 P.2d 221 (Colo.App.1995); People v. Fox, 862 P.2d 1000 (Colo.App.1993); People v. Moore, 701 P.2d 1249 (Colo.App.1985); People v. Key, 851 P.2d 228 (Colo.App.1992),

rev'd on other grounds,

865 P.2d 822 (Colo.1994).

However, after tracing the history of cases that have considered motions for new trial based on jury misconduct, including Colorado Supreme Court decisions from Butters v. Wann, 147 Colo. 352, 363 P.2d 494 (1961), to the present, defendant maintains that divisions of this court recently have applied an incorrect standard of review. Defendant contends the trial court's conclusion is a matter of law that should be reviewed de novo.

While we acknowledge there has been some confusion and inconsistency on this issue, we conclude that under Butters and Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo.1987), we are required to treat the issue as a mixed question of law and fact, applying the normal deferential standard to the trial court's factual findings, but reviewing de novo the trial court's conclusions of law. See People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 (Colo.2002)

.

Butters was a wrongful death action resulting from an automobile accident. During trial, one of the jurors conducted an independent investigation, later explaining that she was "just curious." Butters v. Wann, supra, 147 Colo. at 356, 363 P.2d at 496. The juror learned, among other things, the amount the decedent drank and the fact that his driver's license had been revoked.

The supreme court ordered a new trial, concluding the juror had engaged in gross misconduct because "in total and deliberate disregard of the court's instructions, [the juror] made an independent investigation into matters not permitted to be inquired into at the trial." Butters v. Wann, supra, 147 Colo. at 356, 363 P.2d at 496. The court stated:

It is not the province of the court to speculate, conjecture or determine what or how much effect upon a verdict the gross misconduct of a juror or jurors may in fact have in a particular case. While a correct determination might be possible in some cases, the inquiry would be impractical and fruitless in many cases and in all cases contain an element of speculation.

The proper function of the court is to hear the facts of the alleged misconduct and to determine as a matter of law the effect reasonably calculated to be produced upon the minds of the jury by such misconduct.

Butters v. Wann, supra, 147 Colo. at 356, 363 P.2d at 496-97 (emphasis added). The court then proceeded to state the test to be applied as follows: "The test is not whether the irregular matter actually influenced the result, but whether it had the capacity of doing so." Butters v. Wann, supra, 147 Colo. at 357, 363 P.2d at 497 (quoting Panko v. Flintkote Co., 7 N.J. 55, 61, 80 A.2d 302, 305 (1951)).

In Wiser v. People, supra,

a criminal case involving juror misconduct, the majority did not cite Butters in concluding that one juror's use of a dictionary did not require reversal. The Wiser court discussed the...